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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with modelling inspection policies of facilities which 
Qraduallv deteriorate in time. The context of inspection policies lends itself readily to 
probabilistic modelling. Indeed, many of the published theoretical models to be found 
in the literature adopt a Markov approach, where states are usually 'operating', 'operating 
but fault present', and 'failed'. However, most of these models fail to discuss the 'fit' of 
the model to data, and virtually no examples of actual applications or case-studies are to 
be found. 
hi a series of recent papers dating from 1984, a robust approach to solve these 
problems has been introduced and developed as the Delay Time Model (DTM). The 
central concept for this model is the delay time, h, of a fault which is the time lapse 
from when a fault could first be noticed until the time when its repair can be delayed no 
longer because of unacceptable consequences. The bottle neck in delay time modelling 
is how to estimate the delay time distribution parameters. Two methods for estimating 
these parameters have been developed. namely the subjective method and the objective 
method. 
Markov models have the advantage of an extensive body of theory. 'fliere are, 
however. difficulties of definition, measurement, and calculation when applying Markov 
models to real-world situations within a maintenance context. Indeed. this problem has 
motivated the current research which ainis to explore the two modelling methodologies 
in cases where comparison is valid, and also to gain an insight as to how robust Markov 
inspection models can be as decision-aids where Markovian properties are not strictly 
satisfied. It Nvill be seen that a class of inspection problems could be solved by a serni- 
Markov model using the delay time concept. In this thesis, a typical senii-i%, Iarkov 
inspection model based upon the delay time concept is presented for a complex 
repairable systein that may fail during the course of its service lifetime and the results 
are compared. Finally, a case study of the senii-Markov inspection model and the delay 
time model is discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concenied with modelling inspection policies of facilities such as t) 
machines, vehicles. or buildings which gradually deteriorate in time. In general. most I 
items eventually Nvear out and fail. The time of failure, however. is not known in 
advance, and so it is both possible and probable that items will fail when in operation. 
These failures can be quite expensive not only due to repairing or replacing the iteni, but 
also because of the disruption and delay involved to the purpose of the operation of the 
system. Thus such items are often sub ect to a maintenance policy. 
71-he primary ftinction of maintenance is to control the condition of facilities. It 
involves actions to be carried out in order to inspect, repair, replace or modify a 
component or group of components of a system. hi the past, maintenance was regarded 
as a necessary evil and unavoidable activity. This perception of maintenance has 
slowly changed over the past four decades and now maintenance has in manv cases 
become not only an important pail of an organisation, but may also be considered as a 
profit making activity. In an orgyanisation, an objective of a maintenance ftinction mav 
be to maximize the availability of an operating facility in a safe condition. or to 
minimize the cost while ensuring a certain level or percentage of facility availability. 
The fulfilment of this objective, however, would require not only adequate engineering 
and technological skills but also management skills to effectively plan, organise. direct 
and control maintenance activities and resources. 
Some of the problems associated with maintenance include determination of 
inspection ftequencies. The basic purpose behind an inspection is to detenuine the 
state of equipment. Once indicators, such as bearing wear, gauge readings, quality of 
prodLICt. which may be used to describe the state, have been specified. and the 
inspection made to determine the values of these indicators, then some ffirther 
maintenance action may be taken, depending on the state. The point when an 
inspection should take place ought to be influenced by the costs and benefits of the 
inspection, which xill in turn be related to the indicators used to describe the state of the 
equipment and the benefits of the inspection, such as the detection and correction of 
minor defects before major breakdown occurs. 
At an insplection. defects are presumed identified and repaired so that equipment is 
restored to a specified condition, often regarded as new. Between inspections, defects I 
may arise and be obvious, in which case appropriate action is taken. Alternatively, a 
defect may lie dormant for a period until it either matures in severity to become obvious, 
or is identified at an inspection. Sometimes, and for equipment such as a computer or 
piece of soffivare, very specific checks are required to determine if equipment is 
workina, whilst at other times equipment can only be checked by destruction. Safety 
and defence equipment are typical examples here. hi such a case, statements as to the 
likely availability of equipment in an operating state is based upon statistical evidence 
derived from trials and samples, and is well documented in the literature on reliability. 
In some of the early work, Barlow and Proschan [1965] devised optimal inspection 
schedules which are subject to two-states, namelv a cyood state and a failed state. 
Though simple in form, the schedules proved less than simple to complite, and a number 
of authors presented approximations to the optimal inspection schedules which were 
easier to calculate (see Munford and Shahapi [ 1972] and Nakagawa and Yassui [ 1979]). 
In recent times. as pointed out in Christer [1984], many of the published theoretical 
models of industrial inspection problems adopt a Markov approach where the states are 
"operating", -operating but fault present", and "faileC. Each state is associated with a 
cost or downtime in the broad sense of the term with transitions between them occurring 
according to probabilistic laws, the occurrence of inspections associated with 
maintenance actions. and repair upon failure. 
ThOLIOI tile models provide ideas for possible niodel-building blocks along with 
some qualitative insight as to how a system might behave if only it would oblige the I -- 
model's assumptions. a major interest is in the solution procedures. Much insight has 
been ailined in the task of investigating and solving various tV :: I In . pes of theoretical models, 
but the task of building ail inspection model for an identified plant appears to be 
relatively unexplored. Also. many papers assume that the working condition of the 
system can be expressed as a discrete-tinie Markov chain with a new state, degraded 
states, and a failed state. and that the state transition probabilities can be deten-nined. It 
is. however. difficult in aeneral to define the degraded states for a deteriorating system. 
Even when it is possible to sensibly define the states of the system, it is often more 
difficult to determine the state transition probabilities. We presume that this is the 
reason that so few papers presenting Markov models make any mention of the 'fit' of 
the model to data, on present examples of actual applications or case-studies. 
In a series of recent apers dating from 1984, what has proved to be a robust p 1ý 
approach to solve these problem has been introduced and developed as the delay time 
concept and model. In 1982, Christer exploits the ideas of a "delay time" for a fault, 
which arose originally as a side issue in modelling building maintenance. Fundamental 
to most engineers' experience is the idea that defects do not just appear as failures, but 
are present for a while before becoming sufficiently obvious to be noticed and declared 
as failures. The time lapse from when a defect could first be reasonably expected to be 
identified at an inspection to the consequential failure repair if no corrective action is 
taken has been termed the delay time h of the fault. The bottle neck in delay time 
modelling is how to estimate the delay time distribution parameters. Two main 
methods for estimating these parameters have been developed, namely the subjective 
method and the objective method. 
Nlarkov models have the advantage of an extensive body of theory. There are, 
however, difficulties of definition, measurement. and calculation when applying Markov 
models to real-world situations within a maintenance context. Indeed, this problem has 
motivated the current research which aims to explore the two modelling methodologies 
in cases where comparison is valid. and also to gain an insight as to how robust Markov Z 
inspection models can be as decision-aids where Nilarkovian properties are not strictly 
satisfied (or perhaps testable). It will be seen that a class of inspection problems could 
be solved by a senii-Markov model using the delay time concept. If we can define tile 
degraded states of a system as the number of existing defects, we can easily define tile 
working condition of the system as a Markov chain. Also, if we know the probability 
density function of delay time h, and the statistics of the defect arrival process, it is 
seen to be possible to determine from the probability density function of the delay time 
the state transition probabilities of the associated Markov inspection model. 
Developing these ideas. a typical semi-Markov inspection model based upon the delaý 
time concept is presented for a complex repairable system that may fail during the 
course of its service lifetime. This model is contrasted with the delay time model for 
the same problem. 
hi this thesis, we are ultimately concemed with the problem of modelling to inform 
the task of deciding the inspection policy of equipment where the costs or the 
do,. vntimes are taken into account. Setting an inspection policy includes the 
determination of the inspection frequencies for complex equipment. In order to study 
and solve the inspection problem for a complex system, first of all, we review the 
mathematical Markov literature in chapter 2. and develop the delay time model from 
the concept in chapter 33. In chapter 4, for a common inspection scenario, both a 
simple semi-Nlarkov type inspection model based on the delay time concept, and a delaý 
time model for a single component system are developed and presented, and the results 
are compared. Again. for a common inspection problem scenario for a complex multi- 
component system, in chapter 5, a semi-Markov inspection model based upon the 
delay time concept is developed and a comparable delay time model is constructed. 
The results are compared and the potential accurac and error in using Markov models y 
for non-Markovian problems discussed. Finally, in chapter 6, a case study of the 
seiiii-Markox, inspection model and the delay time model is discussed. We believe this 
is the first instance of a semi-Markov inspection model being used to model a real 
problem in maintenance. Conclusions are presented in chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATME REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades, numerous papers have appeared in the literature which 
deal with the problem of finding optimal inspection policies for systems which are 
subject to failures. This phenomenon is indicated in various surveys of maintenance 
models by Pierskalla and Voelker [1976]. Sherif and Smith [19SI], Christer [1984], 
Thomas [1986]. Valdez-flores and Feldman [1989], Clio and Parlar [1991], Thomas, 
Gaver and Jacobs [1991], and White [1993)]. The models address various aspects of 
inspection problems in such systems as an industrial production plant, a vehicle fleet, a 
housing estate, or a motor way system. The complexity of the models varies from a 
very simple deterministic model of a single-unit system to a very complex model of a 
stochastically failing multi-unit system. In general. the basic type of decision problem 
involved in an inspection system concentrates on determining the inspection schedules 
which niinimises the cost per unit time or tile downtime per unit time. 
The general inspection model of a facility or a component may be classified into the 
model with two-states and the model with multi-states. Many items or systems can be 
described as being in one of two states, one of which is preferable to the other. This 
preferred state can be described as working. whilst the other might represent some form 
of failure. Some examples of this type are shelf life of goods, health of a human being Zý 0) 
life testing of components, and standby systems. It is convenient to label the working 
state as state 0. and to define the unsatisfactory or failed state as state 1. It is assumed 
that a transition from state I to state 0. i. e. failed to working, cannot occur while the 
system is in service. 
The inspection model with a multi-state capability normally considers an equipment 
that siradually deteriorates in time and whose degree of deterioration can be observed by 
inspections only. except for a failed state that is observed inunediately upon its 
occurrence. Practical examples include production machines subject to stochastic 
breakdowns, inventory systems being depleted, and maintenance of com-munication 
systems with redundancy. An inspection is assumed to reveal the exact working 
condition of the system. Depending on the system's degree of deterioration, an Z 
inspection may be succeeded by a replacement or restoration. The system can be 
observed in one of the working conditions 0,1, ..., n, f which describe increasing 
degrees of deterioration. The state 0 represents a new system, the states 1,2. 
represent the degraded states, and the state f represents a failed state or a severe 
malffinction. It is possible to transfer from any state to a failed state f 
In this chapter, a review of the relevant literature on insPection models will be 
presented. 
2.2 Two-State Inspection Model 
2.2.1. Basic Inspection Model based upon Barlow and Proschan's Assumptions 
A basic inspection model for a complex system was given by Barlow and I 
Proschan [1965]. They considered the simplest possible case of an inspection policy, 
which was characterised by the following assumptions. 
(I) Deterioration of a system is stochastic. 
(2) The working conditions of the systern are classified into states 0 and 1. State 0 
denotes a good state and state I denotes a failed state. 
(3) The condition of the system is known by inspection. 
(4) Ail inspection takes negligible tinle. 
6 
(5) Ail inspection does not deurade the system and the system cannot fail 'while being 
inspected. 
(6) Inspections are perfect in that any failure within the system will be identified. 
(7) Each inspection entails a fixed cost C,. 
(8) The time elapsed between system failure and its discovery at the next inspection 
costs C. per unit of time. 
(9) Repair takes place upon discovery of failure and the system is as good as new after 
repair. 
(10) The failure distribution function F(t) of the system is known. 
Assumptions (1) and (2) state that the systern gradually deteriorate in time. Also, 
assumptions (3)), (4), (5), (6), and (7) are related to the general ideal inspection 
policy. Assumption (8) implies a system failure remain unknown until an inspection. 
This rules out most applications in industry. By assumption (6) and (9), an inspection 
will renew the system. 
Under the above assumptions, they derived the expected cost up to detection of 
failure as 
x 
C [CI (k + 1) + C, t)]dF(t), 
k=O , 
(2.1) 
where xO =0<x, < x, <... are the successive inspection times. Assuming a density 
function At) of the failure time distribution F(t), a necessary condition that a sequence 
x 
Ix, 1, be a minimum cost inspection procedure is that 0 for all k-. Hence using Ak 
equation (2.1). the following equation is obtained for k=1,2,3, .... 
XK-1 -Xý = 
F(Xk)-F(Xk-I ) Cl 
f(Xk) C, 
(2.2) 
When 
. 
1'(x, )=0. x,. ,-x,. = 3o so that no more checks are scheduled. The sequence 
is determined recursively once x, is chosen. Unfortunately, it is difficult tO COMPLIte 
optimal inspection procedures numerically. because the computations are repeated until 
the procedures are determined to the required de-gree by changin. g the first check time. 
To avoid this. Munford and Sliahani [1972] suggested a near optimal inspection 
policy which depended on a single parameter p. They introduce the probability of a 
transition from state 0 to state I during the interval (xi_l ý x, ) given that the systern 
was in state 0 at time x, -, . which 
is given by I 
F(xi) - F(x, -, 
) 
=p for i=1,2. -3 (2.3) 1- F(xi-1) 
where 0<p<1, xO =0 and F(O) 0. The above equation (2.3) may be rewritten as 
F(xi) =p+ (I - p)F(xi-1) (2.4) 
and 
F(xi) =I- (I - 
=1 (2.5) 
where q=I-p. Thus for a given p, xi can be found from Zý 
(2.6) 
To choose an optimal p. let a random variable I denote the number of inspections 
necessary for the detection of state 1. We have 
Pr(I = i) = q'-'p. for i=1,2,3. ..., (2.7) 
so that 
8 
iqý-Ip (2.8) 
If the transition occurs at time t and it is detected by an inspection at time xi. then 
(xi - t) is the time for which the system was left in service in state 1. The mean time 
for which the systern will be left in service in state I is 
(x, - t)f (t)dt 
ze. 
=1q: -'p - E(T). (2.9) 
where 
E(T) (t)dt (2.10) 
So the total expected cost until a failure is detected is given by ZP 
x 
E(C) = C, lp + C, F-'(1 - (I - p))(1 - p)'-'p - E(T)). (2.11) 
The optimal p can be chosen such that E(C) is minimized. This policy was used for 
Weibull failure distribution case in Munford and Shahani [ 197-3 )]. 
Also, Nakagawa and Yassui [1979] considered an inspection policy with periodic 
checking times. If it is assumed that the mean duration of undetected failure is I 
approximately half the time between consecutive checking times, the optimum checking 
time p% which minimizes the total expected cost until a failed unit is discovered by 
some clieckin! z. is 
; =-J77:. (2.12) 
9 
where in is the mean of failure times of the unit and r= C, IC, . 
Further, Nakagawa and Yassui [1980] cave an approximate calculation of optimal 
checking procedures which computed successive check times backward. They 
specified the following computing procedure for obtaining the asymptotically optimal 
inspection schedule : 
(1) Choose an appropriate s from among 0<e<C, IC, . 
(2) Determine a check time x,, after sufficient time has elapsed to give the required 
de- ee of accuracv. 
(3) Compute x,, 3 -, 
to satisfy 
F(. v, ) F(x,, -, 
) C, 
(2.13) 
f(x. ) C, 
(4) Compute 'Vn-I ýý' 'Vn-2 >, - recursively from the equation (2.2). 
(5) Continue until Xk <0 or Xk+I - Xk > Xk * 
Luss [198-33] suggested an inspection policy model for production facilities using a 
dynamic programming algorithm. In addition to maximizing the expected profit per 
cycle, lie examined the problem of maximiýing the expected profit per unit time and the 
ex ected profit per "good" unit time. He described a dynamic proo-Tamming algorith-m p 
that found the inspection policy that maximized the expected profit per cycle. This 
algorithm is then imbedded within a Newton-Raphson type search that finds the optimal 
policies for the other objective ftinctions. 
Also, Assaf and Shanthikumar [1987] discussed an optimal group maintenance 
policy for a set of N machines subject to stochastic failures under continuous and 
periodic inspections which minimized the expected cost per unit time over an infinite 
horizon. 
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Dias [ 1990] analysed a new approximation for the inspection period when the failure 
rate is : (a) decreasing ; (b) increasing : (c) first increasing and then decreasing : and, Zý - 
finally, (d) when the failure rate has a 'bathtub' shape. From Nakagawa and Yassui's 
[1979] approximation p*, 
p, = V2rE(T), (2.14) 
where i- = C, ICý,, and E(7) is the expected value of system of lifetime T, he derived 
the new approximation p", 
p 
1+0.234V7 
(2.14) 
where t-'= rIE(T). He confirmed that p" was better than p* for the decreasing, the I 
bathtub-shaped, and, finally, the increasing and then decreasing failure rates. Only for 
the case when the failure rate is increasing, he has obtained worse results. However, 
this is a case in which non-periodic inspections are preferable. 
2.2.2. Modified Inspection Model 
So far, we have cited only the literature xN-hich adopts the assumptions of Barlow 
and Proschan's model. However, they require restrictive assumptions because they 
assume an ideal state. To avoid this, the model with changed lifetime distribution is, 
firstly. presented byAnbar [1976], and Beichelt [1981]. Anbar considered an adaptive 
sequential inspection policy assurning that the lifetime distribution is known to be 
exponential, but with unknown parameter. He sugaested the procedure for estimating 
the expected lifetime. This procedure yields a sequence of estimates which is strongly 
consistent, i. e., converges with probability 1, to the value of the unknown parameter. 
This in turn implies that the sequence of intervals between inspections converges to the 
optimal interval between inspections. Beichelt derived minimax inspection strategies 
for single unit systems on condition that no or only partial information on the lifetime 
distribution of the system is available. 
Luss and Kander [ 1974] discussed inspection policies when the duration of checking 
and repair is non-negligible. Also. the%, assumed that the system continued operation 
during its inspection and could fail , N-hile being checked. The loss ftinctions are I- 
obtained and are solved by both differentiation. which leads to efficient al-orithms for 
EFR(Increasing Failure Rate) distributions, and by dynamic programming, which can be 
used for any failure rate. 
Also, Jardine and Hassounah [1990] demonstrated how the relation between the 
mean arrival rate of breakdowns conditional upon the inspection ftequency of 
equipment could be estimated in practice assuming that inspection times and repair 
times were nesiative exponentially distributed. This work was carried out for a large, 
urban transit authority operating a fleet of approximately 2000 buses undertaking about 
80 million kilometres per year. A model relating total downtime of buses incurred due 
to inspections and repairs per unit time to inspection was developed, and the optimal 
inspection frequency which maximized bus availability was determined. 
Futther, Nakagawa [1984] considered a modified inspection policy with periodic 
check intervals. where the unit after check has the same age as before with probability p 
and is as good as new with probability q. . flie mean time to failure and the expected 
number of checks before failure are derived, forming renewal-type equations. 'flie total 0 
expected cost and the expected cost per unit of time until detection of failure are 
obtained. Optimum inspection policies which minimize the expected costs are given. 
Kaio and Osaki [1986] discussed a typical inspection model taking account of the 
following two imperfect inspection probabilities : 
(a) the system might be regarded as having failed, even if it is normally operating, due to 
imperfect inspection, 
(b) an inspection may not detect a system failure due to imperfect inspection. 
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For this model, they obtained the structure of the optimal policy, and discussed the 
optimal policy which minimized the total expected cost up to the detection of system 
failLire. 
Finally, Munford [1990] considered optimal inspection policies in which penaltý 
costs due to the elapsed time between the failure and its detection were proportional to 
the duration of the inspection interval containing the failure. An algoritlim for 
computing the optimal inspection policy is given for a wide class of failure distributions. 
Two-state inspection models have been established by Barlow and Proschan. [1965] 
by assuming the penalty costs due to the elapsed time between the failure and its 
detection. This assumption rules out most industrial applications. Also, the two-state 
inspection models do not relate to the practical industrial situation in which inspection 
leads to repair before failure because the models define the working condition of the 
system as two states, namely a good state and a failed state. So. other authors have 
established multi-state inspection models to be mentioned in the following section. I 
2.3 Multi-State Inspection Model 
2.3.1. Basic Inspection Model 
We have considered the papers which deal with the model to be classified into 
two states 0 and 1. Now we investigate the literature in which the condition of the 
system can be classified into multi-state 0,1. ..., n, n+l, being characterised typically 
by the followiii2 assumptions. 
(1) The system gradUally deteriorates in time. 
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(2) The working condition of the system at any time t can be completely characterised 
by classifVing it as in one of the states 0,1.2. ..., n, n+1 where 0 is the good state, 
1.2, ..., n are 
degraded states and n+ I is the failed state. 
(3) The degree of deterioration can be observed by inspections only, except for a failed I 
state that is obsen, ed immediately at its occurrence. 
(4) An inspection takes negligible time. 
(5) An inspection does not degrade the system and the system cannot fail while being 
inspected. 
(6) An inspection reveals the exact working condition of the system. 
(7) Each inspection requires a fixed cost of C,. 
(8) After each repair the system is considered to have working condition 0. 
(9) If the system has working condition i at present, then one time unit later it will have 
working condition j with known probability rij, where rij depends only upon the 
current state i and the next state j. 
Assumptions (1) and (2) relate to the working condition of the system which 
gradually deteriorate in time. Assumption (3) is related to the detection of the working 
condition of the system. This assumption is, particularly, different from the 
assumptions of Barlow and Proschan's in recognizing a failure. This implies that this 
model does not need the introduction of a penalty cost due to the elapsed time between 
the failure and its detection. Similarly with the assumptions of Barlow and Proschan, 
assumptions (4) to (7) are related to the general ideal inspection policy. Assumption 
(8) implies that a repair will renew the system. By assumption (9), it is easy to 
establish a decision criterion model, but it is difficult to apply to a practical industrial 
situation. 
Under the above assumptions, Mine and Kawai [1975] discussed an inspection and 
replacement policy which minimized the expected total long-run average cost using a I 
semi-Markov decision process. 'fliey, firstly, considered the following Markov 
degradation properties. 
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(a) The transition rates from one state to another are independent of time. i. e., are 
constant. 
(b) From state i. a random transition is only possible to state i+1 or n-i-l. 
(c) The transition rate from i to n+1 increases as i increases. 
Under the above Markov degradation properties, they derived the transition probability 
Pij (r) which is the probability that the system was in state j at time t given the system 
was in state i at time 0. This transition probability Pj(t) is based on the transition 
(failure) rate from state i to the failed state j= n+l, a, , and the transition 
(degradation) rate from state i to state j= i+l, A, with known a, and Pi 
respectively. Also. defining Ei as the event that the system was in state i and an 
inspection had just been performed, they showed that EO , E, E, ' constituted a 
serni-Markov process and that the process had a single imbedded Nlarkov chain which 
was ergodic for every stationary policy. Then, by using the theory of semi-Markov 
decision processes, they found the optimal policy iteration cycle without predetermining 
the inspection time interval. 
Further, Kander [1978] presented inspection policies for deteriorating equipment 
characterised by N quality levels. He assumed that the mechanism of deterioration 
consisted of successive Poisson transitions of the system from the prevailing state to the 
consecutive state and that the Poisson transition parameters were known. Considering 
three feasible inspection models which are pure checking, truncated checking and 
checking followed by monitorin , he developed optimal policies leading to minimal 9 1"D 
loss. while the system's distribution was represented by an (N+I)-state semi-Markov 
process. 
Also., Ohnishi. Kawai and Mine [1986a] treated a continuous time Markovian 
deterioration systern when the operating costs and the replacement costs are dependent 
on its state, and derived an optimal inspection and replacement policy minimizing the 
expected total long-run average cost. The previous literature had generally assumed 
that the system had a constant operating cost and a constant preventive replacement cost 
which was independent of the state of the system. However, the authors introduced the 
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idea that the operating costs and replacement costs increased as the deterioration of the 
systern increased. This increased the eneral applicability of this modelling, and under 90 
these assumptions. they derived an optimal inspection and replacement policy and 
showed that an optimal policy had monotonic properties tinder some reasonable 
conditions. Under the optimal policy, a control limit rule holds for the replacement 
decision. and the optimal time interval between successive inspections becomes shorter 
and shorter as the system. undergoes deterioration. 
2.3.2. A Variation on the Inspection Procedure 
So far Nve assumed that an inspection does not adversely affect the system. We 
may. however. have some system which is impaired by the inspection. The system 
operates throughout a number of periods and is subject to failure in each period. Prior 
to failure the system enters a state in which it is ftinctioning, but in a possibly impaired 
manner. This state can be detected onl by performing an inspection, by assumption y 
(3). Once the system is known to be in the impaired state, appropriate action may be 
taken to prolong its remaining life. However, the act of inspecting the system when it is 
not impaired may itself cause it to become impaired. In this respect inspection may be 
hazardous. A prime example is the inspection of nuclear reactors. Since one of the 
lar2est causes of malfunction in reactors is human error, a ftindamental question is 
whether or not inspections by humans create more problems than they solve. 
In this respect. Bulter [1979] considered a hazardous inspection model which 
maximized the lifetime of the system when inspections had the potential of being, 
harniftil to the system under consideration. He classified a system into one of four 
states '%x-hich are fully functional, undetected partial failure, detected partial failure and 
failed. and then formulated the inspection model as a Markov decision process. Also, 
Chou and Butler [1983] developed an efficient computational procedures for the 
hazardous inspection model. 
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2.3.3. Inspection Model with a Catastrophic Failure Situation 
Some inspection models are considered to have a renewal point after repair. In these 
models. the objective is usually to seek the optimal inspection schedule for a system 
which minunizes the total cost per renewal cycle. In some cases, however, the cost of 
failure is regarded as so great that it cannot be meaningfidly compared to the costs of I- 
inspections and corrective actions. For example, a person develops cancer, or the 
failure of a crucial component of an aeroplane in flight or within a nuclear power plant. 
In this respect, Milioni and Pliska [1988] sought the optimal inspection schedule for 
a system whose deterioration process is a semi-Markov process that progresses toward 
failure when the failure is catastrophic. They actually analysed two versions of this 
catastrophic situation. In the first version of the catastrophic failure situation, they 
addressed the problem of minimizing the expected maintenance costs subject to the 
constraint that the probability of failure be no greater than a specified value. This 
problem is solved using d%mamic programmin- and La-range multipliers. In the second --) In 
version of the catastrophic failure situation, the problem is to minimize the probability 
of failure subject to the constraint that the number of inspections cannot exceed a 
specified number. This version of the problem is formulated and solved using dynamic 
programming. 
2.3.4. Inspection Model with Non-Negligible Inspection Time 
An inspection model with non-negligible inspection time was given by Tijms and 0ý -- 
Van Der Duyn Schouten [1985]. Theýv considered an equipment which became 
increasingly expensive to operate with an increasing degree of deterioration, and the 
follo-ýN-ing details of the problem were considered. Opportunities for inspections occur 
only at discrete points in time t=0,1, ... and an inspection takes a fixed, integral 
number of T time units and costs J units. Once an inspection has revealed the exact 
workin2 condition. there is an option of either doing a revision or leaving the system as 
it is. A subsequent revision in working condition i takes a fixed integral number of 
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time units and involves a cost of R, ý! 0,0 < i:: ý n+1, and the system incurs an 
operating cost of a, for each time unit it spends operating in working condition i, 
0:! ý i:! ý n. The system must always be revised when working condition n+1 is found. 
In the absence of inspections or revisions. the working condition of the system changes 
according to a discrete-time Markov chain with known probability rj. It is assumed 
"-I 
that i- =I ij for all 0:! ý i: ýý n+1, that is. the working condition of the system cannot 
J=j 
improve on its own. A control-limit rule is characterised by integers and 
prescribes the following actions. Revision is done when the working condition ký:, -. O, 
and inspection is done when ; ri time units have passed since the system was last known 
to have working condition i. Also, state space is taken as 
I= {ili = 0, n, n 1) u( (i, nz)li = 0,..., n, in = 
where a state ( i. in ) corresponds to the situation of in time units having passed since 
the last knowledge of the system's working condition i. The possible actions are 
denoted by 
0, leave the system as it is, 
a= I, inspect the system, 
revise the system. 
As to the transitions resulting from takinL, action a in state (i, M), the following 
definitions are -iven. 
C(,, 
m)(a) 
The expected transition costs, which are made up of inspection, revision and 
operating costs. 
'r(j,. ) (a) The expected transition time if action a=I or a=2 is taken, which are 
made Lip of inspection and revision times. 
I: The expected transition time if action a=0 is taken. 
P -t) The probability of a one-step transition from state s to state s' with s. s'r=I. (L 
is 
q, ", "" : The in-step transition probabilities of the Markov chain for in = 1,2, ..., where 
ql( -) is the probability that in time units from now the system will have working 
condition j when the present working condition is i and no inspections and 
revisions are made. 
For the semi-Markov decision model, denoting the relative operating costs v, (R), seS 
associated with rule R and the long-run average costs by g(R), the following set of 1: 1 
linear equations are fonnulated. 
v, (R) = ai - g(R) + (I - (R) -ý qi,,,, Iv,,., (R), for 0: 5 i< zo, (2.16) 
v, (R) = Ri - g(R) Ti + v, (R), for -,, :! ý i:: ý n+1, (2.17) 
n (M) 
1: qjj aj - g(R) + )(R)+(I- (R), 
j=i I -q 
(M) I-q(m) v("m+l I-q (m) i,? l +I . ý. n+l i, n+l 
for 0:: ý nz < ; ri, 0:: ý i<n, (2.18) 
n 
(R) =J- g(R) T+2: -tý (R), for ; ri :! ý in :! ý Alli, I :ýi<n, (2.19) 
j=i 
auQmented by putting one of the relative operating costs equal to 0, say I -- 
(R) = 0. 
From the above equations, the authors derived the relative operating costs by single-pass 
calculations and presented a special-purpose algorithm to compute the best rule within 
the class of control-limit rules. This algorithm generates a sequence of improving I 
control-limit rules and it can be shown by familiar arguments from Markov decision 
theory that the algorithm converges after finitely many iterations. 
However. Wijnmalen and Hontelez [1992] demonstrated that this algorithm, which 
operated on a class of control-limit rules. did not always lead to ail optimal policy even 
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within the class of control-limit rules considered. They pointed out Tijms and Van Der 
Duvn Schouten's algorithm was too restrictive in the sense that it adhered too much to 
the control-limit structure while applying the usual improvement procedure, and thus 
could exclude better control-limit policies. So, if it had not have been restricted to 
control-Iiinit Policies, the usual policy iteration procedure could have been applied 
without difficulty. In this respect they derived their improved algorithm which could 
compute the optimal control-limit rule, provided that long-run average costs were 
minimized. 
2.3.5. Imperfect Inspection Model 
The models treated so far assumed one of the following two extreme assumptions 
which denote a perfect inspection model. 
(a) At any given time, the state of the system may be identified completely by 
inspection. 
(b) The state of the system can be observed only through costly inspections. 
On the other hand, in practical situations, many systems satisfy neither of the above two 
restrictive assumptions, but some intermediate characterisation of system information. 
That is, the decision maker obtains some information about the state of the system at 
each inspection time, but he needs further and costly in depth inspection to identify the 
exact state of the system with certainty. Under this concept, the imperfect inspection 
model was presented by Ohnishi, Kawai and Mine [1986b], Devooght, Dubus and 
Smidts [ 1990] and (5zekici and Pliska [ 1991 ]. 
Oluiishi, Kawai and Mine investigated an optimal inspection and replacement 
problem for a discrete-time Markovian deterioration system. It was assumed that the 
system was monitored incompletely by a certain mechanism which gave the decision 
maker some information about the exact state of the system. It was noted that this 
information involved uncertainty and was stochastically related to the exact state of the 
system. The decision maker must pay an additional inspection cost to identify the exact 
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state of the systern with certainty. They assumed that the state of the system underwent 
deterioration according to a stationary discrete-time Markov chain having a known 
transition probability Pj which denoted the one-step transition probability from state i 
to state j. They then formulated this model as a partially observable Markov decision 
process and showed an optimal inspection and replacement policy had monotonic 
structural properties. However, in this model, it was assumed that the transition 
probability of the deteriorating process of the system and the probabilistic relation 
between the systern and the monitoring mechanism were completely known. This 
assumption does not always hold in real-world situations. 
Devooght. Dubus and Smidts [1990] developed suboptimal inspection policies for I 
imperfectly observed realistic systems. They considered that the states of the system 
evolve according to a continuous semi-Markovian model because repair and 
maintenance o erations cannot be realistically described by exponential holding times, p 
and the large number of states is a compelling reason to use supercomponents, which 
have subsystems, whose failure rate is a combination of exponentially failing 
components and. therefore, not Markovian. Also, they assumed that 
(a) a large penalty was attributed to the unreliability of the whole system, I 
(b) states could not be ordered and arbitrary transitions were allowed. 
(c) knowledge of the system state is imperfect either because of human error or because 
sensors give only information on the overall behaviour of subsystems and not of its 
detailed components, 
(d) maintenance and inspection by operators are subject to human error and described by 
matrices which relate intended actions with actual actions, and 
- (e) no stationaiý- policy is sought. 
In their model. the emphasis is put on a production process with safety-related 
subsystems, such as in nuclear reactors, whose non-availability provokes the stopping of 
energy production, and therefore has a high cost associated Xvith non-availability. 
Therefore the safety system is periodically inspected and eventually repaired either at 
fixed periods or when a critical state is entered. Under this concept. they obtained sub- 
optimal inspection policies using a dynamic proarammina alzorithiii based on the use of 
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importance parameters for the components. A Markovian evolution code is combined 
with an optimization code using a value iteration algorithm. Z7 
Also, 6zekici and Pliska developed optimal inspection schedules using a delayed 
I'vlarkov model with false positives and negatives under imperfect inspection. They 
considered a system subject to catastrophic failure which deteriorated according to a 
delayed Markov process and was sub ected to a series of binary tests that might yield j 
false negative and false positive outcomes.. A corrective action was carried out when a 
true positive was observed, thereby reducing the chance of system failure. Costs of 
inspections, false positives, the corrective action and failure are incurred and dynamic 
programming is used to compute the optimal inspection schedule. The importance of 
this model is the fact that it is both computationally tractable and useful for several 
kinds of applications, especially medical screening. 
Another imperfect inspection model was presented by Christer and Waller 
[1984a, b, c]. They suggested the optimal inspection policy minimizing the expected 
cost per unit time of the maintaining the plant and the expected downtime per unit time 
using the delay time concept. Unlike previous models, in this case the model was 
developed for and applied to an actual case situation within industry. This model is of a 
very different format to the previous ones and will be presented in detail in the next 
chapter along with numerous variation and developments. 
2.4 Summary of the Literature Review 
We have reviewed numerous models in the literature which deal with the problem of 
finding optimal inspection policies for systems which are subject to failures. Basic 
assumptions for the two-state model were given by Barlow and Proschan [ 1965]. Under 
the basic assumptions, some authors developed methods which could compute Barlow 
and Proschan's model easily and the other authors improved the model and changed the 
basic assumptions. Most of these models present the working condition of the system 
as being in one of two states, operating and failed, the purpose of inspection is to detect 
failure, and the model is based on the time to failure distribution. Importantly, the 
models do not relate to the practical situation in which inspection leads to repair before 
failure. In this respect. the introduction of Markov inspection models is viewed as a 
move towards reality. 
The Markov inspection models are developed by numerous authors. However, most 
of them assume that the working condition of the system can be expressed as a discrete- 
time Markov chain with state, 0,1,2, ..., n, n+l, where the state 0 represents a good 1= 
state, 1,2, .... ii are degraded states and the state n+1 is the failed state, and their 
transition probability is given. In practice, it is , however, difficult to define the 
dearaded states for the deteriorated system and more difficult to qualify the transition 1) 
probabilities. Assuming the unknown transition probabilities, Devooght, Dubus and 
Smidts [1990] tried to develop the inspection policies for imperfectly observed realistic 
systems, but only managed to obtain sub-optimal inspection policies. 
In the sense of developing a useable model with estimable parameters, the delay time I 
concept and model, which is described in the next chapter, represents further 
improvement in the modelling of inspection policies. I 
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Chapter 3 
THE THEORY OF DELAY TEME ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introdnction 
Consider a piece of equipment subject to periodic inspection. At an inspection, 
faults are presumed identified and repaired so that equipment is restored to a specified 
condition, often regarded as new. While the equipment is being operated, faults or 
failures may arise and high costs will be i11CUrred eventually due to failures. Here, a 
systern with a failure or breakdown means a system which cannot be operated, and 
repair is essential, whilst a system with faults or defects means a system which needs 
repair but can still be operated. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider ways to identify 
faults at an earlier time or stage, such as inspection, though these too will incur a cost. 
The objective here is to devise an inspection schedule so as to strike an appropriate cost 
balance between the cost of inspecting and the cost of additional or more serious failures 
which arise through not inspecting. 
To this end, there have been recentlY a considerable number of papers published on 
inspection modelling Litilising and developing the application of a concept which has 
been of research interest for the past 14 years and known as delay time modelling. A 
technique called delay time analysis has been initially developed for modelling 
inspection policies for industrial inspection maintenance when 'the equipment is 
regularly inspected. The idea of the delay time first appeared with the context of 
buildina maintenance addressed by Christer [1982] (there called lapse time) but has 
since been named delay time and extended to indLIStrial equipment. 
This chapter presents a review of the delay time concept, and delay time analysis. 
Several models are reviewed to indicate how delay time analysis has so far been 
employed to model various inspection maintenance problems. 
3.2 Basic Delav Time Models 
In the delay time model presented by Christer and Waller [I 984a], a central concept 
is the delay time h of a fault, which is the time lapse from when a fault could first be 
noticed until the time that its repair can be delayed no longer because of unacceptable 
consequences (see Figure 3.1). 
Time 
0 It zi+h 
Item is new Fault first identifiable Fault leads to breakdown 
Figure 3.1. Delay time concept. 
The important point about the delay time concept is that the failure process is divided 
into two-stages. This enables the theoretical foundation for inspection policies to be 
established. The difficulty in delay time modelling is, however, how to estimate the 
distributions of the delay time h and the initial point it, the instant at which a fault 
may be assumed to first arise since new or reconditioned. Two main. methods for 
estimating these distributions have been developed, namely subjective method and the 
objective method. We will describe these methods in section 3.4. 
If the distributions of delay time and the initial point are known, the failure behaviour 
of equipment can in theory be detennined under any specified maintenance policy. 
'S 
Consider first the simplest possible case of an inspection policy, which may be 
characterised by the following assumptions. 
(a) An inspection takes place every T time units, costs C, units and requires d, time 
units. where cý << T. 
(b) Inspections are perfect in that any fault present within the system will be identified 
and no new fault will arise because of the inspection. 
(c) Faults identified at an inspection will be repaired within the inspection period at an 
average cost of Cý, 
(d) The initial point of a fault at time it after an inspection is independent of the delay 
time h. 
(e) Faults arise at a constant rate of X per unit time. 
(f) Failures are repaired as soon as they arise, incurring on average db units of 
downtime, and cost Cb , where 
C, > Cd and db << T. Here, even though a 
component of the system fails. if the system can still be operated. we do not regard 
that the system is in condition of a 'failure' or 'breakdown'. 
(g) A component of the system is as good as new after repair. 
(h) The probability density function of the delay time, Ah), is knoxvil. 
The assumption di << T in (a) and the assumption (c) may at first seem to be 
contradictory if several defects are identified. However, assumption (c) would seem 
to be reasonable if sufficient maintenance staff were available to perform repairs 
simultaneously. The assumption (e) provides an estimate of the expected number of 
faults arising in the period T, namely K(T). This ignores the downtime due to 
breakdowns, during -Nrhich no faults would arise since the machinery is idle. If this 
downtime is small compared with T, as indicated in the assumption db << T, 
then the error will also be small. Later we consider the modelling changes necessary to 
relax this condition. 
Under these aSSLIIIIptiOIIS, firstly, we determine the form of the function b(T) which 
is the probability that a fault ultimately arises as a breakdown. Suppose that a fault 
arising within the period (0,7) has a delay time in the intei-val (h, h- A) . 
The 
probability that the delay time lies in this interval is J(h)dh. This fault will be repaired 
as a breakdown repair if the filUlt arises in period (0. Th) (see Figure 3.2), otherwise as 
an inspection repair. 
hispection Inspection 
h 
III 0 T-h T 
Item is new 
Figure 3.2. Repair process of a fault. 
The probability of a fault arising before T-h, given that a fault will arise in (0,7-), is, 
from assumption (e), (T-h)IT. We have, therefore, that for small A, the probability 
that a fault with delay time in the interval (h, h+dh) arises as a breakdown is 
T-h 
f(h)dlz 
T 
The delay time h lies in the period (0, T) because the fault referred to this delay time 
h will be identified at the inspection time T by the assumption (b) or will arise as a 
breakdown in case of li: ýT. Allowing h to vary from 0 to T and integrating the 
above term over h, we have the probability of a fault arising as a breakdown, b(7), is 
given by 
T-h 
b(T) -f (h)dlz T0- 
1) 
Since a components with no fault may be regarded as 'new' by the assumption (e) and 
all components with fault are identified and renewed after repair by the assumptions 
(b), (c). and (2) at an inspection point. each inspection point will become in effect a 
renewal or re-conclition point. Accordingly, the equation (3). 1) applies to each 
inspection period. 
Using the eqUation (3.1), with average breakdown and inspection repair costs C, 
and C,, respectively. a model of the expected cost per unit time as a ftinction of the 
inspection period T may be obtained directly. The total expected cost of an inspection 
cycle consists of the expected cost due to failures, the expected cost of rectifying faults 
identified at the inspection, and the cost of the inspection itself If the expected number 
of faults and breakdowns arising over (0, T) is K(Y) and B(7) respectively, then 
K(T) = ;. T (3.2) 
and 
B(T) = K(T)b(T) 
;. Tb(T). 0- 'I) 
Therefore, the total expected cost per unit time over a ftill cycle of length T+ di is 
C(T) = 
Total breakdown cost + Total inspection repair cost + Inspection cost 
Full cycle of length 
B(T) C6 + 11 K(n - B(T)I, Cýj +'C, 
T+d. 
; Tf, C, b(T) + Cý (I -b(T))l + C, 
T+d, (3). 4) 
Here. the decision variable T would be selected to minimise C(T). 
Again. if we are primarily interested in operating an inspection policy to reduce 
downtime. then the appropriate downtime model is derived by considering the expected 
downtime associated with failures and the downtime due to an inspection. Under the 
assumptions of the case beina I., modelled. 
there is no additional expected downtime due 
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to repairing faults identified at an inspection. so tile total expected downtime per unit 
time is 
D(T) 
(T) d,, d, 
T+d, 
(3.5) 
The choice of T is made to minimise D(T). In practice, the equation (3.5) may often 
be used due to the difficulty of establishing an agreed cost measure due to factors in the 
industrial plant. It may also be used because it is the appropriate model (see Christer 
and Waller [1984c]) 
Equation (3.1) to (3.5) constitute the basic inspection model. This basic model 
may be modified according to need. I 
3.3 Some Variations on the Basic Model 
3.3.1 A Variation on the Downtime Illodel 
Suppose there are insufficient staff, available to complete all repairs at an 
inspection. Here we investigate the changes to the basic model that Such a condition 
will make. For instance, if assumption (c) in the basic model was invalid and there 
were only enough maintenance staff to complete the task of identifying faults during the 
inspection period di, then ftirther time is required to perform inspection repairs 
subsequent to inspection, with each inspection repair causing additional downtime. C. 
The formulation of D(7) would be modified as follows. If d,, is the expected 
downtime due to an inspection repair, then assurning repairs are performed sequentially, 
the total downtime over the ftill cycle is 
)Td, b(T)+d, +ATd, 11 I -b(T)k,. 
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Also, considering d the expected length of the ftill cycle is d) 
T4- d, +;. Td, i III - b(T)j. 
Wre have, therefore, the downtime per unit time over an inspection cycle is 
D(T) 
Tdbb(T) + d: + ATdd fl- b(T)) 
T+d, +;. Tdd(I - b(7)1 
Tldbb(T) + dd(I - b(T)II + di 
T+d, +; Tdd(l - b(7)) 
(3.6) 
It is obvious from the equation (3.6) that as expected, dd must be less than d. for 
the inspection to be worthwhile. 
3.3.2 Non-Perfect Inspection Case 
So far, it has been assumed that inspections are perfect in that any fault present 
will be identified. It is, however, unrealistic to expect a perfect inspection every time. 
It is more likely, in most cases, that the probability of a fault being detected at an 
inspection is dependent to some extent on the duration of inspection, di . Such 
dependence would need ftirther investiGation in a particular context. Here we will be 11: 1 
content to review the simpler model used by Christer and Waller [1984a]. 
We introduce a probability i- that a specific fault will be identified at an inspection, 
and a corresponding probability (1-i-) that it will not. The only change that this will 
produce to the above models will be through the form of b(7), the probability of a fault C 
resulting in a breakdown. To find the new form of b(7), consider a fault which first 
arises at time v after an inspection at time point 0 (see Figure 3.3). Clearly, y:! ýT. 
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Fault arises 
Time 
0 JP T 2T 33 T 
Figure 3.3. frispection process of a fault arising at time y. 
If this fault is subsequently identified at an inspection, it could be the inspection at T if 
h>T-y or at 2T if h>2T-y, or failing this, at the inspection at )T if lz>3T-y, and so 
on. We have, therefore, that for the fault arising at point y, 
Prob(fault identified at T) 
Prob(being identified) x Prob(not resulting in a breakdown before T) 
i-R(T - y) (3.7) 
where 
R(x) = 
fy(h)dh. 
Similarly, 
P-S) 
Prob(fault identified at 27") 
Prob(not identified at T but identified at 2 7) 
x Prob(not resulting in a breakdown before 27) 
r(l -)-)R(2T- y) . (3.9) 
In general. the probability that a fault initiated at point j. - will be identified at the 
inspection at nT is 
r(l - r)"R(n T- 17 = I, I .... 
Adding all these probabilities. we obtain the probability I(T), say. that a fault arising at 
time j, will be identified at an inspection as 
r. 
I r(l - i-)-'R(izT - 
n=l 
Since j, can vary uniformly between 0 and T, summing Iff) over all possible j,, the 
probability that a fault arises as a breakdown, b(T), becomes 
b(T) = 1- 
T_(1 
-r) R(nT-v)dy. (3.11) 
'T 
In equation (3.11), for r=0 or 1. b(T) corresponds respectively to the failure 
probability for the conventional failure system, and to the basic inspection model with 
perfect inspection. Also, as inspection interval period T tends to 0 or 00, b(7) must 
intuitively converge to 0 or 1. To confirm this point, rearranging equation (3.11), 
we have that 
00 T 
R(nT-Y)dy. (3.12) 
n=l T 
If the inspection interval period T tends to Q, it follows that 
T JR(izT-y)dj,, (3.13) 
T-W 
n=l 
T, OT 
and 
limh(T) =I Tý 0 Fýo 
=I- (I - 
'I = 
= 
Similarly. if the inspection interval period T tends to co, it follows that 
IIF 
linib(T)= 1-yr(I-r)" lirn-f"R(iff- v)ýv 
T- T-- T 
=I. 1-; ) 
Interestingly, in the steady state situation the only changes in permitting imperfect 
inspection i- #I is that b(7) changes in form, but criteria functions, such as Q7_) and 
D(T) given in equations (3.4) to (3.6), remain the same. The above non-perfect I 
inspection formulation with r#1 was first used in an application of delay time 
analysis modelling; of the planned maintenance for a vehicle fleet by Christer and Waller 
[1984b]. 
3.3.3 A Variation on the Instantaneous Rate of Fault Occurrence 
Another assumption which may require to be relaxed is the constant rate of fault 
occurrence. The effect of this change in the basic perfect inspection model is to modify 
the formulae for bj), so producing consequential changes in the expressions for D(7) 
and C(7). In spite of this change, an inspection renews the system tinder the perfect 1: 1 
inspection by the assumption (c), (f), and (g). Here we assume that the instantane oils 
rate of fault occurrence at time y after an inspection is not constant but is GiVen by C'Cl, ) 
(see Figure 3.4). 
1 
hispection Inspection 
0y )+tty 
Renewal point 
Figure 3.4. A variation on the rate of fault occurrence. 
This being so. the expected number of faults arising in the small interval (I-. y+ýI-) is 
g(Otiv. 
Clearly. the expected number of faults arisin" in tile inter', al (0, T) is 
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T 
K(T) 16) 
Assuming perfect inspections, a fault arising in (y, y+dy) xvith a dela time h<T-y will y 
arise as a breakdown. Therefore the expected number of breakdowns resulting from I 
defects arising in (y, y+dy) is 
g(y)ýv -ý'f(h)dh=F(T-y)ll(y)dy, (3.17) 
where 
F(x) (h) A 
Accordingly, the expected number of breakdowns during the time period (0,7-) is 
B(T) = 
fF(T 
- y)g(y)dj,. (3.19) 
Since. given perfect inspection, the expected number of inspection repairs arising in 
(0.7) is K(T) - B(T), the expected downtime per unit tinle is given by 
D(T) = 
dbB(T) + d, 
T+ d, 
(3.20) 
The cost model in its simplest form is. assuming inspection repairs are performed clurin. g 
the inspection period d, , 
C(T) 
C5 B(T) +f K(T) - B(T)I, Cýj + C, (3.21) 
T+d, 
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If inspection repair requires additional tinle to the inspection period of d, per fault, 
thenequations (3.20) and (3.21) are simply modi fled tothe equations 
d, 
B(T) 
0 
B(T) 
d, 
D(T) 
K(T) K(T) 
(3.22) 
T+. d, +dd('- 
B(T) 
K(T) 
and 
QT) = 
C6 B(T) +f K(T) - B(T)) Cd +Ci (3). 2 3) 
T+d, +(I- 
B(T) 
K(T) 
Christer and Waller [1984a] give a numerical example for a comparison of the 
results for the three models in terms of the expected proportion of faults arising as 
breakdowns and the expected downtime. In terms of the expected proportion of faults 
arisin2 as breakdowns, it is seen from equation (3.12) that the model for non-perfect 
inspections shows, as would be expected, a higher percentage of breakdowns than the 
basic model. Also, the model for non-constant rate of fault occurrence showed in the 
case considered a lower percentage of breakdowns than the basic model. This result is 
because the delay time distribution and the assurned fault arrival rate has a lower fault 
frequency earlier in the cycle. Again, the expected downtime figures show that the 
models with the lowest and highest occurrences of breakdowns have the lowest and 
highest downtimes respectively, which again is to be expected. I 
3.4 Parameter Estimation of the Delay Time Model 
3.4.1 Subjective Estimation 
A task which is vitally important in adopting a delay time model is the estimation 
of the deliy time and initial point distribution. It is not generally posssible to measure 
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directly the delay time It associated with a fault, or the initial point it. A method 
which proved to be possible is to obtain SUbjective estimates of delay time from the 
repairing engineers. At a repair of a failure. or when a fault is identified at an 
inspection. the following questions may be asked of the repairing engineer. 
(a) How lon2 ago could the fault have fir5t been noticed by an inspector or operator 
(=HLA)? 
(b) If the repair is not carried out now, how much longer could it be delayed before a 
repair was essential (=HML)? 
The delay time for each fault is estimated by h= HLA + HAIL (see Figure 3.5). 
Delay time h 
HLA 4- HIM 
Fault first arised Fault detected by an inspection Breakdown occurred 
Figure 3.5. Estimation by h= HLA + HIM. 
In this way, by observing sufficient faults. the delay time distribution J(h) may be 
obtained. Furthermore. at any point in time T when a fault is being attended to, having 
an estimate of HLA provides at once an estimate of the initial point 11, namely 
it = T- HLA . It is the set of such estimates that enables the 
distribution of the initial 
points it to be estimated. The method of estimating the distribution parameters of 
delay time h and initial point it in this way is known as the subjective method. Note 
that. in adopting the subjective method to obtain delay time and initial point estimates, 
the definitions of fitilt and failure are important. 
One of the interesting aspects of delay time modelling is that it can use a synthesis of 
subjectively derived data to model a maintenance situation where the variable of interest 
can be the expected number of breakdowns over (0,7)1 B(7), the expected downtime 
per unit time, D(T), or the expected cost per unit time. C(7). If there is a current 
policy of inspecting the system at point To , then one would expect that the 
relationships such as the following to hold, 
B,, B(TO) . (3.24) 
D, ) D(T, ). (3). 2 5) 
Co = C(T. ) ý (3.26) 
where the left hand side is objective data, the currently observed number of failure, 
downtime and cost per unit time, and the right hand side is the output of a model based 
upon a synthesis of subjective assessments. However, the chance of the above 
relationships being satisfied is remote. The problem is simply stated in Figure 3.6. 
B(7) 
B(TO) 
TO 
Figure -35.6. Bias of the estimation. 
This suggests that a revision will be required in the modelling process, which is I 
expected with any process of decision analysis entailing subjective assessments. 
In view of this anticipated problem. a method has been developed by Christer and 
Redmond [1990] to formally revise or update the prior delay time distribution, J(11), 
usina the known B,,, D,,. or Co. This is done by a shear transformation of each 
estimate of delay time ii to fi' , such as z= cth + (,, ), where ct and (o are the 
Unknown parameters to be determined such that the above-mentioned relationships hold. 
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Tile arMU'llent for this type of trans formation is the observed tendency for estimators to 
systematically underestimate delay time which, therefore, needs to be extended. In 
aeneral. we would therefore expect ct>1. 
Another problem which can arise from using the subjective method is one due to 
sampling bias. At failures, the delay time estimates obtained are ( iz, J=JHLA I (since 
HML=0. b definition), which, if this is the only source of estimatina data, will y I-: - 
generally produce an underestimate of the pdf of h, say lif , because shorter delay 
times have more chance of leading to a failure. On the other hand, at inspection repairs, 
the delay time estimates obtained are )={HLA+HjVILj, which will produce an 
overestimate of the pdf of h, say hT , because longer delay times have more chance of 
spanning the inspection time point T. Christer and Redmond [1990] recognised this, 
established the existence of bias, and proposed a bias correction method. We examine 
this briefly below. 
Here it will be convenient to define the instantaneous arrival rate g(u), the 
probability density function q(u) and the cumulative distribution function Q(11) of the 
initial point u after an inspection. For the present, we suppose that inspections are 
perfect and inspection points are renewal points. The function q(u) is given by 
q(u) = , 
(ii)IK(T) for 0: ý ii:: ý T, 
othenvise , 
(3). 2 7) 
where. as before. K(7) is the expected number of faults arising in the interval (0,7). 
First the Cumulative distribution function of delay time hT was considered under 
the assumption of perfect inspection. The probability that a defect will arise in the 
interval (u, it-i-clu) given that it is identified at an inspection is 
P(Initial point c= (it, it + dit)lh >T- it) = 
q(it)(I - F(T - it)) (3.2 3) 
I- b(T) 
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%\-here, as before, F(h) is tile CUrnulative distribution function of h and b(7) is the 
probability of a fault arising as a breakdown. The distribution of this defect which has 
delay time hT with the delay spanning point T is given by 
F(ý) - F(T - it) P(h :! ý : ýýh >T -it)= for -:: >T-ii (3.29) T 'z TI- F(T -it) 
The cumulative distribution function for 11T is obtained by integrating the product of 
equations (3.27) and (3.28) over all appropriate values of it (see Figure 3.7). 
hT 
0 it T Failure 
Initial point Inspection 
Fioure 3.7. Cumulative distribution of the delay time hT * 
If _->T, it may freely range over the entire interval (0.7) and still be associated with C 
an h satisAing It, <ý. Otherwise, if ý<T, it must be restricted to (T-4,7) to satisfy T. - 
the condition hT<ý':. Noting this point, we have for the cumulative distribution function 
of 
hT 
2 
q (u) f F(ý) - F(T - u), l A for ýý > T, 
I- b(T) 
P(hT 
Tq F(ý) - F(T -A for :'<T. f, 
I- b(T) 
It is noted that P(hT :! ý ý) -- F(ý), that is, h. is a biased estimate of h. 
(3.30) 
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Secondly. we consider the CLIIIILIlatiVe distribution ftinction for delay time h, . To 
determine P(h, <, ý). it is assurned that inspection is perfect with period T and a fault 
which arises at time u<T leads to a failure at time u+hl ý If ý>T. then h_,. < -' and 
so P(h,. <i' xvo cases arises which are u>T-4 and u<T-ý, see _)=I. 
Otherwise, if 4<T, t 
Figure 3.8a, b. 
hf 
0 T-ý it Failure T 
Figure 3.8a. CDF of h, - (zt>T-4). 
T- Failure T 
Fiaure 3.8b. CDF of h, - (u<T-4. 
From the Figure 3.8a, if ii>T-ý, lif must automatically satisfy h.., <ý. Therefore, for 
u> T-ý, we have 
P(h. f 
#f (3.3) 1) 
Again, for ii<T-ý (Figure 3.8b), for the fault to lead to a failure after time hf 
satisfying Iz, -<'ý, we require h,. <T-ii. and the probability of this event is clearly 
F(ý) / F(T - it) for it <T-, ý. Collecting these results together. and integrating over 
all appropriate values of initial point it, Nve find the cumulative distribution ftinction of 
hi. to be 
I 
(F(, ý)Q(T-ý)+ r. q(it)F(T-u)duj for < T, P(h b(T) (3.32) 
for T. 
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From the eqUation (3.32), clearly P(h, < ý)- F(Z) and as expected, F7., f(qý-> F(ý) 
-as T -> oc. where FT.,. -(ý) = P(h, < Therefore the estimate of h, h, , becomes 
asymptotically unbiased with T. 
Christer and Redmond [1990] proposed a maximum likelihood refinement for 
correcting the bias in estimates of delay time. Suppose that there are two data sets of 
A 
"" 
estimates which are failure delay time {hj ;j=1,2,..., n) and inspection repair delay 
ý (2) 
time (k So far, the practice in case studies has been to produce a 
A 
(1) 
A (2) 
combined set [{hj + {k 1] of delay time estimates from which to establish F(Y). 
Here, adopting the same approach, a maximum likelihood refinement may be applied to 
compensate for the bias. Let the prior distribution for the delay-time be F(T, ý), where 
ý denotes the distribution parameters. Accepting this distribution, we have, from 
equation (3 : ). 2 9), the distribution of the delay-time of observations spanning an 
inspection epoch T, 
q(it) f F(ý, y) - F(T - u, 7)) A for T, 
FT'i y) =I- 
b(T) (3.3 -33) T q(zt)(F(ý, y) - F(T- it)) 
1- b(T) 
A for < T. 
Again, the distribution of delay time observations made at failure epochs is, using 
equation (3.32), 
I F(ý, y)Q(T - ý) + q(u) F(T - it, y)dltl for < T, FT. f (3.34) b(T) for T. 
The choice of the parameter ý is made by utilising the maximum likelihood principle in 
A 
(1) 
., ý 
t 2) 
the li0it of the observations fhj ) and (h, 1, that is 
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m. ax: lo,, - 
A... (h +0-: 
If,., 
ulý 
where f denotes the probability density ftinction of F: 
'"0:: -, 3 f7-,. fo ra 
This optimisation process provides an appropriate fit to the parameter to enable 
F(x, y) to be defined. Of course, some form of updating, adjustment will still be 
needed, possibly associated with an iteration between correcting for bias, process 
(33.3 )4), and model and distribution adjustments to the status quo. The main point of the 
above discussion is that there are methods of estimatina and correctin- a subjectivel, % 
derived delay time distribution and model. 
ConcerninQ subjective estimation of the delay time, Wang, [ 1996] pointed out that the 
current practice for asking people for a point estimate or an interval estimate of point 
measures might not be the best method. He had recognised that the subjective 
probability estimation in general arose both from the fields of psychology and 
operational research or statistics. Then, lie had proposed an alternative approach to 
subjective estimation of the delay time for maintenance modelling. namely, to get panel 
of experts and had estimated from them the probability that the mean delay time of a 
chosen failure type would lie in a specific time interval. This method in subjective 
probability and expert j Lidgement assessment had been advocated both by psychologists 
and statisticians. 
3.4.2 Objective Estimation 
If objective data are available, Baker and Wang [1992,1993] have recently 
introduced a method, now known as the objective method, to estimate the delay time 
distribution fi-om objective data, that is. data from maintenance records of failures and 
fhLIItS fOLInd at inspections or planned maintenance. Essentially the data should include .1 
42 
history of breakdown (failure) times, and the results of plartned maintenance or inspections 
which may be positive (fault found) or negative (no fault found). 7nie objective method 
titilises the principle of maxinium likelihood of observing a sequence of events. 
Baker and Wang [1992] first consider the simple case of a single component machine, 
which inav be characterised by the following assumptions. 
(1) The time to the initial point of a defect and the subsequent time to failure of the 
component are independent. 
(2) -flie distributions of initial point u and delay time h are modelled as Exponential or 
Weibull. 
(. 3 )) hispections are perfect. 
(4) Repair times are negligible. 
(5) Repairs are taken as replacements, so that the faulty component is restored to as new 
condition. 
Assumption (2) is simply considered by Baker and Wang [1992] for convenience. Also 
the possible events that can contribute to the likelihood are defined as: 
N: Inspection and no defect found (negative inspection), 
Y: Inspection and defect found (positive inspection), 
B: Breakdown (failure), 
E: End of observation period. 
fn addition. the following notation introduced by Baker and Wang [199-2] is useftil. ID 
R: Replacement on a breakdown, B, or positive inspection, Y, 
A': Denotes anv event. 
Based upon the above assumptions and clefinitions, Baker and Wang [1992] establish 
tlie lik-eliliood of obsening a sequence X X2 X of events of týIles B. E, 1. and 
N' by Litilising the eNpression, 
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L=P,., xxp "3 x ... xp (3.31 7) 
where Pv, denotes the probability of an event X, ,P means the probability of . V, i. vl 
event X, given that event X, has occurred. and so on. Since, after a replacement R, 
the likelihood does not depend on any event previous to R, the likelihood can be written 
as the product of terms conditional on events RX, X,... starting with the last renewal. 
Further, since inspections are assurned to be perfect, we have 
p=P Xi RXI -N, XIRNý (3.38) 
Under this concept, three key probabilities can be considered for the described system. 
(1) 
'ýYBIR(ln'Odt is the probability of a sequence of negative inspections of which the 
last occurs at time tn from last renewal, and a breakdown at a time between t and 
t-, 'dt from last renewal. P. VB/R (tt) isgivenby 
PA'BjR Un 
- 1) ý 
fý 
q(tt)f (t - u)dzi, (3.39) 
where q(u) is the pdf of initial point u, and J(h) is the pdfof delay time h. 
(2) PYEIR (tn 10 is the probability of a sequence of negative inspections of which the last 
occurs at time t,, from last renewal, and no breakdown before observation ceases at 
time t from last renewal. This probability is given by 
Q(t) + q(it)(I - F(t - ii))du (3.40) 
where Q(u) is the cdf of initial point it, and F(h) is the cdf of delay time It. 
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is the probability of a sequence of negative inspections of which the last (3) P\, ) ; 
occurs at time t, followed by a positive inspection at time t from last renewal. This 
probability is given by 
P %) R (t,:, 0ý 
fý 
q(u)(I - F(t - ii))dzt. (3.41) 
Based on the above probability definitions and assumptions, Baker and Wang [1992] 
developed the likelihood ftinction L of observing a sequence of events of (a) breakdowns 
at time t", (i = 1,2,... , 11B )I (b) no 
failure before observation ceases at time tE i 
and (c) positive inspections at time tk' (k as 
n., 
-- 
n, 
tiB' 
I 
tiB ) F1 p E' y. Y), PVBIR NE R ti, 'ýVYIR (tk 9 tk (3.42) 
j=l k=l 
where t, ' is the time of the latest negative inspection, (or, failing that, the latest renewal) 
such that t, " <t. and similarly for tE and t'* * By maximising the likelihood L in J, k ID 
equation (3.42), estimates of parameters of the underlying initial point distribution, q(u), 
and the delay time distribution, J(h), can be obtained. 
A development of and the first application within industry of the objective method for 
estimatin! z delay time parameter is given in Christer et al [1995] in the case of a multi- 
component system. They present a study carried out for a copper products manufacturing, 
company. developing and applying the delay-time modellinor technique to model and thus 
optimise preventive maintenance (PINI) of an industrial press. The data available within 
the plant included the dates and downtimes occurred due to both PM and failures, the 
nature of the occurrence, and the number of faults found at PM. To estimate the 
parameters of the fault arrive process and the delay-tinie distribution, the following 
assumptions -vvere considered appropriate to their study. 
(I) Faults arise according to a lioniouneous Poisson process with rate X. 
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(2) Faults are assurned to arise independently of each other. 
(3) The delay time h of a random fault is independent of its time origin and has pdf J(h) 
and cdf F(h). 
(4) Inspections carried out at PM are assumed to be imperfect in that they can only 
identify a fault present with probability r. Probabilities of detection of a fault at 
successive inspections are independent. 
(5) All identified faults are rectified by repairs or replacements during. - the PM period. 
This does not influence the development of undetected faults. 
(6) Failures are identified immediately, and repairs or replacements are m ade as soon as 
possible. 
Under the above assumptions, the likelihood expression (3.42) need to be revised 
because of the non-perfect inspection. -flie immediate consequence of non-perfect 
inspection is that an inspection cannot be viewed as a renewal point. Consequently, time 
measures are fi-om the 'as new' epoch. 
Ti-I 
Y t t+At 
Figure 3.9. Failure process of a fault arising at time y. 
T, 
If T, is the time epoch of the ith, i =1,2. ..., PM from new, we have the probability 
of a failure in (t, t+-At) resulting from a fault arising at time y (see Figure 3.9), is given 
by 
(I - r)"" (F(t + At -Y) - F(t - 
F(t + At -y) - F(t - y) P(t, t + Atly) F(t + At - 
0 
for T, 
-, <Y !ýT, ýi=1,2,...,; 1 
for T,, <Y<t 
for t <y: ýt+At 
for t+ At <Y. (3.4-3)) 
4(1 
Tlien. for T,, <t:! ý T,, -, , 
the expected number of failures over (t, t-'. -, At), 
EN-f (t, t +At), 
is 
EN.,, (t. t+ At) =A 
fP(t, t+ Atjy)ýy 
nT 
AZ (I - (F(t + At - y) - F(t - y))dy, 
F(t +At -y)dj,. (3.44) A (F(t + At - y) - F(t - y))dj, +Af 
PI 
Changing the integral variable and rearranging the integral sequence, and after some 
manipulation, Nve have 
.,, 
n 
ENf (t, t + At) =A Z(l - r)"' (F(x - Ti-, ) - F(x - Ti))dy 
-At 
+, ý F(x - T,, )d-c. (3.45) 
Also, we have the probability of identiAring the fault at PM time T,,,, resulting from .I 
a fault arising at time y, is given by 
-1 < y:! 
ý Ti, i=1,2,... i-(l - F(T - y)) for T, 
, 11y)= i-(I-F(T,, j-y)) 
(3.46) P(T for T,, <y<T,, 
0 othenvise. 
T'lien. the expected number of faults found at PM time T,,,,, ENP(T,,,, ), is 
EA'p A IP(Tj jy)ýv 
(1-F(T,,. I-y))dy 
(I - F(T, 1 
(3.47) 
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Ross [ 198-33] presented the following proposition in proposition 2.3.2: 
If an event arrival process follows a Poisson process with ý,, the number of events that 
occur by time t, Al(t), is an independent Poisson random variable having mean given by 
; JP(s)ds, where P(s) is the probability that the event occurs independently all else at 
time s. 
Since the fault anival process is assumed to arise according to a Poisson process, as a C 
generalisation of proposition 3.3.2 in Ross [1983], the number of failures in (t, t+At) 
follows a Poisson distribution with mean E. N,, (t, t+ At) and the number of faults found 
at PM follows a Poisson distribution with mean EN,, (T,,., ). Therefore, the 
probability of in failures over (t, t + At), where T,, <t:! ý T,,.,, , 
is given by I 
(EN j (r, t+ At))"'e 
- EN, (t, t+Al) 
P(m failures in (t, t+ At)) =-1 (3.48) 
and the probability of n faults found at T,, -, 
is 
p(T P(n fatilts at T_, )= 
(EN  
»n 
e- 
EN, (T -, 
) 
. (3.49) 
n! ' 
As previously indicated, the data assumed to be available are the number of failures in 
each working day and the number of faults identified at PM times. To forniulate the 
likelihood ftinction of the observed event. suppose first that Ili faults have been 
observed at the ith PM time -flie PNI interval (Ti-1, T, ) is now divided 
into k nonoverlapping subintervals of equal leng-th At. namely 
(T, 
-, + 
(j - I)At, Ti-I + jAt), j=1.2. 
4S 
- of failures occurrin in I' over where T, -, + 
kl = T, . Let m,, denote the numbei f 
(T-: - T) - 
Since we have assumed that all faults are independent of each other. it follows that a 
fault resulting in a failure will not have any influence on a fault which is found at PM, i. e. 
the number of failures since the last PM and the number of faults found at PNI are also 
independent. 'l-his being so, the likelihood is simply 
k 
L {P(.; z, faults at T, )II P(mij failures in Ij (3.50) 
j=1 
Tlierefore, once . 
ýh) has been specified, it is possible to obtain maximurn-likelihood 
estimates for any tu"- own parameters. This includes, for example. those inherent in the 
specification of . 
6h) and the rate of occurrence of faults, X, and the probability 1. that a 
fault will be idenfified at PM if it is present. 
717he above section is concerned chiefly with delay time analysis and the estimation of 
the underlying delay time distribution and defect arrival process. Once these are I 
estimated it is poSsible to apply the knowledge to model maintenance problems. This is 
the main objective of the techniques. 
3.5 Application of delay time modelling In 
'17here are many applications developing delay time maintenance modelling. Some of 
them have assumed that the delay time parameters are given. In real-xvorld situation, the 
delay time paramýeters are, however, only estimated from the data which are from 
subjective or objective information. In this section, we are interested specifically in 
applications of estimating delay time parameters. 
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-nie first application of delay time modelling (DTM) Nvas in the context of building 
maintenance in Christer [1982]. In. this pilot application, DTM was applied to assess the 
potential of an inspection maintenance policy as opposed to the existing breakdown 
maintenance policy for a building complex. I'lie model was of the pooled components 
tNpe. (complex or multi-component type). which grouped faults from individual 
components. It was assumed that faults arose in a homogeneous Poisson process (FIPP). 
Subjective and objective infon-nation were both used. 
In 1984, attempts were made to apply DTNI to a different maintenance context, namely, 
an industrial plant. In Christer and Waller [19S4b], DTM along with the snap-shot 
modelling techniques was applied to a study to model downtime consequences of 
maintenance practice of a hi-Ji-speed product canning process within Pedigree Petfoods 
Limited. In this study, the snap-shot modelling, which is a problem recognition technique 
introduced by Christer and NN'hitelaw [198-33] with strong parallels to reliabilities centred 
maintenance. It was applied to find out which component within the canning plant Z 
develop faults most fi-equently, the causes of the faults, and the possible means of 
prevention's of these faults. In this study, the DTNI was used to model the frequency of 
pit stops so that downtime can be reduced. The delay time distribution for the model was 
estimated using, the subjective method, and it was found that initially the data had 
generally been underestimated. Re-estimation was carried out after feedback to the 
assessors and the result was a very encMiragina, and produced modelling which actually 
satisfied the status quo conditions. 
In another case-study in Christer and Waller [1984c], snapshot analysis and the DTM 
were again applied to modelling preventive maintenance for a vehicle fleet of tractor units 
operated by Hiram Walker Ltd. In this case study. the subjective method was again used 
to obtain the estimate of the delay time distribution. The reconu-nended decrease in 
fi-equency of maintenance as a result of the modelling. was adopted by the management. 
In 1988 the pooled component model applicable to the building industry appeared in 
Christer [I 98S]. Here a DTiM was developed in which the probabilitY p(l) of detection 
of a fault at time y fi-om the faUlt origin time it increased from 0 at V=0 to Unity at 
1-11. Repair cost now varied over the delay time as a deterministic function CO,, h). 
i ý) 
Developments of this study led to a major collaborative research project with the Concrete 
Research Group at QMC London into the inspection and repair modelling of concrete 
bridges and high-rise structures (see Christer and Redmond [ 1993]). 
Later, Chilcott and Christer [ 199 1] used DTM to model the maintenance practices for 
coal face machinery within British coal. Here, they considered the case of a non-periodic 
inspection process where all known defects were remedied during the next maintenance 0 
period. Also, the delay time parameters were estimated based on the subjective method 
which were then used to model the effectiveness of condition-based monitorino, in I'D 
reducing downtime. As a result. the financial consequences due to 2% downtime savings 
are very attractive. 
Christer and Redmond [1993] studied the inspection of concrete structure of bridges. 
Here, it is noted that the deterioration of a component goes through a number of definable 
states, namely new to cracking, cracking to spalling, and spalling to failure (essential 
repair). The DTM approach was used, and the delay time was splitted into two phases, 
cracking and spalling. 17he delay time at the cracking and spalag phases were 
represented as h, and v, with pdfs J(h) and iv(v), respectively. 'flie time it is the 
time the component starts to deteriorate from new to cracking, and its pdf is q(zt). It is 
also assumed that only one type of fault can arise within a single component. The delay 
time parameters were estimated based on objective data at inspection, namely the age of 
each component and its condition. 
In 1987, a model utilising, the notion of delay time was used to establish the reliability 
consequences of inspecting a single component on different inspection periods, Christer 1: 1 - 
[1987]. In the model, the inspections are assumed to be perfect and non-detrimental. 
After the inspection the component is returned to the as new condition. '17he model has 
recently been explored for application to model the reliability of pumping systems for the 
water supply in some 4,000 high rise housing in Hong Kong in Leung and Christer [1995]. 
Also recently, a repeat study was carried out by Christer et al (1995] to model preventive 
maintenance (PM) practices of a cooper products manufacturing in the Northwest of 
England. In this study, as discussed in the previous section 3.4, the DTTVI parameters 
were estimated using objective data. namely, the maintenance record data of failures and 
.; I 
faults found at PNI. The criterion of interest was the to minirnise total downtime over a 
PM interval. Using the same case study, the subjective method was also used to estimate 
DTMparaiiietersCluisteretal[1994]. Although the results of the comparison are still to 
be formally reported. it is noted that both modelling techniques lead to verý, similar results 
and recommendations. This consistency is indicative of a welcome robustness of DTIM. 
Desa [1995] con-sidered a bus fleet maintenance study for an inter-city bus company in 
developing country. namely Malaysia. He showed in this study that in a situation where 
data are almost totally lacking, the snap-shot modelling was both practical and valuable for 
problem identification and definition. Also.. he showed that the use of delay time concept 
and modellhisi enables issues related to existinu maintenance policy and practice to be 
evaluated and modelled from a starting position of basically zero data using subiective I 
assessments. That is, in the situation where objective maintenance data are not available, 
subjectively derived data can be reliably used as the basis for modelling. 
3.6 Conclusions 
A substantial number of theoretical O. R. models developed for maintenance decision 
problems have been reported in the literature. On the other hand, the number of reported 
applications and implementations of these maintenance models to real-world problems is, 
though increasing, still few. The likely factors contributing to the lack of application of I 
maintenance models have also been identified and highlighted by many authors (e. g. 
Pintelon and Gelders [1992], Baker and Christer [1994]). 
The delay time concept has, however. provided a useffil means of modelling the 
effect of periodic inspections on the failure rate of repairable machinery. The delay 
time concept defines a two-stage failure process for a component. which consists of a 
defect first becoming visible at time u from new with probability density ftinction, 
q(u), and the visible defect developing into a failure after some delay time h with 
probability density function, j(h). Once these two distributions are known. it is 
possible to model the reliability, operating cost and availability functions. The 
ý; n 
distribution ftinctions q(u) and J(h) and their parameters are vital to delay time 
modelling. Two basic approaches to solve the associated estimation problems, namely 
subjective and objective methods, have been developed using the information obtainable 
from engineers who repair the machine. Although many variations in maintenance 
practice are possible, the situation where an engineer decides at inspection that a 
component is defective, and replaces it, is very common. Since delay time models can 
be used for decision-making, for example choosing the interval between inspections to 
ininimise cost or downtime, it may be natural to rely on the delay time modelling in 
adapting the maintenance models to real-world situation. 
53 
Chapter 4 
SEMI-MARKOV AND DELAY TIME MODELS OF MAINTENANCE 
FOR A SINGLE COMPONENT SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2, the literature on inspection modelling has been reviewed and in 
chapter 3, delay time modelling has been discussed. It was evident from the literature 
review that inspection models were often formulated as a Markov inspection model. 
The Markov inspection models assume that the working condition of the system can be 
expressed as a discrete-time Markov chain with degraded states and a failed state (see 
Tijms and Van Der Duyn Schouten [1985]). In the literature, the state transition 
probabilities are characteristically assumed to be given. Such an assumption may be 
unrealistic. In practice, it is difficult to define the working condition of a deteriorating 
system in terms of degraded states, and therefore, just as difficult to estimate the state 
transition probabilities. The literature on Markov models is notably silent on such 
matters at the current time. 
These actual problems which have been addressed using Markov models may also be 
formulated and solved using the delay time techniques presented by Christer. The delay 
time concept provides a means of modelling the behaviour of the system, and predicting 
quantities of intereýt such as reliability, downtime or cost, and does so under various 
inspection polices. The delay time model defines a two-stage failure process for a 
component, which consists of a fault first becoming visible by some inspection 
techniques at time u from new, with probability density function q(u), and the visible 
fault developing into a failure after some delay time h with probability density function 
J(h). We have seen that the model parameters for q(u) and J(h) can be estimated from 
both subjective or objective data. 
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In this chapter, we will develop a Markov type inspection model for the simplest 
problem situation for which both Markov and delay time models are valid. The delay 
time and Markov models are then compared for the same problem. 
4.2 System Description 
Consider a repairable single failure mode machine that may become defective or 
suffer breakdown during the course of its service lifetime. Also, assume that the system 
is inspected for a visible fault at a regular periodic interval, and that the inspection 
pattern is re-started after the repair of a failure. For this machine, an inspection policy 
which minimises the expected total long-run average cost or downtime can be derived. 
For modelling purposes, the system considered here is assumed to have the following 
properties. 
(1) A fault can be observed by inspections only, and a failure will be observed or 
repaired inmiediately if it occurs. 
(2) An inspection is undertaken every T time units, and the inspection process restarted 
after a failure repair. 
(3) Inspections are perfect in that any fault present within the machine will be identified 
at inspection, and no new fault injected because of inspection. 
(4) An inspection requires C, cost units and d, time units, d, <<T. 
(5) A fault identified at an inspection will be repaired within the inspection period d, 
and the repair cost per defect is Cd units. 
(6) The component is repaired immediately upon failures and its repair requires C. 
cost units and d. time units. 
(7) The machine is as good as new after a repair. 
The possible operation of this system indicated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 is I 
conveniently classified into two cases. 
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Fault arises 
Fault Operating 
free with a fault 
T. tit ýT. tit ,T. Elf " 
Inspection Inspection Inspection Inspection 
(Fault repair) 
Figure 4.1. Case "I" Inspection cycle. 
Case "I", Figure 4.1, is the case where a renewal point occurs after a fault is repaired 
within an inspection period. 
Fault arises 
Fault Operating 
II free with a fault 
T di T d, 
ýdb 
Inspection Inspection Inspection Failure 
(Repair) 
Figure 4.2. Case "2" Failure cycle. 
Inspection 
Case **2", Figure 4.2, is the case %%, here a renewal point occurs after a failure is Z 
repaired. Note that a renewal point of case "I" or of case "2" may occur after many 
inspections in which no faults are found. 
For this system operating in practice. a variety of data is potentially avaiable. The 
data could include the inspection time point. the inspection result, and the time of 
failure. As an example, such characteristic data is surnmarised in Table 4.1 for T= 10 
units 
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Table 4.1. Characteristic structure of the data of the single component system 
for T=10 units. 
Time point Inspection result or failure Action 
0 Nornially operated No action 
10 No fault detected No action 
20 A fault detected Repair 
27 Failure Repair 
37 A fault detected Repair 
47 No fault detected No action 
54 Failure Repair 
This data indicates fault free operation to T= 10, a defect arisen and being identified at 
T= 20, and a fault then arising and leading to a failure at T= 27. The inspection 
process then restarts. If it is not possible to obtain such data from actual maintenance 
and operating record. assuming a delay time model, it is possible to simulate the process 
and thereby obtain these data. Either way, having the data, it may then be used as an 
exercise or experiment to estimate, or recapture, the underlying delay time parameters 
and in this way model the real-world, or simulated real-world, situation. In section 4.5, 
we will describe the process of simulating data. This is important in validating the Z: ý 
modelling methodology. 
4.3 Serni-Markov Inspection Model 
4.3.1 Introduction to the Semi-Markov Inspection Nlodel 
In the past, various maintenance problems assuming Markovian deterioration of 
s-v-stems have. as already commented. been presented in the literature. Emphasis is 
usually placed upon the modelling of the system, assuming parameters to be known, and 
upon the mathematical derivation of the model or the properties of the model. 
However, only a limited number of Markov papers have discussed the associated 
computational methods for computing maintenance policies. Examples are Tijms 
[19S6] and Tijins and Van Der Duyn Schouten [1985] which dealt with an optimal 
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inspection and replacement problem of a discrete-time Markovian deterioration systern, 
and proposed a computational algorithm by modifying the policy iteration method. 
In this section, xve review Tijms' semi-Nlarkov decision process and apply it to the 
optimal inspection problem of the discrete Markovian deterioration system described in 
the previous section, and use the Tijms and Van Der Duyn Schouten's computational 
algorithm to evaluate the results. 
4.3.2 Semi-Markov Decision Process 
Semi-Markov decision models are concerned with dynamic systems which at 
random points in time may be observed and classified into one of a possible number of 
states. The set of possible states is denoted by L After obsen, ing the state of the 
system, a decision has to be made, and costs are incurred as a consequence of the 
decision made. For each state i(=-I, a set A(i) of possible actions is available. It is 
assumed that the state space I and the action sets A(i), iEI, are finite. The time 
between two consecutive renewal points is measured in discrete time steps At. A semi- 
Markov decision process has to satisfy the following Markovian Properties. 
If at a decision epoch the action a is chosen in state i, the system state at the next 
decision epoch depends only on the pfesent state i and the chosen action a 
regardless of the past history of the system. t) 
(2) The costs incurred until the next decision epoch depend only on the present state 
and the action chosen in that state. Here, cost is taken as the consequence variable 
of interest, which could include downtime as well as direct cost. 
The long-run average cost per unit time or the long-run average downtime per unit 
time is often taken as the optimality criterion in the maintenance decision-making 
process. To establish these criterion functions in the context of a senii-Markov decision 
model. we define the following characteristics. 
i, ý 
P, (a) : the probability that at the next decision epoch the system will be in state j if 
action a is chosen in the present state i. 
r, (a) : the expected time until the next decision epoch if action a is chosen in the 
present state i. 
C, (a) : the expected cost of the action a if action a is chosen in the present state i. 
D, (a) : the expected downtime of the action a if action a is chosen in the present 
state i. 
It is assumed that -r, (a) >0 for all ir=I and aeA(i), that is two or more events cannot 
occur at the same instant in time. We define a stationary policy R as a rule which 
prescribes the same action Ri (=- A(i) whenever the system is observed in state i at a 
decision epoch. It can be shown that under a stationary policy, because of the finite 
state space, the number of decisions made in a finite time interval is finite with 
probability 1. Also, denoting by X,, the state of the system at the nth decision epoch 
from new, it follows that under a stationary policy R, the embedded stochastic process 
JXJ is a discrete-tinie Markov chain with one-step transition probabilities Pjj(Rj). 
Introducing and defining the random variable Z(t) : the total costs incurred from the 
initial point t=0 to time t, t ýA, and denoting by EI. R the expectation operator 
when the initial state -YO =i and the stationary policy R is used, then the limit of the 
expected cost per unit time, gi (R) , 
is given by zD 
I 
(R) = lim - E. , [Z(t)] for all iEL (4.1) [-+ýc t "' 
We can give a stronger interpretation for the average cost function a (R) . If the initial I Ot 
state i is recurrent under policy R, then the long-run actual average cost per unit time I- 
equals gy, (R) with probability 1. In the case when the Markov chain {XJ 
associated with policy R has no two disjoint closed sets, the Markov chain fX,, ) has 
atiniqtieeqtiilibriiiiiidistribtition 11; rj(R), jc=IJ, and gi(R)=g(R) independentlyof 
the initial state A', = i. 
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Tijms [1986] shows that if the embedded Markov chain fX,, l associated with 
policy R has no two disjoint closed sets, then 
lim 
Z() 
= g(R) with probability 1 (4.2) 
t-+-C t 
for each initial state X. = i, where the constant g(R) is given by 
2: Cj (Rj ) irj (R) 
g(R) = j'21 Erj(Rj); rj(R) 
jEl 
(4.3) 
Therefore, a stationary policy R. is said to be average cost optimal if gi (R gi (R) I 
for all ir=I and all stationary policies R. 
For computing an average optimal cost, a policy-iteration algorithm can be 
developed. The policy-iteration algorithm requires that for each stationary policy the 
embedded Markov chain {XJ has no more than one disjoint closed set. Suppose that 
g(R) is the average cost and vi (R) ý i(=- I, are the relative values of a stationary policy I 
R. If a stationary policy R is constructed such that, for each state iEI, 
Ci (Ri) - -:, (R) ri (Ri) + 
1: P (T)v (R):! ý vi (R), (4.4) In. li Ii jEl 
then g(R):! ý g(R). 
Under these conditions, following Tijms' serni-Markov decision process [1986], we 
can now formulate the following policy-iteration algoritlini. 
Poliqv-itemtion algorithin 
Step 0 (initialization) : Choose an initial stationary policy R. 
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Step I (value-detei-mination step) : For the current rule R, compute the average costs C 
g(R) and the relative values vi(R), i(=-I, as the unique solution to the linear 
equations 
(R, ) - g(R)r, (R, ) - (R, )i, ], 
ir=L 
vs = 0, 
where s is an arbitrarily chosen state. 
(4.6) 
Step 2 (policjý-inzprovement step) : For each state iE-=I, determine an action a, yielding 
the minimum in 
min f C, (a) - g(R) r, (a) + Pij (a)vj (R)) (4.7) a r. 4 (i) j r- 
The new stationary policy R is obtained by choosing R, = a, for all iEI with 
the convention that Ri is equal to the old action Ri when this action minimizes 
the policy-improvement quantity. 
Step 3 (convei-gence test) : If the new policy R equal the old policy, the al-orithm is 
stopped with policy R. Otherwise, the algorithm cycles back to step I with R 
replaced by R. 
It can be shown that the algorithm converges in a finite number of iterations to an 
average cost optimal policy. Also, as a consequence of the convergence of the 
alcyoritlim, there exist , a* (R) and v, 
., ic=I, satisfying 
vi .= min (C. (a) -g. (R) ri (a) + 
2: P, (a)ty*), i E=- 1. (4.8) 
a e. 4 (i) jEl 
Theconstant g, *(R) is uniquely determined as the minimal average cost per unit time. 
Moreover, each stationary policy whose actions minimize the right side of (4. S) for all 
iEI is average cost optimal. 
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4.3.3 A Serni-Markov Inspection Model 
. sed 
in the The inspection system mentioned in tile section 4.2 can be analy 
framework of a semi-Markov decision process to find the long term consequences of 
different inspection periods when the distribution of the time to the initial defect is 
negative exponential. For a single component system with discrete-time Markovian 
deterioration, according to the degree of deterioration, the states of the system are 
represented as 0,1 and f, where state 0 represents a normally operated state without 
a defect, state I represents a defective state, and state f represents a failed state. 
These states have been used in the paper of Tijms and Van Der Duyn Schouten' [1985] 
in denoting the working condition of the system. Without any maintenance activities, 
the state of the system at discrete-times t=0, At, 2At.... is assumed to undergo 
deterioration according to a discrete-time Markov chain. Accepting the validity of their 
concept of deterioration and assuming the inspection system as outlined in section 4.2, 
we formulate the simplest possible case of an Markovian inspection policy, which may 
be characterised by the following additional assumptions. 
(S) Opportunities for inspections occur only at equidistant points in time 
t=0, At, 2At .... 
from new or a renewal repair. 
(9) The working condition, or state, of the system cannot improve on its own. 
(10) In absence of inspections and repairs, the working condition of the systern follows a 
discrete-time Markov chain. 
The decision epoclis of this model are the epochs at which opportunities for 
inspections occur when the system is operating, and the epochs at which the exact 
working condition of the system is revealed by either an inspection or the immediate 
detection of a breakdown. We take as the state space 
I= Ifili = 0,1, fl, uf (i, inAt)1i = O, m = 1,2,..., 11) (4.9) 
62 
where At is an arbitrary small time which defines the mesh over which discrete time 
steps are measured. State i is the working condition 0.1 or f that describe degrees 
of deterioration. Also, the state (i, niAt) stands for the state that mAt time units have 
passed since the last inspection, or failure, where it was revealed that the working 
condition was i and the component has not failed currently, or mAt time units ago 
when in state i. For the current problem, we have i=0 since each inspection or 
failure repair is a renewal point. It is noted that M is an arbitrary upper limit of ni 
which will have no influence to the modelling if a finite solution exists. M serves to 
remind us of the finite nature of the state space. The possible actions a are denoted by 
0, leave the system as it is, 
1, inspect the system, 
2, repair the system. 
To formulate the one-step transition probabilities from state i to sate j if action a 
is taken at state i, P,, (a) , the one-step expected transition times -ri (a), the one-step 
expected costs Ci (a) and the one-step expected downtimes D, (a) , we introduce the 
following deterioration probabilities. For t=At, 2At, 3At,..., i=O and j=O, I, f, 
we define the deterioration probability r., where .U 
i, ' = the probability that t time units from now the -system will 
have working condition Y 
j when the present working condition is i and no intervening inspections and 
repairs take place. 
Interestingly, the deterioration probability r-t can be easily estimated in terms of the 
delay tirne concept since the latter is a more ftindamental concept. This will be 
discussed in subsection 4.3.4. 
The one-step transition probabilities can now be readily obtained by considering the 
action taken at each present state based upon the deterioration probability i1j. Firstly, at 
state 0, action a=0, which is the appropriate action to take at state 0, is taken. If 
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the action a=0 is taken at state 0, the system will either survive until next decision 
epoch At or fail within the next decision epoch At. So, from the definition of the 
deterioration probability iii, it is obvious that 
A: loý 
PO, (0) =I- 0-f 
0 
for y=f 
for y= (0, At) 
otherwise , 
(4.10) 
where as before, (0, At) represents the state that At time units have passed since the 
last inspection. or failure. Also, if the system survives until the next decision epoch At, 
the expected time incurred at state 0 is only the time to the next decision epoch At. If 
the system fails before the next decision epoch At, assuming that die next decision At 
is very small, we can approximately regard the expected time incurred at state 0 as time 
to the next decision epoch At. Accordingly, we have that 
TO(o) = \t. 
When we take the action a=0 at state 0, since no cost and downtime are incurred, it 
follows that 
co(o) =0 
and 
Do(0) = 0. (4.1 J) 
At state 1. action a=2, which is the only possible action to take at state I 
because a fault found at an inspection has to be repaired, can be taken. If the action 
a=2 is taken at state 1, we have by the assumption (4) and (6) of the section 4.2 
that 
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Plu(2) = 1. (4.14) 
Also. since the fault identified at an inspection is repaired within the inspection period 
and its repair costs per defect is C, units. it is obvious that 
ri (2) = 0, 
C, (2) = 
Cd, (4.16) 
and 
D, (2) = 0. 
At state f action a=2 is the only possible action to take because a failure must be 
immediately repaired. Accepting the action a=2 is taken in state f, we have by 
assumption (6) and (7) of the section 4.2 that 
Pfo(2) = 1. (4.18) 
Also, since a failure repair requires C. cost units and db time units, it is obvious that 
rf (2) = 
db 
, (4.19) 
Cf (2) = 
Cb 
ý (4.20) 
and 
Df (2) = 
db 
. 
At state (0. mAt)ý the actions a=0 and a=1, which are the only possible actions 
to take at state (0. nzAt), can be taken. Since state (0, mAt) represents the situation 
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that no failure has occurred in the time period of nzAt time units starting from state 0, 
all the one-step probabilities transitions from (0, InAt) are conditional upon no 
inspections or repairs being undertaken within inAt time units. This means that there 
must be no failure in the first nzAr time units from state 0. If action a=0 is taken at 
state (0, nzAt) for in = 1,2, ..., tVP 1, there must have been no failure in the 1IIAt time 
units from state 0, and the system will either survive until next decision epoch 
(in+l)At or fail before the next decision epoch (ni+I)At. The probability that there is 
no failure in the inAt from state 0 is I- i-" and the probability that there is a failure Of 
between the present decision epoch mAt and the next decision epoch (m+I)At is 
(M+I)& 
-I. 
mAt. 
I*Of Of By the definition of the deterioration probability, we have that 
(m+1)är 
_1. 
MAI 
of 
1. M. 11 of 
rýf 
rof 
for y=f 
for y= (0, (in + I)At) 
othenvise . 
(4.22) 
Also, if the system survives until the next decision epoch (m+I)At from the current 
decision epoch mAt, the expected time incurred by taking the action a=0 at state (0, 
mAt) is At time units from the current decision epoch nzAt to the next decision epoch 
(in+I)At. If the system fails before the next decision epoch (in+I)At, assuming that At 
is very small, we can approximately regard the time of failure as (nz+l)At. That is the 
expected time incurred by taking the action a=0 at state (0, mAt) is At time units to 
the next decision epoch (ni+I)At. Accordingly, we have that 
r(0, 
mA1) (0) = At , (4.23) 
When the action a=0 is taken at state (0, mAt), since no cost and downtime are 
incurred, it follows that 
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C(O"niät) (0) =0. (4.24) 
and 
D(O. 
mAt) 
(0) =0. (4.25) 
If action a=I is taken at state (0, nzAt), for in = 1,2, ..., 11, assuming perfect 
inspection the system will be in a situation of either having a fault or having no fault at 
an inspection. Since the probability of finding no fault at an inspection is rý' and the 
probability of finding a fault is by definition of the deterioration probability, 
under the condition that there is no failure until inAt from the state 0, we have that 
1. MAI 
00 
- for 0 
. mAt Of 
MAI 
P(O, 
MAI)y (1) ol - for 1 (4.26) I. M& Of 
othenvise. 
Also, since an inspection requires d, time units and Ci cost units. it is obvious that 
r(o, mA, ) 
(1) = di (4.27) 
C(O, 
mAl) 
(1) = ct 1 (4.28) 
and 
Dco, 
lw) 
(1) = cý . (4.29) 
Now, utilising the standard serni-Markov decision model of the previous subsection 
4.3.2 (see the equation (4.5)), we can formulate the cost model as 
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vo = -g, (R)At + Pof (O)vf + Po(o, _v, 
(O)v(O, A, ) 1 (4.30) 
VI Cd + VO 1 (4.31) 
vf = Cb - g, (R)db + vo , 
(4.32) 
V(O. 
niAi) ': 
- -9c 
(R)At + P(O.., 
)f 
(O)vj. + 
for 0< mAt < s, (4.33) 
and 
Ci -g, (R)di +P(O,,,, )O(I)vo +P(O,. w), (I)vl, 
for s :! ý mAt :! ý MAt (4.34) 
where g, (R) is the expected average cost per unit time given policy R, s is the time 
to next inspection when the working condition revealed at present inspection time is 0, 
and v., ,xEI, are the relative costs of the various starting states when policy 
R is 
used. Using the embedded technique, by a repeated application of the above equations, 
we can get the expected cost per unit time. By putting vo =0 the linear equation can 
determine uniquely the average cost g, (R) .- Once g, (R) and vo 
have been determined 
we can obtain all the values v., by recursive calculations if they are required. 
In a similar way, we have for the corresponding downtime model that I 
lt'0 -2 -9d(R)At + Pof (0)ivf + Po(O., ) (0)iv«)), 
W, = Wo I 
wf = d6 - g, l (R)db + iv, 
(4.35) 
(4.36) 
(4.37) 
6S 
-a,; ( R) At 
+P(O. 
niAI)f 
(0)"'. 
f 
+ P(O. 
mld XO, (,,, -I)AI) 
(0)'V(O, 
(n)-l 1.1t I c, 
for O<mAt <s, (4.38) 
and 
6d(R)dl 
di - 
cr + P(O,,,, 
A, )O(')'VO 
+ P(O,. 
Al)l 
(')'Vl 
for s: 5 mAt :! ý AfAt , (4.39) 
where - (R) is the average downtime per unit time given policy R and 1ý,, xEEI, od 
are the relative downtimes resulting from the various starting states when policy R is ZD 
used. Using the same embedded technique, we can obtain the expected average II 
downtime per unit time 9d(R). By putting one of the relative downtimes equal to 
zero, say wo = 0, the linear equation can determine uniquely the averal-ge downtime per 
unit time g,, (R). Once gd(R) and ivo have been determined we can obtain all the 
relative downtimes wx by recursive calculations if required. 
The cost model and the downtime model can be evaluated using the following 
policy-iteration algorithm of the subsection 4.3.2. 
Policjy-iteration algorithin 
Step 0 Choose an initial policy R with the parameter s. 
Step I For the current rule R, compute the average costs g, (R) and the relative 
Costs V,, W or the average downtimes MR) and the relative downtimes 
irt, i(=-L as the unique solution to the linear equations 
Ci (R, ) - g, (R) ri (Rj) + 
2] Pij (R, )vj, (5.40) 
jel 
V 0, 
in the cost case. or in the downtime case 
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Di gl (R)-r, (R, ) + (Ri)it,,, iEI, (5.41) 
JEI 
= 
where x is an arbitrarily chosen state. 
Step 2: For each state iE: -I, determine an action a, yielding the minimum in 
min {Cj (a) - g, (R), ri (a) + 
1] Pij (a)vj (R)J, 
ae. 4(i) jel 
or 
min 11 Di (a)- gd(R)ri(a) +Z Pij (a)ivj(R)I. a EA k ý) jEl 
The new stationary policy R is obtained by choosing Ri = ai for all iEI with 
the convention that R, is chosen as being the old action R, when this action 
minimises the policy-improvement quantity. 
Step 3: If the new policy R equal the old policy, the al-orithm is stopped with policy 
R. Otherwise, the algorithm cycles back to step I with R replaced by R. 
'fliis algorithm generates a sequence of improving control-limit rules and it can be 
shown that the algorithm converges after a finite number of iterations to an averacye cost 1.7 In 1ý 
or downtime optimal policy (see Tijms and Van Der Duyn Schouten [1985] and Tijms 
[1986]). Also, as a consequence of the convergence of the algorithm, there exist a 
*(R) and iv*, ir=I, where the constant a: (R) is or gd (R) and v,, ic 
uniquely determined as the minimal average cost per unit time and vi* as the relative 
cost or gd(R) is uniquely determined as the minimal average downtime per unit time 
and ir, * as the relative downtime, when the decision variable s would be selected to 
minimise the average cost per unit time or the average downtime per unit time. I= 
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4.3.4 Estimating the Deterioration Probability Based upon the Delay Time e5 
Concept 
The above semi-Markov inspection model formulation is dependent upon the 
deterioration probabilities, rij, where i is the working condition 0 and j is the 
working condition 0,1 and f T'llis model assumes that the deterioration probabilities 
are given or readily avaiable. In practice the deterioration probabilities are not given, 
but need to be estimated from the available data. In this subsection we consider the 
estimation of the parameters related to the current finite semi-Markov decision process 
with deterioration probabilities. Such statistical estimating problems are of prime 
importance in mathematical modelling. 
Since the deterioration probability iij is a probability that t time units from now 
the system will have workin condition j when the present working condition is i and 9 1= 
no inspections and repairs are undertaken, it can be easily obtained from the delay time 
concept. Here we are interested in the deterioration probabilities r, ro and rof co 11 
Firstly, we consider the deterioration probability r, ý, that is the probability that t time 
units from now the system will have the working condition 0 when the present working I 
condition is 0 and no inspections and repairs are undertaken. According to the delay 
time concept, this is a case that the system has no initial point it within the period 
[0, J]. In this case, the deterioration probability r0'0 isgivenby 
roo = Pr(it ý: 
=I- 
fq(it)dit, (4.42) 
where, as before, q(zt) is the pdf of the initial point u. As already pointed, q(u) is 
the negative exponential distribution in this case, but we keep a more general notation to I 
assist us in subsequent robustness analysis of the model when q(it) is not negative 
exponential. Secondly, the deterioration probability i-01 is the probability that the 
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system has an initial point u within period [0, r] but is still operating normally without 
a failure at time t. In this case, the deterioration probability i-' is given by 01 
1 ro , Pau -h ýý t and 0 :g 11 :5 t) 
fy(u)(I 
- F(t - it))dlt, (4.43) 
where F(h) is the cdf of the delay time h. Lastly, the deterioration probability r,, f is 
the probability of a failure within [0, t]. In this case, the deterioration probability ro'f 
is given by 
ro'f = Pr(u -h 
= 
jq(u)F(t 
- u)du. (4.44) 
L' +t-', + 
' =1. Note that as required, 1-')0 0 rof 
The deterioration probabilities are given by the distributions of the initial point it 
and the delay time h. If the distributions of the initial point u and the delay time h 
can be estimated from the collected data, or from subjective techniques, the 
deterioration probabilities can be easily obtained. Various available methods for 
estimating the initial point and the delay time distribution has been discussed in the 
section 3.4 of the chapter 3. 
4.3.5 Satisýving the Markovian Properties required of a Semi-Markov . :n 
Inspection Model 
The above model has been formulated as a serni-Markov inspection model and the 
fact that it is such a model has been asSUrned. Here we establish that it is, indeed, a 
semi-Markov niodel and satisfies the necessary condition for a serni-Markov decision 
process agiven as t 1) and (2) in subsection 4.3.2. 
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'17he one-step transition probabilities, Pij (a) , of subsection 4.3.3 have been 
expressed as a ftinction of the deterioration probability, r.. Accordingly, using 
equation (4.44) Nvith t=At, equation (4.10) becomes 
fý(it)F(At 
- ti)dit for f 
PO' (0) 1- 
ý, 
ý(u)F(At 
- it)du for y= (0, At) (4.45) 
0 othenvise 
and using equation (4.44) with t= niAt and t= (in+I)At, equation (4.22) becomes 
illzý I) -V "I 
q(u)F((m + I)At - u)dit - 
Jý(u)F(mAt 
- u)du 
&I -- - for yf I- Jý(zt)F(mAt - u)du 
P(0,17z. 
%I)y (0) 
1 q(u)F((in + I)At - u)du 
for y= (0, (in + 1) At) 
-V I- Jý(u)F(mAt - u)du 
0 otherwise. (4.46) 
Using equations (4.42), (4.43), and (4.44) with t= mAt, equation (4.26) for the 
probability the component survives inAt time units to be inspected at nzAt with result 
y=0 or y=I (no defect or a defect present) becomes 
Al 
P(O. 
": A. r)y( 
0=ý 
J LV ý(u)F(mAt 
- u)dit 
F(mAt - u))dit 
zt)du 
0 
for y=0 
for y =I (4.47) 
othenvise. 
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The other one-step transition probabilities, P, 0(2)=l and Pfo(2)=1 (see equations 
(4.14) and (4. IS)). Since equations (4.14), (4.18)1 (4.45), (4.46), and (4.47) are 
seen to be dependent only upon the current state i, i (=- 1, the next state j, jGI, and 
the chosen action a, a=0.1,2, we have that the one-step transition probabilities. 
Pij(a), used in the semi-Markov inspection model of subsection 4.3.3 satisfy the 
required condition (1) of Markovian property of subsection 4.3.2. 
Also, the one-step expected costs, Ci (a), and the one-step expected downtimes, 
D, (a), are given by a constant which is dependent only upon the current state i, ieI, 
and the chosen action a, a=0,1,2 (see equations (4.12), (4.13), (4.16), (4.17), 
(4.20), (4.21), (4.24), (4.25), (4.28), and (4.29)). Accordingly, the one-step 
expected costs and the one-step expected downtimes used in the above semi-Markov 
inspection model satisfy condition (2) of Markovian property of subsection 4.3.2. 
Therefore, the semi-Markov inspection model established in subsection 4.3.3 satisfy 
all conditions of Markovian properties of the semi-Markov decision process. 
4.3.6 Some Problems of the Semi-Markov Inspection Model 
The above model is concerned xvith a typical semi-Markov inspection model 
which minirnises the expected total cost per unit time or the expected total downtime 
per unit time. It presents the model formulation and solution computation process for 
the maintenance problem. However, the outstanding general problem is not so much in 
solving the model of the problem, as in structuring the assumptions and validating them. 0 
The model assumes that the workin! z condition of the system can be expressed in 
terms of a new state, a degraded state and a failed state, and further, that these states 
change accordin- to a discrete-time Markov chain. Also, the model presumes that 
transition probabilities, or deterioration probabilities, are given or are calculated. Such 
assumptions need to be established as appropriate in any particular case. In practice, as 
previously indicated, it is difficult to define and measure the workin condition of the 9 
deteriorated system as a degraded state. and difficult to measure directly transition 
-4 
probabilities or deterioration probabilities. In applying the model in real-world 
situations. the immediate problem is to analyse and interpret the collected data. Even 
thOL101 the working condition of the deteriorated system is expressed as one of a set of 
defined states, from data we have to establish a Markovian deterioration property for the 
system and estimate the transition probabilities, or deterioration probabilities. 
However. as evidenced by the lack of actual applications to problems and data of real- 
world situations, it is believed difficult to justify the Markov property assumptions, 
excepting exponentially distributed data, and therefore difficult to determine valid 
transition probability or deterioration probabilities. It is not felt to be reasonable to 
automatically assume always that actual problems satisfy the required Markov 
properties. There are. of course, corresponding problems for the assumption in delay 
time models. However, there are techniques and case experience indicating how they 
may be resolved. 
4.4 Delay Time Model 
4.4.1 Introduction to the Delay Time Model 
Markov models have the advantage of an extensive body of theory. They could, 
however. be improperly applied within a maintenance context. In a series of papers 
dating from 1984, a robust approach to solve these problems has been introduced and I 
developed as the Delay Time Model (DTNI). It has been seen in the cha ter 3 that the p 
DTM is a powerful tool when applied to the modelling of actual industrial maintenance 
problems. 
The inspection system presented in the section 4.2 can also be analysed in the 
framework of a DTM to find the optimal inspection period which minimises the 
expected total cost per unit time or the expected total downtime per unit time. In this 
section, we formulate the optimal inspection problem of the system as a delay time 
model. There are differences in the structure of the model in that the delay time model 
does not require a discrete time zone for analysis, and is assumed here (though not 
necessary) to have a fixed but unknown inspection period T. 
4.4.2 Formulation as a General Delay Time Model 
To formulate the inspection system mentioned in the section 4.2 as a delay time 
model, in adding to the system description of the section 4.2, we adopt the following 
assumptions for a single repairable component: I 
(1) A fault can be observed by inspection only, and a failure will be observed or repaired 
immediately if occurs. 
(2) An inspection is undertaken every T time units, and the inspection process restarted 
after a failure repair. 
(3) Inspections are perfect in that any fault present within the machine will be identified 
at inspection, and no new fault injected because of inspection. 
(4) An inspection requires Ci cost units and d. time units, di <<T. 
(5) A fault identified at an inspection will be repaired within the inspection period d, 
and the repair cost per defect is Cd units. 
(6) The component is repaired immediately upon failures and its repair requires Cb 
cost units and 
db time units. 
(7) The machine is as good as new after a repair. ZD 
Then, as we noted in the section 4.2, there are two types of renewal points, that is, at a 
failure or when a fault is found at an inspection. assuming that a failure repair or fault 
rectification at an inspection may be regarded as renewing the component. Under these 
conditions, first of all, we formulate the Creneral model without the specific specification 
of the initial point distribution or the delay time distribution. After that, a proof is 
given that the model reduces to a simpler form which also represents a semi-Markov 
inspection model. This being so, we are able to usefully compare both models. 
Firstly, we consider the expected renewal cycle cost, E(cycle cost). Noting that 
there is a renewal point after a fault rectification at an inspection, consider a general 
case that negative inspections arise at T, 2T, .... (k--I)T and a positive inspection arises 
at U (see Figure 4.3). 
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Negative inspections Positive inspection 
Time 
01 21 (k-I)T it KI 
't-- Fault arises 
Fi2ure 4.3. A case with a positive inspection at kT. 
In this case, the total costs are k times the inspection costs plus fault repair costs at the 
inspection. The probability of this case arising, that is (k-1) negative inspections I Z: 
followed by a positive inspection at U, Pk, i , 
is 
Pk., = Pr((k- I)T<it <kT and h> kT-ii) 
,T ýk--I)T 
q(u)(1 - F(kT - u))dit, (4.48) 
and the expected cost is given by 
"T 
(kCi + Cd ) 
fý- 
1) T q(u)(I - F(kT - it))dit, k=1,2,3, (4.49) 
As before, C, and Cd are inspection costs and fault repair costs at an inspection 
respectively, and q(it) and F(h) are the pdf of the initial point it and the cdf of the 
delay time It respectively. Summing over all possible case, we have that the expected 
cost up to a renewal point due to a positive inspection is given by 
T 
(kCi +Cý; I q(u)(I - F(kT - u))dit. (4.50) 
Again. in the case of a renewal point initiated by a failure repair, suppose that negative 
inspections arise at T. 2T, ..., (k--I)T and a 
failure arises before kT (see Figure 4.4). 
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Negative inspections Failure arises 
Time 
UT 2T (k-I)T it zi+h 
't-- Fault arises 
Figure 4.4. A case with a failure before U. 
In this case, since the required costs are (k-1) times the inspection costs plus a failure 
repair cost, and the probability of this case arising, P(k-l), f I is 
Pr((k- 1)T<zt <kT and h <kT-it) 
fAT 
1) T. q(tt)F(kT - ti)dit, 
(4.51) 
it follows that the expected cost due to a failure in ((k-I)T, Iff) is given by 
'T 
I) Ci + Cý) 
ýký 
-1) T 
q(zi)F(kT - it)dzt, k=1,2,3, (4.52) 
, where, as before, C, is the failure repair costs. Summing over all possible values of 
k, the total expected cost to a renewal point caused by a failure repair is given by 
x 'T 1: ((k - I)C, + Cb) q(u)F(kT - zi)dit. k=l k-I)r 
(4.53) 
We have, therefore, that the expected renewal cycle cost, E(cycle cost), is the sum of 
the expected costs resulting from inspection cycles which, from equations (4.50) and I 
(4.53), is given by 
.0 'T 
E(cycle cost) = 2] ((kC,, + 
Cd ) 
k-I)T q(u)(I - F(kT - u))du k=l 
((k - I)Cj + 
Cb ) 
fkT- 
1) T q(ii)F(kT - u)dul 
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I(kCý. , 
Cd) 
fT 
1) T. q (u)du + (Cb - 
Ci 
- 
Cd) 
'T 
q(u)F(kT-u)du). (4.54) A 
fk-I)T 
Letting we have that 
.0T 
E(qvcle cost) =I , 
j(kCj + Cd) ((k-I)T+v)dv 
k=l 
'T 
(C,, 
- 
Ci 
- 
Cd) fq((k 
- I)T + v)F(T - v)dv). (4.55) 
Now, we consider the exPected renewal cycle length, E(cycle length), where 
E(cycle length) =Z E(length of inspection cycle) x Pr(Inspection of the cycle) 
inspection cycle 
E(length of failure cycle) x Pr(failure of the cycle). (4.56) 
failure Cycle 
Similarly to the above, for a positive inspection renewal point, since the required length 
is of the form k times the inspection period plus downtime, and the probability of an 
inspection repair at kT is as given in equation (4.48), the expected length is given by 
X'T 
2: k(T-- d, ) 
ýý-I)T 
q(u)(I - F(kT - it))dti, 
k=l 
(4.57) 
where, as before, cý. is the downtimes for an inspection. To find the expected lendi 
to a renewal point of a failure repair, consider the random variable X, which is the time 
to failure from the last inspection (see Figure 4.5). 
Negative inspections Failure arises 
T ime 
T 2T (k-- I) T it zi+h 
t-- Fault arises 
Figure 4.5. Definition of random variable X. 
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In this case, tile required length is (k-1) times the inspection period plus inspection 
downtime, the expected tirne to failure from the last inspection, E(X)ý and the 
downtime for a failure repair. To formulate the expected time to failure from the last 
inspection, E(X), if the probability density and the cumulative distribution function of 
X are Sk-I(x) and Sk-, (x) respectively, the edf Sk-I (x) is the convolution of the 
distribution of u. and h given it + h: 5 kT and (k - I) T: ý it :5 kT. So we have, 
because of perfect inspections, that the cumulative distribution of X for the interval 
((k-I)T, k7) is given by 
Sk-I (X)=Pr{lt+h:: ý(k-I)T+x and (k-I)T:! ýu:! ý(k-I)T+x 
given it +h< kT and (k - I) T: 5 it < kT) 
Pr{it+h:: ý(k-I)T+x and (k-I)T: ýit<(k-I)T+xj 
Pr(u +h< kT and (k - I)T:! ý it < kTj 
k I)T+x 
k' T q(u)F((k - I)T +x- u)du 
f 'T - fo r 0: v<T. (4.58) 
k-I)T q(zt)F(kT - zt)dit 
Letting zi=(k-I)T+v and applying the equation (4.51), the equation (4.58) becomes 
Sk-1 (X) -ý «k - 1) T+ v) F(x - v)dv 
Also. the pdf of X is given by 
Sk-I W P(k-1), f 
((k - 1) T -1, v)f (x - v)dv 
0 
for 0:!: -tx<T. (4.59) 
for 0:! ý x<T (4.60) 
otherwise , 
where. as before, J(h) is the pdf of the delay time h. The expected time to failure 
from the last inspection, E(X) is, therefore, given by 
so 
T 
E(X) = 
f-ys(x)dv 
=1fx 
fq«k 
- 1) T+ v)f (x - v)dvdv. (4.61) Pf 
Since the probability of a renewal point initiated by a failure repair is given by equation 
(4.51), we have that the expected length to a renewal point caused by a failure repair is 
given by 
x "T Z 
((k - 1)(T + d, ) + E(X) + 
db 
1) Tq 
(u)F(kT - zt)dzi, (4.62) 
k=l 
where, as before, db is the downtime for a failure repair. Summing over two cases, 
we have the expected renewal cycle length, E(cycle length), is given by 
00 "T 
E(cycle length) = 2: fk(T + di) ' q(zi)(I - 
F(kT - u))dit k=l K-I)T 
((k - 1)(T + cý. ) + Eff) + 
db ) 
fkT- 
1) T q(it)F(kT - zi)dti) 
T 
(k(T + di) 
-I)T 
q(u)du 
k=l 
(E(X) + db-T-di) 
fkT- 
1) T q(zi)F(kT - u)du). (4.63) 
Letting zt=(k-l)T+v, we have that 
co 
E (qycle length) =E Ik (T + di 
T 
((k - 1) T+ v)di, 
k=l 
T 
(E(X) + db- T-d, ) fq((k - I)T + v)F(T - v)dv) 
mTT 
=E, (k(T+d, ) ((k-I)T+v)dv+ x' ((k-I)T+v)f(x-i, )dvdy 
k=l 
+(dý -T-d, )f, 
ý((k-I)T+v)F(T-v)dv). (4.64) 
81 
Thirdly, for a downtime model, we consider the expected renewal cycle downtime, 
E(cycle downtime). Similarly, for a renewal point of a positive inspection. since the 
downtime is kcý and the robability of this case arising is P., , we have the expected Ip 
downtime is given by 
X 
jkdj q(u)(1-F(kT-zt))du. 
k=l T 
(4.65) 
Also, for a renewal point of a failure repair, since the downtime is (k - 1)di + db and 
the robability of this case arising is 
P(k-1).., 
', the expected downtime is p0 
'T 
((k - I)di + db) q(zt)F(kT - it)dit. k-I)T (4.66) 
Sununing over two cases, we have the expected renewal cycle downtime, E(cy-cle I 
downtime), given by 
E(cycle downtime) (kd, q(u)(I - F(kT - it))du 
k=l 
fkT- 
1) T 
((k - I)di + d5) 
fkT- 
1) T q(zt)F(kT - zt)dii) 
= 2], {kdi 
fkT- 
1) T q(zi)dit -- (db- di) 
fkT- 
1) T q(zt)F(kT- zt)dit). (4.67) k=l 
Letting u=(k- I)T+v, we have that 
X 
E(cycle downtime) =Z (kdi 
fq((k 
- I) T+ v)dv 
k=l 
T 
(db -di) ((k-I)T+v)F(T-v)dv). i (4.6S) 
We can, therefore, have that, from the equations (4.55) and (4.64), the steady state 
expected cost per unit time C(7) is 
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C(T) = 
E(cycle cost) 
E(cycle length) 
(4.69) 
and. from the equations (4.64) and (4.68), the steady state expected downtime per unit 
time D(T) is 
D(T) = 
E(cycle dowitime) 
E(cycle length) 
(4.70) 
From the above equations (4.69) or (4.70), we can determine the optimal inspection 
period T' which minimises the long run expected cost per unit time or the long run 
expected downtime per unit time. 
4.4.3 A Simpler Delay Time Model 
In order to compare the delay time model with the semi-Markov inspection 
model, the general delay time models of the subsection 4.4.2 must be reduced to a 
simpler and more restricted form. For example, the initial time it is now assumed to 
be exponentially distributed with a mean given by I/k to satisfy the Markov property. 0 
If the initial point it has an exponential distribution with a mean given by I/X, Z7 
q(u) = Ae-"' 
and from equations (4.55), (4.64) and (4.68), we have that 
f 'T 
-). (k _1)7. 
T 
, q((k - 
1) T+ v)dv =e 
fq(i, )dv 
and 
(4.71) 
(4.72) 
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fr A(k-I)T T 
, 
iq((k - I)T+v)F(T-v)dv = e- 
fq(v)F(T-v)di,. (4.73) 
So, it follows that the equation (4.55) for the expected cycle cost becomes 
-A(k-I)T 
T 
E(qycle cost) {(kCi + Cd)e q(v)dv 
k=l 
(k-I)T 
T 
(C, - Ci - C, )e' 
. 
fq(v)F(T-v)dv) 
T Co 
-A(k-1)T 
T0 
-Ä(k-1)T Ci fq (v) dv2: ke + C, fq(v)dv2: e 
k=I k=I 
T oo 
(cb 
- 
ci 
- 
cd )fq(v)F(T-v)dvEe (4.74) 
k=l 
Also, we have that 
2: e-"(k-1)r = -- (4.75) 
k=I 
i- 
Co M OD 1 
ke -;. (k-1)T e -). 
(k-1)T )(2: e -). 
(k-1)T) 
-d 
k=I k=I k=I 
- (I 
I 
-). T )21 
(4.76) 
and 
fT 
q (v) dv =I-e (4.77) 
Re-arranging the equation (4.74), we finally have that 
rT 
E(, ývcle cost) = 
Ci +Cdfq(v)dv + (C5 - Ci - Cd) 
fq (v) F(T - v)dv 
. (4.78) I-e-lT 
S4 
Also. in the equation (4.64), since 
r 
«k - 1) T+ v)f (x - v) di-dv =e v)di, dv, (4.79) 
_, 
q (V)f (X 
using the equations (4.72), (4.73), (4.75), and (4.76), it follows that the expected 
cycle length equation (4.64) becomes 
Tc 
E(cycle len-th) = (T+d, )fq(v)dvy ke 
k=J 
x fq(v)f(x - v)dvd-cý- 
; (k-1)T Y- e- 
k=I 
(db -T-d, ) 
fq(v)F(T 
- v)dv2: e 
k=I 
T+d: + I. -cfq(v)f(x-v)dvd-c+(db -T-d, )fq(v)F(T-v)dv 
I-e -AT -. 
(4.80) 
In the same manner, the expected renewal cycle downtime, E(eycle doivnthne), is 
given by 
T 
di + (d6 - d, ) 
fq(v) F(T - v)dv 
E(cycle downtime) =-I- 
e-). T 
We have, therefore, from the equations (4.78) and (4.80), that the expected cost 
per unit time QY) is given by 
F -T Ci + Cý, fq(v)dv + (Cb - Ci - Cd)fý(v)F(T-v)dv 
C(T) =-T-- (4.82) 
T+d: + fx fq(v)f (x - v)dvdy + (d6 -T-d, ) 
f'q(v)F(T 
- i, )dv 
and, from the equations (4.80) and (4.8 1), the expected downtime per unit time D(7) 
is given by 
S5 
T 
d, +(db-di) (i, )F(T-v)di, 
D(T) TT (4.83) T+d, + 
1. 
v 
fq(v)f (x - v)dvdy + (db- T-di ) 
fq(v) F(T - v)di, 
From the above equations (4.82) and (4.83), we can obtain the optimal inspection 
period T' which minimizes the expected cost per unit time or the expected downtime 
per unit time respectively. In the section 4.5, using the equations (4.82) or (4.83), 
the numerical examples will be given to compare with the semi-Markov inspection 
model. 
4.4.4 Evaluation of the Delay Time Model 
Two basic models of the inspection process have been fornaulated, the delay time 
model and the semi-Markov model. A semi-Markov inspection model provides a 
means of niodellin- the effect of inspections on the failure rate, operating cost and 
downtime of repairable machinery. It is necessary to express the working condition of 
the system as states of a Markov chain, and establish from data or otherwise, the 
Markov property and associated transition probabilities. This means that this model 
can on])- be used in applied situation when the initial point of a fault has a negative 
exponential distribution. The advantages of a semi-Markov model include a well 
established theory, and a mechanism of investigating formally the structure of an 
optimal solution. For example, we have assumed here a constant inspection period, and 
thereby constrained the search space for an optimal policy. This constraint is 
pragmatic. since the solution needs to be workable. A delay time based investigation of 
non-uniforni inspection strategies is possible. However, the semi-Markov theory 
provides a well established (though computationally demanding) means of investigation 
here. 
In contrast to the serni-Markov inspection model, the delay time model has only a 
few restrictions. The distribUtion ftinctions q(ii) and j(h) and their parameters are 
vital to delay tirne modelling. Once these two distributions are known. it is possible to 
model the operating cost and availability ftinctions for any inspection practice of 
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interest. Two methods for estimatinia these two distributions have been developed, 
namely the Subjective method and the objective method, which have been described in 
the chapter 3. Also. this model may have any distribution for it and h regardless of a 
Markov property and Markov transition probability. This generality of the delay time 
model and its basic simplicity are very useftil when attempting to apply it to real-world 
situations. 
4.5 Numerical Examples 
4.5.1 Generating the Data using Simulation 15 t5 
When xN-e are faced with the preventive maintenance problem of an industrial plant, 
the data collection is of prime importance. In attempting to apply models of maintenance 
in a real-world situation, the immediate problem is often not that the model does not fit the 
data, but that there are no data to be fitted. In such data-starved situations, one wishes to 
initiate collection of any available data as quickly as possible. Much thought needs to be 
given to data. that is. its quality, its cost. its acquisition and its use in modelling. It is 
moreover difficult to , et the ideal data for model fitting in real-world situations. In spite 
of this, we need the ideal data to be fitted to the model of section 4.3 and 4.4 if we are to 
compare two models. It is reasonable here to generate the data using computer simulation. 
From the system description for modelling of the section 4.2, we note that there are 
two random variables, that is, the initial point it and the delay time h. In order to carry 
out a simulation of a system having the initial point it and the delay time h we have to 
specify the probability distributions of these random variables. Then, given that these 
random variables follow particular distributions, the simulation proceeds by generating 
values of these random variables from the appropriate distribution. In this section, we 
select the exponential and the WeibUll distributions as the distributions for these randorn 
variables fora numerical example. 
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If the distributions of the initial point it and the delay time It are specified, we address 
the issue of how we can generate random variables with these distributions in order to 
simulate the process. -flie basic ingredient needed for the method of generating random 
variables is a source of independent identically distributed uniform random variables with 
(0,1 ), U(O' I ). For this reason.. it is very important that a statistically reliable U(0,1) 
random-number generator is available. Most computer installations have a convenient 
random-number generator. We therefore use this computer random-number. 
Using this random-number we can generate the random variables of the initial point it 
and the delay time h. If the exponential random variable with the mean 1/k, ý>O, is 
considered for an initial point u or a delay time h, we can derive the following 
algorithm for a exponential random variable X. 
1. Generate U-U(0,1). 
2. Set X logU and return to the main progam. 
If the Weibull distribution with the shape parameter cc>O and the scale parameter P>O is 
selected, the Weibull random variable X is generated by the following algorithm. -tý 
1. Generate U-U(0,1). 
1 
2. Set X=, 8(-IogU), 7 and return to the main program. 
Once the random variables of the initial point it and the delay time h are generated, rD 
the simulation can be built under the system description for modelling of the section 4.2. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the simulation progress by presenting the flow chart. In Figure 4.6, 
as before, T is a present inspection period, di is a downtime for an inspection and db 
is a downtime for a failure and A" is a pre-specified number of renewal points for a 
simulation run and RP is a present renewal point time. 
ss 
Start 
I 
Choose T, N, 
initialized, db 
RP=O 
Generate it 
k=l 
Yeiý < 
Tý- 
Print RP+k(T+d)-di, 
'Fault free' 
k k+I 
I Generate hI 
ti+h < kT 
Print RP+k(T+di)-d, Print RP+zi+h+(k- I)di, 
'Detected a fault' 'Failure' 
T 
RP = RP+k(T+d, ) RP=RP+zi+h+(k-I)d, +db 
-j 
in > 
y 
Stop 
Figure 4.6. Flow chart for generating failure and inspection data for a single component system. 
Including these downtimes, di and db ý we can obtain the expected downtime per unit 
time D(Y). Also, If the inspection costs Ci, the inspection repair costs per fault Cd 
and the failure repair costs C, are included, we can derive the expected cost per unit time 
C(T). We will discuss the method of getting C(7) and D(T) using the simulation in the 
next subsection. 
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4.5.2 A. Markovian Case of the Fault Arrival Rate 
Numerical example of the cost model outlined in the section 4.3 and 4.4 has 
been evaluated for demonstration purposes. First of all, consider the case that the fault 
arrival rate has a Markovian property. Assuming that the fault arrival rate has been 0 
taken as ý. faults per unit time, it follows that the pdf of the initial point it is given by 
q(it) = Ae-ý". (4.84) 
Firstly, consider the case that the pdf of the delay time h has been chosen as an 
exponential distribution with the mean Uct, (x>O, 
= ae'. (4.85) 
Assuming that the data have been given in the real-world situation or using simulation, C' 17 
X and a have been estimated as X 0.1 and a=0.05. Also, costs are taken by 
Ci =10 units, Cd=2 units and C, 100 units and downtimes for a cost model are 
taken by di = 0.08 time units, d. = 0.1 S time units. 
Then, from the semi-Markov inspection model of the section 4.2, the expected 
average cost per unit time a (R) can be given as a function of the inspection period 0C 1-7 
T. That is, according to the change of the inspection period T, we can obtain the 
expected average cost per unit time o,,, (R). Also, from the equation (4.82) of the 1. 
simpler delay time model of the subsection 4.4.3, the expected cost per unit time C(7-) 
can be obtained. To compare the two models fairly, a simulation model can be used. 
It was shown in the flow chart of the Figure 4.6 of the previous subsection 4.5.1 that 
for a given inspection period T the required data can be generated. Changing slightly 
the flow chart of the Figure 4.6 into the flow chart of the Figure 4.7, we can get the 
expected cost pe'r unit time C(7) or the expected downtime per unit time D(7) 
accordin, 2 to the inspection period T. In the Figure 4.7, TC is the total cost and TD is 
the total downtime. 
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Start 
Choose T, N, 
initialize di, db, C, Cd, Cb 
RP=O, TC=O, TD=O 
Im =1 I 
Generate it 
k=l 
i 
I 
es 
hlo 
Tc = Tc+cj 
TD = TD+d, 
k k+l 
I11 TCýTC+Cb 
TC= TC+Ci+Cd TD = TD+db TD = TD+d, 
Generate h 
Ye-s 
-zi+h 
< kT? 
__-- 
RP = RP+k(T+di) 
tio 
ni m+1 
RP = RP+zt+h+(k- I)d, +db 
C(7) = TCIRP 
D(7) = TDIRP 
Stop 
Figure 4.7. Flow chart of simulation model for generating the cost and downtime 
for a single component system. 
91 
The results for these models, in terms of the expected cost, are shown in Figures 4.8, 
4.9, and 4.10. which represent the outcome of different small time intervals At of the 
semi-Markov inspection model. 
3.9 
3.7 
E 3.5 
3.1 
19 
2.7 
From Delay Time Model 
From Simulation 
From Semi-Markov Model 
468 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Inspection Period 
Figure 4.8. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a Markovian case of the fault arrival rate Nvhen At = 1, the delay tinie has an 
exponential distribution. ?, =O. I, a7-0.05, C, =10, Cd =2, Cb = 100, di = 0.08, and 
db = 0.18. ) 
3.9 
3.7 
3.5 
3.3 
3.1 
-). 9 
2.7 
From Delay Time Model 
From Simulation 
From Semi-lvlark-ov Model 
2468 10 12 14 
Inspection Period 
16 Is 20 
Figure 4.9. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a Nfarkovian case of the fault arrival rate when At = 0.5, the delay time has an 
exponential distribution. X=0.1. a--0.05, Ci =10, 
Cd =2, Cb = 100, d, = 0.08, and 
db = O*IS, l 
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From Delay Time Model 
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From Semi-Nfarkov Model 
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Imspection Period 
Figure 4.10. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a Markovian case of the fault arrival rate when At 0.25, the delay time has an 
exponential distribution, X=0.1, a=0.05, C, =10, Cd =2, Cb = 100, di = 0.08, and 
db = 0.1 S. ) 
From Figure 4.8, there is a little difference between the delay time model curve and the 
semi-Markov model curve. The reason is that the delay time model is continuous and 
the Markov model is discrete. In establishing the semi-Markov inspection model, we 
have approximately calculated the average cost per unit time, g, (R) , or the average 
downtime per unit time, MR), on condition that the time interval At is very small. 
Accordingly, the accuracy of the average cost per unit time, g, (R), or the avera,:,, e 
downtime per unit time, MR), is dependent upon the time interval At. As expected, 
we can demonstrate that as the time interval At decreases the semi-Markov model 
cun-e approaches to the delay time model curve (see Figure 4.8,4.9 and 4.10). Also, 
the Figures show that the simulation curve is consistent with the delay time model curve 
and the senii-Markov model curve. 
Changing the scale of the cost per unit time and removing the simulation curve of 
Figure 4.10, we can compare the senii-Markov model curve with the delay time model 
curve in detail. The result is shown in Fisiure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11. The detailed expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a Nfark-ovian case of the fault arrival rate when At = 0.25, the delay time has an exponential 
distribution, k=0.1, a: --0.05, C, =10, Cd=2, Cb = 100, di = 0.08, and d, = 0.18. ) 
Figure 4.11 shows that the semi-Markov model curve is still consistent with the delay 
time model curve and from the semi-Markov model curve and the delay time model 
curve we can obtain an optimal inspection period point which minimise the cost per unit 
time 
Secondly, assuming that the fault arrival rate has been taken as X faults per unit 
time, consider a case where the pdf of the delay time h has been chosen as a Weibull 
distribution with the shape parameter cc>O and the scale parameter 0>0, 
ag-"h-e (4.86) 
We assume that X, cc and P have been estimated as X=0.1, (x=1.5 and P=I. Also, 
costs are taken by C, =I 0 units, Cd=2 units and Cb = 100 units and downtimes for 
a cost model are taken by di = 0.08 time units, db = 0.18 time units. Then, 
similarly, we can get the expected cost per unit time C(T) according to the inspection 
period T from the semi-Markov inspection model, the delay time model and from the 
simulation. Although this case is non-Nfarkovian assuming Weibull distribution, 
transition probabilities may still be calculated using equations (4.45), (4.46), and 
(4.47) and a **Senii-%i, Iarkov Type" model evaluated. 
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The results of such a process are shown in Figure 4.12,4.13) and 4.14, which 
differ according to the time interval At of the semi-Markov inspection model. 
10 
From Delay Time Model 
From Simulation 
From Semi-Markov Model 
05 10 15 20 
Inspection Period 
Figure 4.12. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a Markovian case of the fault arrival rate when At = 1, the delay time has a Weibull 
distribution. X=0.1, oL--l. 5,0=1, Ci =10. Cd=2, Cb = 100 1 
di = 0.08, and 
db = 0.18. ) 
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10 
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From Delay Time Model 
From Simulation 
From Semi-i'vfarkov Model 
05 10 15 20 
InsPection Period 
Figure 4. U 3. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a Markovian case of the fault arrival rate when At = 0.5, the delay tinie has a Weibull 
distribution. ), =O. I, (x=1.5, P=I, Ci =10. C, j =2. Cb = 100 1 
di = 0.08, and 
d5 = 0.1 S. ) 
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Figure 4.14. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a Markovian case of the fault arrival rate when Ai = 0.1, the delay time has a Weibull 
distribution, X=0.1. cc7-1.5, P=I. Ci =10, 
Cd 
=2, 
Cb = 100 
1 di = 0.08, and 
db = 0.18. ) 
Through Figure 4.12,4.13 and 4.14, we can demonstrate that as the time interval At 
decreases the semi-Markov model curve is getting consistent with the delay time model I 
curve. This means that the delay time formulae and the semi-Markov formulae for the 
same inspection problem lead to the same results as expected. Difference between the 
models is to be formed in the complications of the formulation and the extent of the 
numerical work required, where the delay time formulation is much simpler in this case. 
It is arguable that if transition probabilities for the semi-Markov inspection model had to 
be estimated from actual data via a delay time formulation as here, the semi-Markov 
inspection model would be even more demanding than the delay time model. I 
4.5.3 A Non-Markovian Case of the Fault Arrival Rate 
In the previous subsection, a case when the fault arrival rate has a Markov property 
lias been discussed. As a consequence of the previous subsection, we found that when the 
fault arrival rate has a Markov property the system can be fitted to the semi-Markov 
inspection model and the delay time model. If the fault arrival rate does not have a 
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Markov property, the system should not be fitted to the semi-Markov inspection model. 
However, as already stated the delay time model can be fitted to any system regardless of 
the Markov property of the fault arrival rate. To make this point clearly, we now consider 
a case when the fault arrival rate also has a non-Markov property. 
Assuming that the initial point it has a Weibull distribution, i. e., a case when the fault 
arrival rate has a non-Markov property, it follows that the pdf of the initial point it is 
given by 
q(u) = a, 8-'zt'-le 16 (4.87) 
where (x, (x>O, is the shape parameter and P, P>O, is the scale parameter. Also, 
assuming that the delay time h has a Weibull distribution, we have that the pdf of the 
delay time h is given by 
(4. SS) 
and the cdf of the delay time h is given by 
F(h)=I-e (4. S9) 
where y, y>O, is the shape parameter and 6,5>0, is the scale parameter. Applying the 
equations (4.87), (4.88) and (4.89) to equations (4.55) and (4.64), Nve obtain after 
some algebra the expected cost per unit time formulations. Rearranging the equations 
(4.55) and (4.64), we have that 
XTT 
E(cycle cost) = C, Zk q((k - 1) T+ v)di, + CdE ((k-I)T+v)dv 
k=l k=l 
C, 
- 
Cý, )j ((k - 1) T+ v)F(T - v)dv. (4.90) 
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and 
.0T 
E(cycle length) = (T+di)Ekfq((k - I)T+ v)di, 
k=I 
.0T 
+1 f-c fq «k - 1) T+ v)f (x - v)dvd-c 
k=I 
+ (db -T-d, )E 
fq((k-I)T+v)F(T-v)cA-. (4.91) 
k=l 
.. T 
q((k - 1) T+ v)dv, In the equations (4.90) and (4.91), since the terms, k 
TT fq((k--I)T+i-)dv, fq((k-I)T+v)F(T-v)dv and 
T JX fq ((k - 1) T -I v) f (x - v) dv dx 
decrease as k increase, we can neglect the terms when they are less than the constant 6 
which does not affect the total value. 
Given the data ftom a real-world situation or the data simulated data, we assume that 
the parameters for the distributions of the initial point zi and the delay time h have 
been estimated as cc=2, P=I, y--l. 5 and 5=1.3. Also, costs are taken as C, =10 
units. Cd=2 units and Cb =5 units and downtimes for a cost model are taken by 
di = 0.08 time units, db= 0.18 time units. Then, taking e= 10-4, we can 
numerically get the expected cost per unit time C(7) according to the inspection period 
T from the delay time model, the semi-Markov inspection model and the simulation. 
'Me results for these models are shown in Figures 4.15,4.16 and 4.17, which are 
changed according to the time interval At of the semi-Markov inspection model. From 
Figures 4.15.4.16 and 4.17, we can see that even though the time interval At 
decreases the semi-Markov model curve is not consistent with the delay time model curve 
and the simulation curve. On the other hand, the delay time model curve is consistent 
with the simulation curve. 
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Figure 4.15. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(TI-ds is a non-Markovian case of the fault arrival rate when At--I, the delay time has a 
Weibull distribution, a7-2, P=I, y=1.5,5=1.3, C, =10, Cd=2, Cb = 5, d, = 0.08, 
and db = 0*18*) 
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Figure 4.16. The expected cost per Unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a non-Markovian case of the fault arrival rate when At--0.5, the delay time has a 
Weibull distribution, oc=2,0=1, y=1.5,8=1.3. C, =10. Cj =2, 
Cb 
= -5. di = 0.08, 
and 
db = 0*18 *) 
"" .- ." 
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Figure 4.17. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a non-Markovian case of the fault arrival rate when At = 0.1, the delax, time has a 
Weibull distribution, a=2,0=1, y--l. 5,5=1.3, C. =10, Cd=2, Cb = 5, di = 0.08, 
and d. = 0.18. ) 
Also, to compare the semi-Markov model curve with the delay time model curve in 
detail, we change the scale of the cost per unit time and remove the simulation curve of 
Figure 4.17, see Figure 4.18. Figure 4.18 shows that the semi-Markov model curve 
has a notable difference with the delay time model curve as the inspection period T 
increases. Furthermore, from Figure 4.18. we can see that a finite optimal inspection 
period point which minimises the cost per unit time can be identified from the delay time 
model curve, but cannot be decided from the seiiii-Markov model cun"e because as the 
inspection period T increases the cost per unit time of the semi-Markov model curve 
decreases. 'nie reason is that since the initial point it and the delay time h have a 
Weibull distribution which does not have a Markov property the failure process can not 
follow the Markov process required of the semi-Markov model. T'lierefore, when die 
system does not have a Markov property, the system cannot be fitted to the senii-Markov 
inspection model but can be fitted to the delay time model, 
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2.6 
2.4 
2.2 
2 
1.8 
From Delav Time Model 
-From Semi-i-vlarkov Model 
468 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Inspection Period 
Figure 4. IS. The detailed expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is a non-I'vlarkovian case of the fault arrival rate when At = 0.1, the delay time has a Weibull 
distribution, (x=2.0=1, y--l. 5,5=1.3, Ci =10, Cd=2. Cb =5, di =0.08, and d. =0.18. ) 
4.6 Comparison and Conclusions 
As expected, the semi-Markov inspection model is consistent with the delay time 
model in situations when the Markov assumption is valid, see Figures 4.8 to 4.10 and 
Figures 4.12 to 4.14 of the numerical examples. Here the key point is that the system 
has a Markov property because the initial point 11 has a negative exponential 
distribution which has a memoryless property. In real-world situations, however, there 
are few cases with data for which the Markov property can be established. Even when 
the data are given, it may be difficult to justify the Markov property and to get its state 
transition probabilities from the data. Either way, if the system has a Markov property, 
it was shown in section 4.3. that the deterioration probability iri can be estimated 
based upon the delay time concept; that is the state transition probabilities follow from 
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delay time parameters. Relying on the delay time concept, the semi-Markov inspection 
model can now be used for the first time in practice, for the single component system. 
In a single component system. as discussed in the numerical examples of the section 
4.5, if the initial point it does not satisfy the Markov property, the system cannot be 
fitted to the seiiii-Markov inspection model. Figures 4.15 to 4.13 illustrate that an Z: ý 
optimal finite inspection period point, which minimises the expected cost per unit time, 
may not be given by the senii-Markov inspection model because as the inspection period 
T increases the expected cost per unit time of the semi-Markov inspection model 
decreases continuously. Also, Figures 4.15 to 4.17 illustrate that the semi-Markov Z. 
inspection model curve is far from the simulation curve and the delay time model curve. 
In contrast to the semi-Markov inspection model, the delay time model can not only 
give the optimal inspection period point in Figures 4.15 to 4.18, but also the delay I 
L_ 
time model curve is consistent with the simulation curve in Figures 4.15 to 4.17. We 
have seen that delay time model may be fitted to a large class of inspection / PM 
problems, and that techniques exist for parameter estimation and model validation. In 
the case of a semi-Markov model, the class of problems being addressed requires the 
Markov property to be satisfied. In delay time model terms, this means the time to 
initial point is negative exponential. In the case considered, the Markov model is 
derived tinder the assumption of a delay time based configuration which allows the 
transition probabilities to be evaluated. A process of analytic continuation enables 
values for notional transition probabilities -to be calculated even when the Markov 
assumption is not valid. Figures 4.15 to 4.17 indicate the order of error introduced 
by this 'approximation'. Evidently the Markov model cannot be assumed to be robust to 
the Markov assumptions, and therefore Markov models become poor approximation for 
non-Markov cases. This emphasises the recognised generality of the delay time 
formulation for actual problem solutions. 
Senii-Markov inspection models have provided a useful means of modellinIg the 
effect of inspections on the failure rate of repairable system. They enable the structure 
of optimal solutions to be identified. However. as already stated, in attempting to apply 
such models in a real-world situation, it may prove difficult to justify tile Markov 
property assumptions and to determine the state transition probabilities or the 
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deterioration probability from the data. When the initial point it has a negative 
exponential distribution, the system can be fitted to the semi-Markov inspection model 
by estimating the deterioration probability from the data using the delay time concept. 
In the case that the initial point it is not negative exponentially distributed, the system 
cannot be formally fitted to the semi-Markov inspection model. In contrast to the semi- 
Markov inspection model, the delay time model is free from such constraints. In 
addition, the formulation of the delay time model is seen as being much simpler than 
that of the semi-Markov inspection model, and the delay time model requires less 
computing time than the semi-Markov ins ection model to compute solutions. Ip 
Therefore, the delay time model is more general and practical than the semi-Markov I 
inspection model in applying to real-world situations. 
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Chapter 5 
SEMI-MARKOV AND DELAY TIME MODELS OF MAINTENANCE 
FOR A MULTI-COMPONENT SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the serni-Markov inspection model and the delay time model 
for a single component system have been discussed. As a consequence of the previous 
chapter, it was seen that the delay time model was more general than the semi-Markov 
inspection model in terms of application to real-world situations for a single component 
system. There will, however, be few systems with a single component in a real-world 
situation. The system usually consists of many components and is therefore more 
complex. Thus these models need to be extended to represent a multi-component 
system. 
In a multi-component system. the fact is that the scientific management of planned 
preventive maintenance will rely on the modelling of probabilistic parameters which can 
change. If the process of equipment deterioration and degradation were entirely 
deterministic, there would be no need for frequent inspection and condition monitoring 
Changes in parameters that define equipment condition are generally probabilistic. 
This explains why, as Christer [1984] points out, many of the published theoretical 
models adopt a Markov approach, where states are usually 'operating', 'operating but 
fault present'. and 'failed'. Transitions between these states occur according to 
probabilistic laws, with each state being associated with the coincident occurrence of an 
inspection and some associated maintenance actions. 
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A number of such models, as Baker and Christer [1994] point out, have a seemingly 
arbitrary nature in their assumptions and the lack of evident conviction in applicability 
to the real-world. Nlost of them assume that the working condition of the system can be 
expressed as a discrete-time Markov chain with states 0,1,2, ..., Nf, where the state 0 
represents a good state, the states 1,2, ..., N are degraded states and the state f is the 
failed state. Transition probabilities are assumed given. In practice, it is, as already 
indicated. difficult to define the degraded states for the deteriorated system. and also 
difficult to determine their transition probabilities. So in general, papers on Markov 
modellin- in maintenance do not mention the 'fit' of the model to data and no examples 
of actual applications or case-studies are available. This applies to both component 
models and complex system models. The value of these papers is to be found in an 
investigation of problem structure. I 
A robust approach to model and solve industrial maintenance problems has been 
introduced and developed as the Delay Time Model (DTM) in a series of recent papers 
dating from 1984. We will see that a serni-Markov inspection model can be established 
here using the delay time concept. If the degraded states selected to represent the 
condition of the deteriorated system in a semi-Markov inspection model can be 
expressed in terms of the expected number of defects, we can easily define the working 
condition of the system as a Markov chain state. Also, if we know the fault arrival rate 
X and the probability density function (pdj) of the delay time h, it is possible to 
transform the fault arrival rate and the pdf of the delay time h into transition 
probabilities of a senii-Markov inspection model. It must be remembered that there are 
methods for estimating delay time parameters, the objective method and the subjective 
method. 
In this chapter, we consider a repairable complex system with many components that 
may fail or suffer breakdown during the course of its service lifetime. For this system, 
a typical semi-Markov inspection model and a delay time model are presented and the 
results are compared. 
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5.2 Basic System Description for Modelling 
Consider a system for which the number of components is very large. We assume 
that if any one component of the system fails, the system is considered to have failed. 
For this system. an inspection policy which minimises the expected total long-run 
average cost or downtime can be derived. For modelling purposes, consider the general I 
case of an inspection policy, which may be characterised by the following assumptions. 
(1) The condition of the system can be observed by inspections only, and a failure will 
be observed immediately at its occurrence. 
(2) An inspection is undertaken every T time units. 
(3)) Inspections are perfect in that any defect present within the system will be identified 
at inspection, and no new fault generated because of inspection. 
(4) An inspection requires Ci cost units and di time units. 
(5) Defects identified at an inspection will be repaired within the allocated inspection 
time, di, and the mean repair cost per defect is Cd units. 
(6) The component is repaired immediately upon failure and the mean repair cost and 
time for a failure repair are Cb cost units and db time units respectively. 
(7) The component is as good as new after repair. 
(8) Defects are independent of each other and arise as a homogeneous Poisson Process 
(HPP), with rate of occurrence of defects X. 
(9) The delay time h of a defect is independent of the time of origin, and all defects 
share a common delay time pdf J(h) and cdf F(h). 
As a consequence of assumptions (3), (5)ý (7), and (8), an inspection will renew the 
systern because all components with no fault are essentially regarded as new by 
assumption (8) due to the memoryless property and the fact that faults in all 
components are identified and renewed after repair at the inspection time, see 
assumptions (-3 )), (5), and (7). It is noted that assumption (3) will be relaxed to 
allow imperfect inspection according to need in the subsection 5.3.2 and 5.4 1 
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For a system satisfying the above assumptions, we may collect data which includes 
the inspection time point, the inspection result, and the time of any failures. 
Characteristic data is summarised in Table 5.1 as an example, when inspections are 
occurred every T=l 0 time units. 
Table 5.1. Characteristic structure of the data of the multi-component system 
for T=10 units. 
Time point Inspection result or failure Action 
0 Normally operated No action 
10 2 faults detected Repair 
20 5 faults detected Repair 
27 Failure Repair 
30 1 fault detected Repair 
40 No fault detected No action 
44 Failure Repair 
This data indicates that 2 defects arose within the period (0,10) and identified at 
T=10,5 defects arose within the period (10,20) and was identified at T=20,1 defect 
arose within the period (20,27) and lead to a failure at T=27, I defect arose within 
the period (20,30) and was identified at T=30, and so on. If it is not possible to 
obtain such data from actual maintenance and operating records, assuming a delay time 
model, it is possible to simulate the process and thereby obtain these data. Either way, 
having the data, it may then be used to estimate the underlying delay time parameters 
and in this way model the real-world, or simulated real-world, situation. These 
parameter estimating procedures re-gain the parameter. 
this process provides a test of the estimating procedure. 
describe the process of simulating data. 
When the data is simulated, 
hi section 5.5, we will 
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5.3 Serni-Markov Inspection Model 
5.3.1 A Semi-Markov Inspection Nlodel for a Perfect Inspection Policy 
The inspection system described in section 5.2 can, as in the semi-Markov 
inspection model for a multi-component system, be analysed within the framework of a 
semi-Markov decision process to find the long term consequences of different Z 
inspection periods. For a multi-component system with discrete-time Markovian 
deterioration, the system can, as in the paper of Tijms and Van Der Duyn Schouten' 
[ 1985], be observed in one of the working conditions 0,1,2, ..., N, 
f where N is the 
upper bound of the number of defects, the -vNrorking condition of the system 0 represents 
a normally operated state without a defect. the working conditions of the system 1,2, 
..., N represent 
defective states, and the working condition of the system f represents a 
failed state. To overcome the difficulty of expressing the degree of system 
deterioration as the defective states 1,2, .... N, we assume that the defective states 1, 
21 ..., 
N in semi-Markov inspection model represent the expected number of defects in 
the system, which may be determined using the delay time concept. Accepting the 
defined states for the working conditions of the system and assuming the inspection as 
outlined in section 5.2, we formulate the possible case of a Markovian inspection 
policy, which may be charaterised by the following additional assumptions; 
(10) In the absence of inspections and repairs, the working condition of the system 
follows a discrete-time Markov chain. 
(11) Opportunities for inspections occur only at equidistant points or epochs in time 
=At, At, 3At. --. 
(12) The working condition of the system cannot improve on its own. 
The decision epochs for this model include the epochs at which opportunities for 
inspections occur when the system is operating. and the epochs at which the exact 
working condition of the system is revealed by an inspection. We take as state space 
los 
I= (iji= 1,2, ---, M , 
where At is an arbitrary small time. Also. state i corresponds to the situation in 
which an inspection identifies i defects within the system, the states (0, InAt) 
corresponds to the situation in which mAt time units have passed since the last 
inspection, and the states (nzAt, j) correspond to the situation in which a breakdown has 
occurred between (nz-I)At and mAt. We assume a sufficiently large integer M is 
chosen to ensure that an inspection must always be made in the state (0, MAt). It is 
noted that the integer M will have no influence on the modelling if a finite solution 
exists. 
The possible actions a are denoted by 
0, leave the system as it is, 
a=1, inspect the system, 
2, repair the component. 
The action a=0 is the only feasible action in the state 0, the action a=2 is the only 
feasible action in the states i with 1:! ýi-<W and in the states (mAt, j), actions a=0 and 
a=I are the feasible actions in the states (0, mAt) except for the state (0, MAt), where 
the only action a=I is feasible. 
As in the previous chapter, we define the one-step transition probabilities Pij (a), 
the one-step expected transition times r, (a), the one-step expected costs C, (a), and 
the one-step expected downtimes D, (a) given by the following. 
P, j (a) : The probability that at the next decision epoch the system will be in state j if 
actions a is chosen in the present state i. 
r, (a) : The expected time until the next decision epoch if action a is chosen in the 
present state i. 
C, (a) : The expected cost caused by the action a if action a is chosen in the present 
state i. 
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D (a) : The expected downtime caused by the action a if action a is chosen in the 
present state 
As described in chapter 3, Ross [ 1983] presented the following proposition: 
If an event arrival process follows a Poisson process with rate X. the number of events 
that occur by time t, N(t), is an independent Poisson random variable having mean 
given by A P(s)ds, where P(s) is the probability that a marking event occurs, 
independently of all else, at time s. 
As a generalisation of the above proposition in Ross [ 1983], Christer and Wang [ 1995] 0 tý 
presented the following Lenuna 5.1. 
Lemma 5.1 
If the defect arrival process follows a HPP with the rate X, the number of defects 
identified (the marking events) at time x by an inspection at time x is Poisson 
distributed with a mean given by 
ENÄ. 'zf, 1(1-F(x-ii»dii, (5.1) 
where, as defined in assumption (9) of section 5.2, F(h) is the cdf of the delay time 
/I. 
Also, noting the Ross' [1983] proposition, Christer and Wang [1995] presented the 
followinc, Lemnia 5.2. 
Lem ma 5.2 
If the defect arrival process follows a HPP with the rate of X. we have the failure 
arrival process follows a non-lionio2eileous Poisson Process (N'H? P) with the rate In 
finiction given b,, - 
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v(x) = 
Pf (x - 11)dii 
= (5.2) 
where, as defined in assumption (9) of section 5.2, J(h) is the pqf of the delay time h. 
Based upon the above Lemmas, the one-step transition probabilities Pj (a), the one- 
step expected transition times z-i (a), the one-step expected costs C, (a), and the one- 
step expected downtimes Di (a) can now be readily obtained by considering the action 
at each present state. 
Firstly, at state 0, the action a=0, which is the only sensible possible action to take 
at state 0, can be taken. If the action a=0 is taken at state 0, the system will either 
survive until the next decision epoch At or fail within the next decision epoch At. The 
probability of a failure arising within the next very small decision epoch At can be 
obtained from Lemma 5.2. Accordingly, for very small At, we have that 
rN v (x) A for j= (At, f) 
POj (0) =I- 
rv(x)dx for j= (0, At) (5.3) 10 
otherwise . 
Also, if the system is survived until the next decision epoch A[. the expected time 
incurred at state 0 is only the time to the next decision epoch At. If the system is 
failed before the next decision epoch At, assuming that the time interval to the next 
decision At is very small, we can approximately regard the expected time incurred at 
state 0 as the time to the next decision epoch At. Accordingly, we have that 
TO (0) = At. (5.4) 
NN'lien the action a=0 is taken at state 0, since no cost and downtime are required, it 
follows that 
c (0) =0 (5.5) 
and 
DO(O) =0- (5.6) 
At state k. k=1,2, ..., A, the action a=2, is the only possible action to take at 
state k because any fault found at an inspection is repaired by assumption (3) and (5) 
of the section 5.2. If the action a=2 is taken at state k, we have by assumptions (5) 
and (7) that 
P, 0(2) =I for k=1,2, ..., N. (5.7) 
Also, since the fault identified at an inspection is repaired within the inspection period 
and its repair costs per defect is Cd units, it is obvious that 
zý,. (2) =0 for k-=1,2, ..., N, (5.8) 
Cý. (2) = kCd for k=1,2, ..., N, (5.9) 
and 
Dý (2) =0 for k=1,2, --., N. 
At state (0. nzAt)j in = 1,2, ..., M, the action a=0 and a=1, which are the only 
possible actions to take at state (0, mAt), can be taken. If the action a=0 is taken at 
state (0, in-Ar) with m=1,2, ..., M-1. the system will either survive until the next 
decision epoch (in + I)At or fail within the next decision epoch (III-I)At having 
survived to the present decision epoch mAt. Since the probability that there is a failure 
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between the present decision epoch nz-At and the next decision epoch (m+I)At for very 
small At is v(x)d-c fromtheLemma 5.2, wehavethat 
. -V 
V(X)d-c for j= ((nz + 1)At, f) 
'n+')"I 
P(0,171_v), (0) v(x)dv for j= (0, (in + I)At) 
0 otherwise 
Also, if the system is survived until the next decision epoch (nz+l)At from the current 
decision epoch inAt, the expected time incurred by taking the action a=0 at state (0, 
mAt) is At time units from the current decision epoch mAt to the next decision epoch 
(ni+I)At. Although the system is failed before the next decision epoch (in+l)At, 
assuming that At is very small, we can approximately regard the expected time incurred 
by taking the action a=0 at state (0, inAt) as At time units to the next decision epoch 
(m+I)At. Accordingly, it is obvious that 
At . (5.12) 
When the action a=0 is taken at state (0, mAt), since no cost and downtime are 
required, it follows that 
(0) =0 (0, mät) 
and 
D(O, j(0) = 0. 
If action a=1 is taken at state (0, mAt) with nz= 1,2, ... ' M, assuming the perfect 
inspection of the system, the inspection will result in a situation of finding j, j=0,1,2, 
N, faults at an inspection. Since the number of defects identified at an inspection 
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has a Poisson distribution by the Lemma 5.1 and the assumption (8) of the section 
5.2, we have that 
e-E-%', I(m-Al) 
(ENd ("'LW)j 
for j=0,1,2,.. -, N j(1)=j1 (5.15) 
10 othenvise 1. 
Also, since an inspection requires di time units and Ci cost units, it is obvious that 
rto, m-lv) 
(1) = (ýo 1 (5.16) 
CtO.., 
n-V) 
(1) = Cý, - 
and 
D, 
O. mAt )(1 
)= d,.. 
At state (mAt, fi, ?n=1,2, ..., NI, the action a=2 is the only possible action to 
take because a failure is immediately repaired. If the action a=2 is taken at state (InAt, 
J), we have by assumptions (1), (6) and (7) that 
(2) =I for in = 1,2, ..., M. 
Al 
(5.19) 
Also, since a failure requires C, cost units and db time units, it is obvious that 
rt,,. f) (2) = cý for in = 1,2, ---, M, (5.20) 
(2) = Cý; for (5.21) 
and 
11-4 
P f) (2) = db for nz=1,2, ---, M. (5.22) 
As in the single component case model, it still needs to be established that the above 
multi- component system model, in fact. satisfies the Markovian property requirements. 
We have that since equations (5.3), (5.7), (5.11), (5.15). and (5.19) are dependent 
only upon the current state i, i c=- I, the next state j, jEI, and the chosen action a, I 
a =0,1,22, the one-step transition probabilities, Pj(a), satisfy condition (1) of the 
semi-Markov decision process of subsection 4.3.2. Also, since the one-step expected 
costs. C, ja), and the one-step expected downtimes, Di(a), are dependent only upon 
the current state i, ieI, and the chosen action a, a=0,1,2 (see equations (5.5), 
(5.6). (5.9), (5.10), (5.13), (5.14), (5.17), (5.18), (5.2 1), and (5.22)), the one-step 
expected costs and the one-step expected downtimes satisfy condition (2) of subsection 
4.3.2 for a semi-Markov decision process. Accordingly, the above inspection system 
can be analysed within the framework of a semi-Markov decision process. 
NVe have specified the basic elements of the semi-Markov decision model. Fix now 
a control-limit rule R with parameter value s, which is the time to next inspection 
when the workine condition revealed at present time is 0. We first form the cost model 
usin,, this control-limit rule R. Utilisin- the standard senii-Markox- decision model of 
the subsection 4.3 ). 2 (see the equation (4.5)) and the above specifications, we can have 
that 
v= -g, ( R)At + PO(O, A, ) (0) v(o,. v) +P (5.23) 0 0(ýV, f ) (0) V(W, f )9 
ly 
k : -- kCd-, P, 0(2)vo for k=1,2, ---, N, (5.24) 
v, (R)At + 
P(O'niAtx(nz+I)L%I.. 
f)(O)V((m+I)Al. f) +p (0. -: -V) 
CT. 
- (O. "l-Vxo, (m-DA: ) 
(O)V(O, 
(m+I)AI) 
for O<mAt <s. (5.25) 
C. - gc (R)di + P(O,,,, Lv)o 
(I)vo + P(O,., V)l (I)VI +' - . +P(O. ",. V"- 
Mv, 
for s: 5 mAt :! ý . 11-\t , (5.26) 
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and 
v(, nAt.. j 
Cý - g, (R)d6 +P (2)v (m-V.. fXO, (ni- J-V) (0, (M- d, ) At) 
_I: At 
for in = 1,2,. - -, M, (5.27) 
where g. (R) is the average cost per unit time criven policy R and v,, ,x (=- I, are the 
relative costs resulting from the various starting states when policy R is used. Using 
the embedded technique, by a repeated application of the above equations, we can 
obtain the average cost per unit time g, (R). By putting one of the relative costs equal I 
tozero, say v., =O, the linear equation can determine uniquely the average cost per unit I 
time g, (R). Once g, (R) and vo have been determined we can obtain all the 
relative costs v, by recursive calculations if required. 
In a similar way, we have for the downtime model that 
'VO ad(R)At + Po(o, w) (O)w(o, ý, ) + Pok_v, f) (O)iv(, 5,, f), (5.28) 
'Vk = Tý., )(2)ivo for k=1,2, ---, N, (5.29) 
IV , (R)At + (0)11, (kllýI)Arj) 
+ P(O, 
mAlxo. (RI-I)At)(O)ii, (O. (m+I)AI) 
for 0< mAt < S, (5.30) 
di -gd(R)d, + P(O.,,,, )o (I)ivc, + . I)AI 
(I)wN 
for s:! ý mAt:! ý MAt, (5.31) 
and 
d5- 9d (R), ý5 +P (2)w 
)(Opll- -V) 
for in = 1,2. ---, M, (5.32) 
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where - (R) is the average downtime er unit time iven policy R and w 6dp9 XEI, 
are the relative downtimes resulting from the various startina states when policy R is 
used. Using the same embedded technique used above, we can obtain the expected 
average downtime per unit time gd(R). By putting one of the relative downtimes 
equal to zero, say wo = 0, the linear equation can determine uniquely the average 
downtime per unit time gd(R). Once g,, (R) and wo have been determined we can 
obtain all the relative downtimes iv., by recursive calculations if required. 
These models can be evaluated using the following policy- iteration al-orithm. of the 
subsection 4.3.2. 
Policy-iteration algorithm 
Step 0 Choose an initial policy R with the parameter s. 
Step I For the current rule R, compute the average costs g, (R) and the relative 
costs v,, iEI, or the average downtimes gd(R) and the relative downtimes In 
iv,, i(=-I, as the unique solution to the linear equations 
vi = Ci (R, ) - g, (R) -rj (R, ) +Zý,, (Ri)v, i r= 1, (5.33) 
jai 
IY x= 
in the cost case, or in the downtime case 
Dt(Ri) - gd(R) ri (Ri) + 
2: ý, j (Rj)ivj, 
iEI, (5.34) 
jEl 
ii, x= 
where x is an arbitrarily chosen state. 
Step 2: For each state ic-I, deterrnine an action a. yielding the minimum in 
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min IC, (a) -a (R)ri (a) + (a)v, (R)j, a EAM ') c 
or 
min f D, (a) (R) r, (a) + 
arAU) JEJ 
The new stationary policy R is obtained by choosing Ri = ai for all iEI with 
the convention that R, is chosen as being, the old action R, when this action 
minimises the policy-improvement quantity. 
Step 3: If the new policy R equal the old policy, the algorithm is stopped with policy 
R. Othenvise, the algorithm cycles back to step I with R replaced by R. 
This algorithm generates a sequence of improving control-limit rules and it can be 
shown that the algorithm converges after a finite number of iterations to an average cost 
or downtime optimal policy (see Tijms and Van Der Duyn Schouten [1985] and Tijms 
[19S6]). Also, as a consequence of the convergence of the algorithm, there exist a 
g: (R) and v, , iE=-I, or gd(R) and wi , ieI, where the constant g: (R) is 
uniquely determined as the minimal average costs per unit time and v, * as the relative 
costs or gd(R) is uniquely determined as the minimal average downtimes per unit 
time and ivi . as the relative downtimes, when the decision variable s would be 
selected to minimise the average cost per unit time or the average downtime per unit 
time. 
5.3.2 A Semi-, Nlarkov Inspection Model for an Imperfect Inspection Policy 
In the previous subsection 5.3.1, we have assurned that inspections are perfect in 
that any fault present will be identified. However, in most cases, it is more reasonable 
to assume that inspections are imperfect. So, in the section 5.2, the assumption (3) 
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will be relaxed to allow an imperfect inspection policy, which may be characterised by 
the following changed assumption (Y). 
Inspections are assumed to be imperfect in that a fault present will be identified 
with probability r, 0-<j-:! ýI. Probabilities of detecting a fault at successive 
inspections are assumed to be independent and constant. 
If inspections are imperfect, as in the above assumption (Y), we can not directly 
establish the semi-Markov inspection model based upon Lemma 5.1 and 5.2 because 
the failures arriving in the present inspection period may be affected by the faults arising 
in past inspection periods. To establish the semi-Markov inspection model for an 
imperfect inspection policy, we need to change Lemma 5.1 and 5.2. 
With an imperfect inspection policy, consider the probability of a failure arriving in -=2 
(r. t+ At) of the period (T, - I, 
Tj ) resulting from a fault arising at time y in the period 
(T,, 
-,, 
T,, ), namely P(t, t+Atly), (seeFigure -5.1). 
Tt t+At n-I Y 
T" Ti-I Ti 
Figure 5.1. 'flie failure process of a fault arising in (T,, -1 , 
T,, 
Since the probability that a fault is identified during the inspection time is r, the 
probability that a fault arising in (T, _,, 
T) with sufficiently long delay time will not be 
identified before the interval (T, 
-, , 
Tj ) is given by 
for n=1,2, ..., i-I. (5.3 5) 
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Accordingly. the probability of a failure in (t, t+ At) resulting from a fault arising at 
time y in (T,. -: ý 
T,, ) is given by 
c,, (F(t + At - y) - F(t - y)) for T,, -, <y<T. 
1,2, - -, i-I 
P(t, t 
F(t + At - y) - F(t -Y) for T, -, <y<r 
F(t + At -y) for t <. i, <t-- -ýr 
0 othenvise. (5.36) 
From equation (5.36), we can obtain the expected number of faults identified at 
time t if there is an inspection at time t, namely ENd W given b-, 
i-I 
ENd(t)=A2], C,, r (1-F(t-y))ýv+Arl (1-F(t-y))qi-. (5.37) 
n=l 
Using equation (5.37), Christer et al [199-5] presented the following Leninia 5.3. 
Lemma 5.3 
If the fault arrival process follows a HPP with the rate of X. the number of faults 
identified at time t if there is an inspection at time t is Poisson distributed with a mean 
given by equation (5.37). 
Also, using equation (5.36), we can derive the Lemma 5.4 instead of Lemma 5.2. 
-flie Lemma 5.4 is of value to us later. 
Lemma 5.4 
If the fault arrival process follows a HPP with the rate of X, Nve have that the failure 
arrival process follows a NHPP with the rate function Liven by m 
V(t) lim 
P(t, t+ Atly) 
dy 
I., -0 At 
;., I c (F(t -T (5.38) F(t - 7ý)) + F(t - T, -, 
)I. 
1-10 
Proof 
To prove the lemma 5.4. we recall the definition of a Poisson process in Ross 
1983]. Let N,. (t) ,tý! 0, 
be the number of failures which occur during (0, t) and 
v(t), t ý: 0, be the rate of occurrence of failures for the process. Then, to satisfy the 
definition of a nonhomogeneous Poisson process. we require that the process Nf (t) 
satisfies 
(1) Nf (0) = 0, 
(2) Nf (t) has independent increments, 
(3) P(Nf (t + dt) - Nf (t) = 1) = v(t)dt + o(dt), 
(4) P(Nf (t + dt) - Nf (t) ý: 2) = o(dt), 
where for small dt, o(dt) is defined as a functiongiven by 
lim o(dt) = 0. di-o dt 
(5.39) 
Condition (1), which simply states that the counting of events begins at time t=0, and 
condition (2) can usually be directly verified from our knowledge of the process, or is 
otherwise assumed. We will now deduce that conditions (3) and (4) are valid for the 
current failure process with a regular inspection period. Should a failure arise in (t, 
t+dt) before a regular inspection, we must have that a defect arises in some interval (y, 
i+d y) with a delay time h E=- (t -y- dj,, t-j, + dr) (see Figure 5.2)). 
Tn-l 
vTt t+dt y+dy n 
TI-I Ti 
Figure 5.2. The failure process of a fault arising in (y, y+dj, ) of (T,, -,, 
T,, ) . 
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Since the defect arrival process follows a HPP with the rate of k. the probability 
that a defect arise in interval Cy, is given by I 
P(Nd (J'+dl') - Nd (Y) )dl'+ 0(ýV) (5.40) 
where JVd(y) denotes the number of defects in (0, y). Also, if p(Y; t) denotes the 
probability density for a defect at time j-, the probability this leads to a failure at time t 
equals the probability of having a delay time he (t -y- dy, t-y+ dt) , that is 
P(h e (t -Y - dy, t-y+ dt)) = p(j,; t)dt . (5.41) 
From equations (5.40) and (5.4 1), integrating overall possible y, we have 
P(Nf (t + dt) - N_f (t) = 1) = 
1), 
p(j,; t)ývdt + o(dt). (5.42) 
If we define that the rate function is given by 
V(t) = 
No,; tmi. , (5.43) 
the equation (5.422) becomes 
P(Nf (t + dt) - Nf (t) = 1) = v(t)dt + o(dt). (5.44) 
The equation (5.44) clearly satisfies the condition (3) for a NEPP. 
For the condition (4), note that the probability of being over I failure, 
P(A",. (t + dt) - N, (t) :ý 2), is given by 
P(Nf (t + tit) - Ný, - (t) > 2) 
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=I- P(. \'.,. (t + dt) - N. f (t) = 1) - P(Nf (t + dt) - Nf (t) = 0) . (5.45) 
Here, the probability of having no failures in (t, t+dt), P(Nf (t + dt) - Alf (t) = 0), is 
the summation of the probability of having no defects in (0, t) and the probability that a 
defect arise in some interval (y, y+dy) with a delay time ho (t -y- ýy, t-y+ dt) 
Since the probability of no defects in (0, t) is 
P(no defects in (O, t)) =1- 
jAdy (5.46) 
and the probability that a defect arise in some interval (y, y+dj? ) with a delay time 
ho (t -y- ýyj -Y + dt) is 
P(l defect in (y, y+dy))P(ho(t-y-dy, t-y+dt) 
= P(Nd(y + dy) - Nd(Y) = 1){l - P(h e (t -y - dy, t -y + dt)) 
= (; Wy + o(dy))(1 - p(y; t)dt), (5.47) 
integrating the equation (5.47) over all possible y, the probability of having no 
failures in (t, t+dt) is 
P(Nf (t + dr) - Nf (t) = 0) =1- 
1), ýv + f(1 - p(j,; t)dt)Ady + o(dt) 
=1- v(t)dt + o(dt). (5.48) 
Accordingly, considering the equation (5.44) for the probability of having I failure in 
(t. t+dt), P(Nf (t + dt) - Nf (t) = 1), the probability of more than I failure, 
P(Nf (t + dt) - N, - (t) ý: 2), is given by 
P(N_I. (t + dt) - Nf (t) ý! 2) = o(dt). (5.49) 
The equation (5.49) satisfies the condition (4) which establish the NHPP for failure 
arrivals. 
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Given a defect arising at time y, the probability density function of time t to failure 
is given by 
P(Y; 0= lim 
P(t, 
-t-- 
Atly) 
Al-+O At 
(5.50) 
where, as before, P(t, t -. Atly) is the probability of having a failure over (t, t+At) 
resulting from a fault arising at time y. We have that the failure rate function is given 
by 
V(t) 
IA lim 
P(t, t -:. - Atý y) dy. (5.5 1) 
&-+0 'A t 
Also, for T,, 
-, <y<T, n=1,2, ..., 
i- 1, 
P(t, t + Atly) F(t + At - y) - F(t - y) lim = cil ilm 
W-0 At W-0 At 
= Cnf (t - Y) 1 (5.52) 
and for T, -, <y<t, 
lim 
P(t, t+ Atly) 
= lim 
F(t + At - y) - F(t - y) 
W-W At -V-*O At 
= f(t-Y) - (5.53) 
Therefore, equation (5.5 1) becomes 
i-I T 
v(t) = AE c,, f (t - y)dy +A v)dy rf 
(t 
n=l -1 
1-1 
T,, 
-, 
) - F(t - T,, )) + F(t - T, -, 
)',. (5.54) 
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The proof of Lemma 5.4 is complete. 
In solving a maintenance problem, our interest is in the reduction of the expected 
downtime per unit time over the long future period. Once the inspection process and 
plant has been operated for a long time period. it is expected that the behaviour will 
become steady state, and any initial influence of the newness at time t=0 is lost. This 
being so, with the current assumption, we can regard an inspection as a regeneration 
point of the system. That is, subsequent inspection cycles become statistically identical 
over time. 
If, after a long period of operation, an arbitrary time from an inspection Tj -1 
is x 
(see Figure 5.3), steady state condition can be assumed and the equation (5.36) will be 
changed slightly. 
T11-1 T, T-1 + At 
Figure 5.3. The failure process from an inspection T-, . 
Since t=T, -, +x 
from Figure 5.3, using the equation (5.36), the probability of a 
failure in (x, x+ Ax) from an inspection T, -, resulting 
from a fault arising at time y 
in (T,, 
-,, 
T,, ) is given by 
P(X, x+A. Yk .) 
c,, (F(T, -, +x+ 
Ax - y) - F(T, _, +x -y)) 
for T,, 
-, <y<T.. -n=1,2, ---, 
i-I 
F(Ti-I +x+ Ax - y) - F(Ti-I +x- for T, -, <y<T-, +x 
,x+ 
&Y 
-1 +X< I -, +X+&- 
F(Ti-I -, - Y) fo r Ti -<Tx 
0 otherwise. (5.55) 
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From equation (5.55). the expected number of faults identified at time x from an 
inspection (which is a regeneration point if there is an inspection at time x), namely 
EN, (x), can be obtained by letting i -> or- in equation (5.37). This gives 
c,, (I - F(Tj + (I - F(Ti-i +x- YNYI - (5.56) ENd 
W "M 21 
-, 
+x-i i 
n=l I. -; 
Using equation (5.56) and Lenu-na 5.3, we can state the following Lemma 5.5. 
Lemma 5.5 
If the fault arrival process follows a HPP with the rate X, the number of faults 
identified at time x from an inspection (which is a regeneration point) if there is an I 
inspection at time x is Poisson distributed with a mean given by equation (5.56). 1 
Also, from Lenuna 5.4, the failure arrival rate ftinction at time x from an 
inspection which is a regeneration point, namely p(v), can be obtained by letting i -> co 
in equation (5.38). Using equation (5.55). this gives 
i-I 
, o(x) = lim A {Z c,, (F(T, -, +x-T,, -, 
) - F(Ti-I +x-T, )) + F(x)). (5.57) i-+m 
n=l 
Using eqUation (5.57) and Lemma 5.4, we can state the following Lemma 5.6. 
Lemma 5.6 
If the fault arrival process follows a HPP with the rate of X, we have that the failure 
arrival process follows a NHPP with the rate function given by equation (5.57). 
By using Lemma 5.5 and 5.6 instead of Lemma 5.1 and 5.2 respectively, we 
can embed the serni-Markov inspection model for an imperfect inspection policy in the 
serni-Markov inspection model of the subsection 5.3.1. When computing the 
equations (5.56) and (5.57), since we are interested in a regular inspection policy, we 
have to note that 
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nT, (5.58) 
where T is the regular inspection period tinder the Current policy R of the policy 
iteration algorithm of the subsection 5.3.1. For a special delay time distribution F(y), 
for example an exponential distribution, the expectation and failure of equations (5.56) 
and (5.57) can be obtained easily. Otherwise, we have to obtain the approximate 
value of equations (5.56) and (5.57) numerically. We will discuss this point in the 
subsection 5.5.33. 
5.3.3 Evaluation of the Serni-Markov Inspection Model 
In the previous chapter, the semi-Markov inspection model for a single 
component system was discussed. As a consequence of chapter 4, it was seen that 
when the distribution of the initial point it had a Markov property, the single 
component system could be modelled by a semi-Markov inspection model. However, 
in a real-world situation, there will be few systems with a single component. The 
system usually consists of many components and is therefore more complex. Thus, in 
contrast to the semi-Markov inspection model for a single component system, the semi- 
Markov inspection model for a multi-component system has the benefit of being 
relevant to the real-world situation. It is seen that if the fault arrival rate, regardless of 
the delay time distribution, satisfies the Markov property, then the multi-component 
system can also be modelled by a senii-niarkov inspection model. 
However, the senii-Markov inspection model for the multi-component system may 
still have some problems in being applied to a real-world situation. There may be 
difficulties in expressing the working condition of the system as degraded states, and 
ftirther difficulties in estimating the state transition probabilities for an industrial 
situation. It is shown in the previous subsections 5.3.1 and 53.2 that such 
difficulties maN, be solved using the delay time concept by expressing the degraded 
states of the system as the expected number of defects. State transition probabilities 
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may then be calculated using the distribution of the delay time h and defect arrival rate 
L To succeed here, the delay time parameters with the known case histories have 
established that they can be estimated from real-world data or subjective techniques as 
described in the chapter 3, and later in the chapter 6. Either way, the multi- 
component system can be fitted to the semi-Markov inspection model utilsing the delay Z 
time concept. 
Nevertheless, the semi-Markov inspection model for the multi-component system 
may still have problems in terms of its validity in a specific case. In the subsection 
51 3.1, the model assumes that faults arise as a HPP with the rate of occurrence of faults 
as the constant X under the perfect inspection policy. Also, from the Lemnia 5.1 and 
5.1), the semi-Markov inspection model has been established based upon this 
assumption. From the Lemma 5.1, if the system has an imperfect inspection policy, it 
is obvious that the number of defects identified at an inspection will be changed. 
Again, if the system is subject to an imperfect inspection policy, the failure arrival 
process may not follow a NEPP with the rate ftinction v(x) in equation (5.2), because 
failures arrivina in a current inspection period may be affected by faults arising in past 
inspection periods. Accordingly, it may be unrealistic to apply the semi-Markov tý I 
inspection model of the subsection 5.3.1 to the system with the imperfect inspection 
policy. It may be more reasonable in most cases to assume an imperfect inspection 
policy when modelling industrial situations. 
To solve these problems, the semi-Nlarkov inspection model for an imperfect 
inspection policy is presented in the subsection 5.3.2 under the assumption that the 
systern will be in steady state in the long term future period. The semi-Markov 
inspection model for an imperfect inspection policy is established on the basis of 
Lemma 5.5 and 5.6 which are based upon the delay time concept where the fault 
arrival process follows a HPP. Also, the parameters in the model can be estimated 
from the delay time concept. 
I-IS 
5.4 Delay Time Model 
5.4.1 Formulation as a Basic Delay Time Model 
The inspection system mentioned in the section 5.2 can also be analysed in the 
framework of a delay time model to find the optimal inspection period which minimises 
the expected total cost per unit time or the expected total downtime per unit time. 
Indeed. this is necessary if the two modelling methodoloGies are to be compared as 
intended. To formulate the inspection system mentioned in the section 5.2 as basic 
delay time model, additional to the description of the section 5.2, we need the 
following assumptions. 
(1) An inspection takes place every T time units and requires Ci cost units and d, 
time units. 
(2) Inspections are perfect in that any defect present within the system will be identified 
at inspection, and no new fault inputted because of inspection. 
(3) Defects identified at an inspection will be repaired within the allocated inspection 
time, d,, and the mean repair cost per defect is Cd units. 
(4) A failure will be observed immediately at its occurrence. The component is 
repaired immediately upon failures and the mean repair cost and time for a failure 
repair are Cb cost units and 
db time units respectively. 
(5) 'nie component is as good as new after repairs. 
(6) Defects are independent of each other and arise as a homogeneous Poisson Process 
(HPP), with rate of occurrence of defects X. 
(7) The delay time h of a defect is independent of the time of origin, and all defects I 
share a common delay time pdf J(h) and cdf F(h). 
Then, as we noted in the section 5.2, an inspection will renew the system. 
To introduce the delay time modelling of this system, it is convenient to import the 
basic delay time model of the chapter 3. Since the instantaneous rate of defect 
129 
occurrence within the system after an inspection is ý,, the number of defects arriving in 
the inten, al (it, u+dzi) is Mi. Clearly, the expected number of defects arising over (0, 
T) is (seethe equation (3.2)) 
A-(T) = 
f1dit 
= AT. (5.59) 
A defect arising in (u, u+du) with a delay time h<T-u will arise as a breakdown (see 
Figure 5.4). 
0U u+du zt+h T Inspection Failure Inspection 
Figure 5.4. Failure process of a defect arising in (it, u+du). 
We have. therefore. that the expected number of breakdowns arising over period (0,7) 
is (seethe equation (3.3)) 
T 
B(7) = 
JAF(T 
- u)du. (5.60) 
A model of the expected cost per unit time as a function of the inspection period T 
may be obtained directly. The expected total cost of an inspection cycle consists of the 
expected cost of attending to failures, the expected cost of rectifying defects identified at I 
inspection, and the cost of the inspection itself. Since the expected number of defects 
and breakdowns arising over (0,7) is known, namely N(7) and B(7), assuming that 12 -- 
the downtime of a failure, d, , is very small. the expected total cost per unit time over a 
ftill cycle of length T+d, is (see the equation (3.4)) 
C(T) =I (B(T)Cb+ (N(T) - B(T))Cd+ (5.61) T+d, 
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Here, the decision variable T would be selected to minimise the expected total cost per 
unit time C(7). 
Similarly, for the downtime model, since the expected total downtime of an 
inspection cycle consists of the expected downtime of attending to failures and the 
downtime of the inspection itself, assuming that the downtime of a failure, d,, is very 
small, the expected total downtime per unit time over a full cycle of length T+d, is 
(seethe equation (3.5)) 
D(T) =I (B(T)db + di). T+di 
(5.62) 
Here, the decision variable T would be selected to minimise the expected total 
downtime per unit time D(7). 
5.4.2 A Delay Time Model for an Imperfect Inspection Policy 
So far, it has been assumed, as in the section 5.2, that inspections are perfect in that 
any fault present will be identified. However, in most cases, it is more likely that 
inspections are imperfect. Based upon the assumptions of the section 5.2, suppose, as 
before in subsection 5.3.2, that there is a probability r :51 that any fault present at an 
inspection will be identified at the inspection. It has been shown that , under these 
circumstances, the probability of a fault leading to a failure, b(7), becomes (see equation 
(3.11)) 
b(T)= I- E-(I-r)"-'R(nT-y)dy, 
11=1 
T 
(5.63) 
where R(h) = I-F(h). Then, since the probability of a defect arising as a breakdown is 
changed, modifying equations (5.61) and (5.62), we have that the expected total cost per 
unit time is given by 
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C(T) = 
N(T), Ib(T)Cb+ (I - b(T))Cd) + C, (5.64) 
T+d, 
and the expected total downtime per tulit time is given by 
D(T) 
N(T)b(T)db +d, (5.65) 
T+d, 
Here, the decision variable T would be selected to minimises the expected total cost per 
unit time C(7) or the expected total downtime per unit time D(7). 
5.4.3 Evaluation of the Delay Time Model 
In the previous section, it is shown that the system mentioned hi the section 5.2 can 
be fitted to the semi-Markov inspection model for a multi-component system based upon 
the delay time concept. The delay time concept provides a means denoting the working 
condition of the system as the degraded states of the semi-markov inspection model, and 
obtaining the state transition probability from data in an industrial applications by first 
estimating the paranieters of the delay time distribution. Using the delay time concept in 
this way. the semi-INIarkov inspection model is potentially useftil in application to a real- 
world situation. Here we can see the modelling value of the delay time concept. 
In applying the semi-Markov inspection model to an actual situation, the key point is 
that the fault arrival process has a HPP with the rate X. If the fault arrival process follows 
a N_HPP. we cannot apply the semi-Markov inspection model to the real-world situation. 
However. in this case. the delay time model can still be used as discussed in the chapter 3. 
Accordingly, the delay time model is again more robust than the semi-Markov inspection 
model in applying to the real-world situation. The delay time model may be fitted 
regardless of the HPP " NHPP status of the fault arrival process. 
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5.5 Numerical Examples 
5.5.1 Generatino, the Data usin- Simulation eý 6 
As discussed in chapter 4, when we are faced with the industrial preventive 
maintenance problem, the data collection is of prime importance. In attempting to apply 
models of maintenance to an actual industrial plant, the immediate problem is usually that 
there are no data to be fitted. Either way, we require data to fit to the models of section 
5.3 and 5.4 in order to compare both models. Comparing, the two models with each 
other is only part of the research process here, since both models also ideally need to be 
compared with the time value, which is unknown. This is a reason for generating the data 
using computer simulation and a known delay time model. 'Me generated data can then II 
be used to model the process. 
By the assumption (8) of the section 5.2, defects are independent of each other and 
arise as a HPP with the rate X. If X,, 1 nýýI, denotes the time between the (n-I)st and 
nth defect from the last inspection point (see Figure 5.5), the sequence { X,, , ný: II is 
called the sequence of inter-arrival times and X,, are independent identically distributed 
exponential random variables having mean :M 
[1983]). 
I/k (see the proposition 2.2.1 of Ross' 
X1 X, X3 
0T Inspection Inspection 
X(n-1) X,, 
(k-I)T U 
Inspection Inspection 
Figure 5.5. The sequence of inter-arrival times. 
Nothi- this inter-arrival time pattern, the system description for modelling of section 
5.2, and assumption (Y) which is changed in assumption (3) of section 5.2, we can 
generate a set of synthetic data for an imperfect inspection policy corresponding to this I 
situation using simulation. By setting the probability of identiA-ing a fault at an 
inspection r=1. we can generate a set of data for a perfect inspection policy. Figure 5.6 
133 
illustrate the simulation progress by presenting the flow chart which is for the 
characteristic structure of the data shown in the Table 5.1. 
Start 
Choose T, N, Initialize r, db, NFS'--O, SX=O 
Do 10 m=1 A' 
NLý=O, N-F-=O 
Generate X 
SX=SX+X 
Cc SX<l I -P 
AIFS--Oi 
Do 15 iý-I, AIFS 
0<171 
F- 15 FTP(i)=TP(i)-(ni-l)*T 
yes 
NFS--NFS-NF 
Print m, NF, FTP, ND' 
Do 16 i=NF+I, NFS 
TP(i-NF)=TP(i) 
16 
10 stop 
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Generate h 
1 FT=SX+h I 
Generate madom number : RN 
Yes 
r? 
rjo 
NL)=ND+l 
1 NFS--NFS+l I 
TP(NFS)=FT 
Sort TP according to size 
BSX=SX 
Generate X 
SX=&V+X 
IVFS'--O? 
Do 13 i--I, NFS 
Tj i)>SA-. > 
SX=SX+db 
Ye- s 
YS 
iý-NFP 
Do 13 i=i+I, NFS 
TPU)=TP(i)+db 
13 
Yes 
-- -- ---- -11- T9 _. - _ SX<ln 
J0 ý 
Figure 5.6. Flow chart for generating the data for a multi-component system. 
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In Figure 5.6, the following notation has been used. I- 
T: A present inspection period. 
N: The number of inspection for computer running. 
ND : The number of defects arising within a present inspection period. 
NF: The number of failures arising within a present inspection period. 
X: An inter-arrival time of defect. 
SX: The present summation of inter-arrival times. 
h: A delay time 
TP(j) : The jth failure time point. 
FTP(j) : The jth failure time point within a present inspection period. 
5.5.2 A Perfect Inspection Case 
A numerical example of the cost model outlined in the section 5.3 and 5.4 is 
evaluated for demonstration purposes. From the semi-Markov inspection model of 
section 5.3 and the delay time model of the section 5.4, the expected cost per unit 
time can be determined as a function of the inspection period T, or the decision rule 
R= s*. This means that we can obtain the optimal inspection period T* which 
minimises the expected cost per unit time. Since, however, we wish to know which is 
the most accurate of the models, and the extent of any difference between them. we 
compare the two models with a simulation model. It was shown in the flow chart of 
Figure 5.6 of the previous subsection -5.5.1 that the required data could be obtained 
for any inspection period T. A minor change to the flow chart of Figure 5.6 
transforming it into the flow chart of Figure 5.7 will provide the expected cost per unit 
time C(7) according to the inspection period T. In Figure 5.7, adding the notations 
of Figure 5.6, TC denotes the total expected cost. In this subsection, we can get the 
expected cost per unit time by setting r=I in Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7. Flow chart for computing the expected cost per unit time. 
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To compare the semi-Markov model with the delay time model, firstlv, consider the 
case where the fault arrival rate has been taken as X faults per unit time. the delay time 
h has an exponential distribution with the mean UP, P>O, and the downtime of the 
failure can be neglect, d, = 0. Since the inter-arrival time X has an exponential 
distribution with the mean I /X, the pdf of the inter-arrival time X is given by 
q(x) = Ae-ý`. (5.66) 
Also, we have that the pdf of delay time h is given by 
(h) = 8e -fl' (5.67) 
and the cdf of the delay time h is given by 
F(h) =I- e-"'. (5.68) 
Assuming that the data have been given in the real-world situation, or generated 
using simulation, the estimates of X. and P have been estimated as X 0.3 and P= 
0.1. Also, costs are taken as C, =10 units, Cd =5 units, and C, 15 units, and 
downtimes for a cost model are taken as di = 0.4 time units. In the semi-Markov 
inspection model for the perfect inspection case of subsection 5.3.1, we have assumed 
that N is the upper bound of the expected number of defects and the time interval At is 
very small. For a numerical example of this subsection, we assume that N= 30 and 
the time interval At = 1. Under these circumstances, the result for the semi-Markov 
inspection model for a perfect inspection policy of subsection 5.3.1 , namely equations 
(5.23) to (5.28) and equation (5.61) for the basic delay time model for expected cost, 
is shown in Figure -5.8. 
Figure 5.8 sho,. %-s that the semi-Markov model curve is consistent with the delay 
time model curve and the simulation curve and an optimal inspection period point 
which minimises the cost per unit time can be obtained from these three curves. This is 
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as expected because of the Markovian nature of the modelling assumption and services 
as a check of our numerical procedures. Accordingly, the above mentioned system can 
be modelled with both a semi-Markov inspection model or a delay time model. 
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Figure 5.8. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is for a perfect inspection policy Nvhen the delay time has an exponential distribution, 
At--I, X=0.3,0=0.1, Ci =10, Cd = 5, Cb = 15, di = 0.4, and d, = 0. ) 
Secondly, tinder the same conditions as in the above case, consider a case when the 
downtime of the failure cannot be neglected, db # 0. If we assume that db = 0.05, 
the result for the semi-Markov inspection model for a perfect inspection policy of the 
subsection 5.3.1 and the equation (5.6 1) of the basic delay time model can be shown 
in Figure 5.9. 
1 
Figure 5.9 shows that there is little difference between the semi-Markov model 
curve and the delay time model curve, although a difference does now exist. Further, I 
the simulation model curve may be more consistent with the semi-Markov model curve 
than the delay time model curve. The reason is that the equation (5.61) of the basic 
delay time model neglects the downtime of a failure. This can be readily corrected if Z7 
required (see Chilcott and Christer [1991)). However, in getting the optimal inspection 
period point which minimises the expected cost per unit time, we can obtain the optimal 
inspection period from the semi-Markov model and from the delay time model, and in 
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this case the optimal inspection period from the delay time model is the same as that 
from the semi-Markox- model (see Table 5.2). 
4.4 
4.1 
3.8 
3.5 
3.2 
-From Delay Time Model 
------ From Simulation 
-From Semi-Markov Model 
05 10 15 20 25 30 3) 5 
Inspection Period 
40 
Figure 5.9. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. I 
(TWs is for a perfect inspection policy when the delay time has an exponential distribution, 
A, t--I, X=0.3. P=0.1, Ci =10, Cd = 5, C,, = 15, di = 0.4, and d,, = 0.05. ) 
Table 5.2. Expected cost per unit time for Figure 5.9. 
hispection 
Period 
Delay time 
model 
Simulation 
model 
Semi-Markov 
model 
Remarks 
7 3.567 3.588 3.553 
8 3.510 3.483 3.494 
9 3.478 3.454 3.461 
10 3.465 3.486 3.447 
11 3.464 3.462 3.444 Optimal 
12 3.471 3.436 3.450 
13 3.483 3.414 3.461 
14 3.500 3.419 3.476 
15 3.519 3.477 3.494 
141 
To confirm this point clearly, if we increase the downtime of a failure into d. = 0.2, 
the result is as shown in Figure 5.10. 
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-From Delay Time Nlodel 
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Figure 
-5.10. 
The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is for a perfect inspection policy when the delay time has an exponential distribution, 
At--I, X=0.3, P=0.1, Ci =10, Cd = 5, Cb = 15, di = 0.4, and db = 0.2. ) 
Fi ure 5.10 shows that there is the bigger difference between the semi-Markov model 9 
curve and the delay time model curve than Figure 5.9. Also, the simulation model 
output is more consistent with the semi-Markov model than the delay time model. 
However, from both models, the optimal inspection which minimises the expected cost 
per unit time can be obtained, and the inspection period choice resulting from the delay 
time model is the same inspection period resulting from the semi-Markov model line 
(see Table 5.33). 
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Table 5.3. Expected cost per unit time for Figure 5.10. 
Inspection 
Period 
Delay time 
model 
Simulation 
model 
Semi-Markov 
model 
Remarks 
7 3.567 3.515 3.511 
8 3.510 3.461 3.448 
9 3.478 3.416 3.412 
10 3.465 3.430 3.393 
11 3.464 3,400 3.387 Optimal 
12 3.471 3.3 3) 5 3.388 
13 3.483 3.356 3.396 
14 3.500 3.376 3.408 
15 3.519 3.392 3.423 
Thirdly, under the same conditions of the above second case, consider the case that 
the delay time h has a Weibull distribution with the shape parameter cf>O and the 
scale parameter P>O. We have that the pdfof the delay time h is given by 
(h) = a, 6-'h-'e (5.69) 
and the cdf of the delay time h is given by 
h 
F(h)=I-e 16 (5.70) 
Assuming that the data have been given in the real-world situation or using simulation, 
(x and P have been estimated as (x = 0.9 and P=9.0. If we assume that db = 0.05, 
the result for the semi-Markov inspection model for a perfect inspection policy of the 
subsection 5.3.1 and the equation (5.61) of the basic delay time model can be shown 
in Figure 5.11. 
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From Delay Time Model 
------ From Simulation 
-From Semi-Markov Model 4.1 
3.8 
3.5 
3.2 -L 
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Figure 5.11. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is for a perfect inspection policy when the delay time has a Weibull distribution, At--I, 
). =0.3, cc=0.9,0=9, C =10, Cd= 5, Cý = 15, di = OA, and 
db = o. m. ) 
Fi! zure 5.11 shows that there is still a little difference between the semi-Markov model 
curve and the delay time model curve, and that the simulation model may be more 
consistent with the semi-Markov model curve than the delay time model curve. The 
two models would not move closer together if At were to decrease from At = 1. The 
simulation output confirm this. However, in determining the optimal inspection period, 
the delay time model and the semi-Markov model do, to the precision of the measure 
scale, again indicate the same decision (see Table 5.4). Zý 
Table 5.4. Expected cost per unit time for Figure 5.11. 
Inspection 
Period 
Delay time 
model 
Simulation 
model 
Semi-Markov 
model 
Remarks 
9 3.606 3.568 3.586 
10 1.591 3.588 3.570 
11 3. _5 87 3.585 3.565 Optimal 
12 1 3. i9l 1 3-543 3.567 
1n .3 601 
_ 3 530 1. - 3.576 
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5.5.3 An Imperfect Inspection Case 
In the previous subsection, we have discussed the case when the fault arrival rate 
obeyed a HPP and inspections were perfect. The discussion of the previous subsection 
confirmed that, regardless of the distribution of the delay time h, when the fault arrival 
process is a HPP, for the perfect inspection case, the system can be represented by both a 
semi-Markov inspection model and a delay time model. In this subsection, we consider 
an imperfect inspection case in order to check that the system can be fitted to the semi- 
Markov inspection model and the delay time model. As before, if we take the simulation 
model to compare fairly the semi-Markov inspection model and the delay time model, we 
can use the flow chart of Figure 5.7 for the simulation progress. 
Firstly, consider a case where the delay time has an exponential distribution of equation 
(5.68). In this case, for a delay time for an imperfect inspection policy of the subsection 
5.4.2, the probability of a fault leading to a failure, b(Z), of the equation (5.63) becomes 
))dy 
n=, 
T 
r(I - e-gr) 
)6T(I - (I - r)e 
(5.71) 
Applying the equation (5.64) of the delay time model for an imperfect inspection policy 
based upon the equation (5.71), we get the expected cost per unit time C(7) according to 
the inspection period T. Also, for a semi-Markov inspection model for an imperfect 
inspection policy of subsection 5.3.2, the number of faults identified at time x from an 
inspection, ENAX) I oftheequation (5.56) becomes 
i-I 
ENd (x) = liniAr[j: (I e '(T, -[+-'-Y)))dy 
1-4 n=l 
+ -(1- 
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Ar 
(, 
(I - r)(I - e#T)e-l" (5.72) 
effr 
and the failure arrival rate ftmction at time x from an inspection, p(. Y), of the equation 
(5-57) becomes 
-AT 
, 
O(X) = lim AI -n ((l _ee+ 
n=l 
r)(I - el")e-l" + I-r-e flT 
(5.73) 
Applying the semi-Markov inspection model for an imperfect inspection policy of the 
subsection 5.3.2 based upon the equations (5.72) and (5.73), we can get the expected 
cost per unit time g(7) according to the inspection period T. I 
Given the data from the real-world situation or using simulation, we assume that the 
parameters for the distributions of the inter-arrival time X and the delay time h have 
been estimated as X=0.3 and P=0.1 respectively and the probability of identifying a 
fault at an inspection has been estimated as r=0.7. Also, as before. costs are taken by 
Cj =I 0 units, Cd= 5 units, and Cb = 15 units and downtimes for a cost model are 
taken by di = 0.4 time units and db = 0.05 time units. Also, for the numerical example 
of this subsection, Nve assume that' ýV 30 'and the time interval At =I in the semi- 
Markov inspection model for an imperfect inspection model of the subsection 5.3.2. 
Under these circumstances, the result for the semi-Markov inspection model for an 
imperfect inspection policy of the subsection 5.3.2, the delay time model of the equation 
(5.64), and the simulation model is shown in Figure 5.12. 
Figure 5.12 shows that the semi-Mark-ov inspection model is consistent with the delay Zý 
time model and the simulation curve and an optimal inspection period point which 
mininiises the cost per unit time can be obtained from these three curves. Accordingly, 
the mentioned system for an imperfect inspection policy can be fitted to the semi-Markov 
model or the delay time rnodel. The difference between the presented simulation model 
and the analytic models of Figure 5.12 is due to the rather large average failure repair 
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time d6 = 0.05 of the simulation. Had db been reduced, the deviation of the 
simulation model to the analytic models would here been much reduced for the smaller 
time periods. 
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Figure 5.12. ne expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 1. 
(This is for an imperfect inspection policy when the delay time has an exponential distribution, 
A, t--I, X=0.3.0=0.1,1--0.7, Ci = 10, Cd = 5, Ct, = 15, di = 0.4, and d. = 0.05. ) 
Secondly, consider a case that the delay time has a Weibull distribution of the equation 
(5.70). In this case, for a delay time for an imperfect inspection policy of the subsection 
5.4.2. the probability of a fault leading to a failure, b(7-), of the equation (5.63) becomes 
))dy 
dy. 
n=l T 
(5.74) 
Here the equation (5.74) can be obtained numerically using the computer. Applying the 
equation (5.64) of the delay time model for an imperfect inspection policy based upon the 
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equation (5.74. ), we can get the expected cost per unit time QY) according to the 
inspection period T. Also, for a semi-Markov inspection model for an imperfect 
inspection policy of the subsection 5.3.2, the number of faults identified at time x from 
an inspection, ENd(X) of the equation (5.56) becomes 
i-i T -( 
T- [+x-y ). 
EN, (x) = lim Aj-[2: (1 - r)'-" (1 - (1 -e» dy Z ->X n=I 
))dy] 
,-I 
i-n 
T -( T +x -( f. 
e dy+ E' e dy (5.75) 
n=l _I, -1 
and the failure arrival rate fimction at time x from an inspection, p(. Y), of the equation 
(5.57) becomes 
i-I T_i+x-T_I)a T I+x-T x 
A {Z (I 
_ . 
)i-n ((I 
-( 
18 
-( rýi ýý an )l - (-), 
, P(X) = 
lim -e )-(I-e + (I -e iýx 
n=l 
i-I T I+X-T T-, +x-T-, ). 
i-n 
=). IimZ(I-r) (e e6+ A(l -e6 (5.76) 
n=1 
The equations (5.75) and (5.76) can also be obtained from the numerical method. 
Applying the semi-Markov inspection model for an imperfect inspection policy of the 
subsection 5.3.2 based upon the equations (5.75) and (5.76), we can get the expected 
cost per unit time g(7) according to the inspection period T. 
Given the data from the real-world situation or using simulated data, we assume that 
the parameters for the distributions of the inter-anival time X and the delay time h have 
been estimated as X=0.3, cc = 2.0, and P= 10 respectively and the probability of 
identifying a fault at an inspection has been estimated as i- = 0.7. Also. as before. costs 
are taken as C. =I 0 units, Cd =5 units, and Cb = 15 units and downtimes for a cost 
model are taken as di = 0.4 time units and db = 0.05 time units. Under these 
circumstances. the result for the semi-Markov inspection model for an imperfect 
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inspection policy of the subsection 5.3.2, the delay time model of the equation (5.64), 
and the simulation model is shoNNm in Fizure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.03. The expected cost per unit time according to the inspection period. 
(This is for an imperfect inspection policy when the delay time has a Weibull distribution, At--I, 
X=0.3, cc--2.0, P= 10, t--O. 7. Ci = 10, 
"Cd 
= 5, C1, = 15, di = 0.4, and d. = 0.05. ) 
Figure 5.13 shows that die semi-Mark-ov inspection model is consistent with the delay 
time model and the simulation curve and an optimal inspection period which minimises 
the cost per unit time can be obtained from these three curves. Accordingly, an imperfect 
inspection policy for the given multi-component system can be modelled by either the I 
semi-Markov model or the delay time model. 
5.6 Comparison and Conclusions 
The single component system can only be fitted to the semi-Markov inspection 
model in the case that the initial point u has a Markov property. As well as the semi- 
Markov inspection model for a single component system, if the fault arriving process 
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follows a HPP for a complex system, the semi-Markov inspection model for a multi- 
component system can be applied to the system regardless of the distribution of the 
delay time h, as discussed in the subsection 5.5.2. We note that the models here rely 
on the delay time concept. The delay time concept provides a means of not only 
denoting the working condition of the system as the degraded states of the semi-Markov 
inspection model, but also of obtaining the state transition probabilities from data by 
first estimating the fault arrival rate and the parameters of the delay time distribution. 
The semi-Markov inspection model based upon the delay time concept can, in this way, 
become useftil in modelling real-world situations. The importance of the delay time 
concept is evident. 
When we establish the semi-Markov inspection model, we have to note Lemmas -5.1 
to 5.6 which are based upon the delay time concept. Then, after some complicated 
manipulation, we have the semi-Markov inspection model of the section 5.3 which is 
fitted to the multi-component system with a perfect inspection policy or an imperfect 
inspection policy. The equations of the semi-Markov inspection model, as shown in 
the section 5.3, are complicated. Therefore, when compared to the delay time model, 
it takes a larger time to compute the solution of the semi-Markov inspection model 
using the personal computer. This time depends upon the upper bound of the number 
of defects N and the arbitrary small time period At. In the numerical examples of the 
section 5.5, we assumed that the upper bound of the number of defects is N= 30 and 
the arbitrary small time period is At = 1. However, since, in the real-world situation, 
the multi-component system may consist of many components and need the arbitrary 
smaller time. there may be the more difficulties in computing the semi-Markov 
inspection model using the personal computer. Also, in applying, the semi-Markov 
inspection model to the real-world situation, the key point is that the fault arrival 
process follows a HPP which satisAl the Lemmas 5.1 to 5.6. If the fault arrival 
process follows a NHPP, we cannot apply the semi-Markov inspection model to the 
real-world situation because Lemma 5.1 to 5.6 are not satisfied and the model is not 
robust to these requirements. It is noted that there is a greater applicability of semi- 
Markov models to complex system maintenance than to component maintenance. This 
is due to a fundamental difference between the consequences of a breakdown in the two 
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cases. For a component, a breakdown represents a system renewal here, whereas for a 
system, the defect is repaired, and the system continues to age as before. 
In real-world applications, the delay time model is consistent with the semi-Markov 
inspection model as discussed in the section 5.5. However, in contrast to the semi- 
Markov inspection model, the delay time model consists of the simpler equations as 
shown in the section 5.4. Therefore, it does not require a long time compared to the 
semi-Markov inspection model to compute the equations of the delay time model using 
a personal computer. Also, the delay time model provides a means of modelling the 
behaviour of the system and predicting such useful quantities as reliability or cost under 
various inspection policies. If the fault arrival rate, regardless of a FIPP or a NHPP, and 
the parameters of the pdf of the delay time h, J(h), regardless of any distributions, are 
estimated from the data of the real-world situation through either the subjective or 
objective estimation method, we can easily establish the delay time model which can be 
used to find the optimal inspection policies minimising the expected total cost per unit 
time or the expected total downtime per unit time. As confirmed in the nurne rical 
example of the section 5.5, it was seen that the simulation model curve and semi- 
Markov model are nearly consistent with the delay time model curve. This means that 
the delay time model can be practically applied to the multi-component system. 
In conclusion. since the delay time model is free from constraints on the fault arrival 
process, and does not require as much time as the semi-Markov inspection model in 
computing the solution of the delay time model using personal computer, the delay time 
model may be more general than the semi-Markov inspection model in applying to the 
real-world situation. 
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Chapter 6 
A CASE STUDY OF SEMI-MARKOV AND DELAY TIME MODEL 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on a case stud), of the semi-Markov and delay time models of 
maintenance applied to a subsystem of a complex machine used within a vehicle brake 
lining manufacturers, namely a Preformer in a production machine. One of the 
objectives and motivations behind this case study is to build a model for both 
identifying and quantifying ways of iniproving the overall efficiency of the scheme of 
preventive maintenance (PM) for the Preformer. The other objective in this study is to 
develop and check the applicability of the semi-Markov and delay time models of 
maintenance of the previous chapter, with particular focus on the estimation of values of 
parameters of the models, the compatibility of the results, and the general applications 
of the modellinc, methods. 
One of the key issues in the semi-Markov and delay time models of maintenance 
based upon the delay time concept is the estimation of parameters which is usually the 
rate of occurrence of faults, the distribution of the underlying delay time h of a fault, 
and the probability of identiffing and removing a defect at inspection. The method 
initially developed for this purpose is called the subjective method, because estimates 
are obtained from the synthesis of numerous subjective opinions of engineers collected 
at maintenance intervention. It has been observed that applied studies of the delay time 
concept were initiated by Christer & Waller [1984a, b], Chilcott & Christer [1991], and 
Desa [1995] within industrial situations. In all these studies, the probability density 
function of the delay time was established through subjective estimates derived in well 
structured situations. 
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A recent development in delay time modelling has established that these parameters 
can also be estimated using objective data which are from maintenance records of 
failures and any faults found at PM. _17his estimating method has been termed the 
objective method. In the papers by Baker & Wang [1992,1993], the objective method 
was initially designed for a single component subject to failures and inspections at PM, 
or a system with a few key components. For complex machinery with many 
components, some modelling has been carried out for actual plant using the delay time 
concept in the paper by Christer et al. [1995]. They developed a model which was 
based upon the stochastic process of the fault-initiating process and the interval data. 
Here we develop a model which is different from previous delay time models. This 
model deals with a case where historic data exists recording failure time points and PM 
times, but they are no record of the result of a PM. So, we '%vill use the objective 
method for the failure data and the subjective method for the inspection data in order to 
estimate the parameters. Then, PM models are developed to reduce the expected total 
downtime using both the semi-Markov and the delay time models of maintenance. As 
this is a case-related study, numerical examples are given throughout to demonstrate the 
modelling ideas. I 
6.2 The Production Plant and Maintenance Practice 
The formal name of the company collaborating in the research study is "Brakelinings 
Limited" which produce truck brake linings in the Northwest of England. The company 
has the production machine comprising of a set of subsystems, which are Preformer, Lift 
table 1, Lift table 2, Dies, Die and Trans, Hot and Press, Conveyor, and others. The 
production machine is key plant in the factory, which is operated 24 hours a day (3 
shifts) for 5.5 days a week excluding public holidays and maintenance downtimes. 
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At the time of the study, in order to reduce downtime, a system called total 
productive maintenance (TPM) has been implemented. TPM was introduced in Japan 
more than ten years ago and has since found wide acceptance. TPM is implemented by 
all employees, and is based on the principle that equipment improvement must involve 
everyone in the organisation, from line operators to top management. The key Z 
innovation in TPM is that operators perform basic maintenance on their own equipment. 
They maintain their machines in good running order and develop the ability to detect 
potential problems befora they generate breakdowns. Therefore, we can regard the 
TPM as a kind of preventive maintenance (PM). In the company, TPM very much 
takes the form of a PM activity, it requires about 6 hours, and is performed 
approximately once per three weeks. We have, however, no record of the performance 
or the results of the TPM. It is evident that the TPM as currently operated is some what 
short of the ideal of Nakajima [1989]. 
The company's objective is to reduce the downtime caused jointly by failures and 
TPM activities, and thereby increase the availability of the machine. The company 
supposed that the operators and maintenance engineers will find and rectify faults on the 
machine at TPM within the TPM downtime, but experience shows that there are still 
failures occurring immediately after TPM. The relevant questions of concern are 
(1) whether TPM can identify most faults present and reduce the number of failures 
caused by those faults, and 
(2) whether the current TPM period is the right choice, particularly, the three-week TPM 
cycle for the Preformer subsystem. 
To establish the relationship between the downtime measure and TPM activities 
using the delay time concept, the first task is to estimate parameters. These are the rate 
of occurrence of faults, the underlying delay time distribution, and the probability of 
identifying and removing a fault. It is then possible build a model to describe the 
interplay of the failure, downtime, and TPM process. 
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6.3 Data Analysis 
6.3.1 The Available Data 
The available data over a recent 13 month period include dates and times of 
downtime occurrences due to both TPM and failures, along with a brief description of 
its nature. Production records provide the downtimes associated with each failure. 
The data normally relate to a 24 hour operating day (three shifts), 5.5 operating days 
per week, but the company sometimes has 6 operating days per week. 
The production machine is divided to three sections for TPM, each of which include 
three subsystems. Accordin-c-, to the recorded data, the TPMs are performed 
approximately every three weeks, but TPM periods are sometimes 4,5, or 6 weeks. 
In an initial investigation of the effectiveness of the TPM practice, we use as a measure 
of Plant performance the average number of breakdowns per day or week since TPM for 
the subsystem. 
Also, since full observation of defects identified and rectified at TPM are not 
recorded, we need to estimate the probability of identifying and removing the defect I 
during a TPM activity using the subjective method. Such estimates are obtained from I 
knowledgeable engineering staff by asking the following questions; 
(a) Suppose 100 defects are present at TPM. How many of them could be identified at 
the TPM and before they led to a failure? 
(b) Suppose 100 defects are identified at TPM. How many of thern would be rectified 
at or immediately after the TPM? 
From the above questions, the probability of identifying and removing the defect 
during the TPM, q. can be given by the following equation. 
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Figure 6.2. The Preformer breakdown number per operating hour measured weekly. 
According to Figure 6.2, the failure occurrence rate per week for the Preformer 
seems to be constant through with a element of variability. A Nest supports the 
hypothesis that the perforniance is constant. To check the validity of this point, we can 
fit the graph to the regression line which is shown in Figure 6.2. Therefore. we 
conclude that the failure occurrence rate per week may be assumed constant. 
6.3.4 The Effectiveness of TPM for the Preformer 
The number of completed TPM cYcles is 13 for the data collection period. 
Given effective TPA I, it is expected that the number of failures would increase with each - 
working day from the TPM. To explore this relationship, Table 6.1 is presented for 
the Preformer data and FiRure 6.3 is based upon Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1. The average number of failures since TPM. tý 
Davs Total 
since No. of 
TPM Failures 
Sample 
Size 
Average 
No. of 
Failures 
Days 
since 
TPM 
Total 
No. of 
Failures 
Sample 
I 
Size 
Avera2e 
NI. 0. of 
Failures 
1 0.154 27 8 -3 2.667 
2 14 1.077 28 10 
_33333 3 7 B 0.538 29 4 1.3 3) 
4 9 1 0.692 30 8 2.667 
5 16 1.000 31 0 3 0 
6 11 12 0.917 32 4 3 J. 33 33 
7 14 10 1.400 33 4 3 1.3 3 33 
8 9 8 1.125 34 1 3 0.3 33) 
9 11 7 1.571 35 0 0 
10 11 7 1.571 36 2 0.667 
I1 7 0.429 37 5 1.667 
12 5 6 0.833 38 1 0.333 
1n 10 6 1.667 39 2 3 0.667 
14 2 6 0.333 40 2 0.667 
15 12 6 2.000 41 3 1.000 
16 11 6 1.833 42 2 1.000 
17 11 6 1.833 43 1 0.500 
18 6 6 1.000 44 4 2 2.000 
19 10 6 1.667 45 2 1) 1.000 
20 3 6 0.500 46 1 2 0.500 
21 4 5 0.800 47 2 2 1.000 
22 7 5 1.400 48 2 1.000 
2 3) 7 4 1.750 49 6 1) 3.000 
24 8 4 2.000 50 4 2 2.000 
25 - 
3 67 0.6 51 7 ? 3.500 
2 6 7 3 2.33 -3) 
3 52 4 2 2.000 
In Table 6.1. since we cannot place reliance on the average number of failures after 21 
days since TPM, because of the small number of TPMs, Figure 6.3 for the average 
number of failures per day is produced by the average number of failures until 20 days 
since TRIM. 
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Fiaure 6.3. The effectiveness of TPM for the Prefornier. tý 
Figure 6.3 shows that the number of breakdowns of the Preformer slightly increase 
accordin- to each working day since TPM. This may imply that the performed TPM 
for the Preformer might be effective in reducing, the number of failures. Itp 
6.3.5 The Number of Defects Identified and Rectified during TPM 
As a result of asking the production manager in the company, we have an 
estimate of the number of defects identified at TPM from the question (a), and the 
number of defects rectified during TPM from the question (b). Since the number of 
defects identified at TPM is given as 45 and the number of defects rectified during 
TPM is given as 30, which seemed low to us, from the equation (6.1), the probability 
of identiAin- and removing the defect during TPM, q, is estimated b-, 
45 30 
-x15. 100 100 
(6.2) 
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6.3.6 The Mean Downtimes due to Failures and TPM activities 
The collected data indicated 317 failures, with a total downtimes of 289.8 
hours, that is a mean downtime per failure of 0.914 hours. The variance of downtime 
per failure repair is 2.154. 
The total number of TPMs over the data collecting period is 13, with recorded total 
downtimes caused by TPM of 67.7 hours. Since 3 subsystems, including Preformer, 
are inspected for each TPM, assuming that the three subsystems take equal time to 
TPM, the mean duration of the TPM activity incorporating the Preformer, di, is given 
by 
67.7 
di =-=1.73 (hours). (6.3) 13 x3 
6.4 Assumptions for Modelling 
-flie first objective of the statistical modelling in this study is to estimate the 
parameters of the fault arriving process, the delay time distribution, and the probability 
of identifying and removing a fault at TPNI. This will permit OR models of 
consequence variables such as downtime to be established based upon the estimated 
parameters. Observations of the data and previous experience suggest the following 
initial assumptions describe the operating practice over the period of data collection. 
(a) Faults arise as a homogeneous Poison Process (HPP), and the instantaneous rate of 
occurrence of defects (ROCOD) is denoted by X. 
(b) Faults are independent of each other. 
(c) The delay time h of a random fault is independent of its time of origin and has pdf 
fi. ) and CDF F(. ). 
(d) Inspections carried out at TPM are assumed to be imperfect in that a fault present 
will be identified with probability i-, 0: ýi-:! ýI. Probabilities of detection of a fault at 
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successive inspections are assumed to be independent and constant. An inspection 
requires di time units. 
(e) Not all faults identified at TPM are assumed to be fixed because of limited time and 
resource allocated. Unattended faults may cause failures later. We assume that a 
fault identified at TPM is fixed during the TPM period with probability s, 0:! ýS:! ýI. 
This does not influence the development of undetected faults. We assume that the 
choice of defect to rectify is arbitrary. 
(f) Failures are identified immediately, and repairs or replacements are made as soon as 
possible. The mean downtime per failure is db . 
In general, one would expect a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NBPP) to be a 
good approximation to the fault arrival process. As plant ages, we would expect a BPP 
of arrival rate to be appropriate. This is because the probability of a fault arriving in a 
small time interval will be hardly changed by the pattern of previous fault arrivals, since 
those failed or defective components which are repaired or replaced are a negligible 
fraction of the total plant. This independence of intensity on past failure epochs 
cliaracterizesaHPP. Barlow and Proschan [1965] proved that, for a complex machine 
with negligible repair times, the failure process does indeed in the limit follow a HPP. 
Furthermore, in this study, since the failure occurrence rate per week has an random 
pattern (see Figure 6.2), the fault arrival process may reasonably be assumed to follow a 
HPP. This is the reason underlying assumption (a). I 
When the system is so complex that it is difficult to track individual components, it is 
simplest when modelling to pool faults from all components. In this case J(h) is the 
delay time pdf for any fault, that is assumption (b). Assumption (c) is common in 
delay time modelling, since it both greatly simplifies the modelling work and has been 
validated by real-world observation. Assumption (d) is due to the fact that the 
inspection work carried out on the Prefornier during TPM period can be imperfect in 
that it has been observed that failures occur immediately after TPM, and furthermore, 
the number and the downtime of breakdowns are roughly the same for each working 
day. Assumption (e) is based upon observation and has been confirmed by the 
production manager. Assumptions (d) and (e) give Lis the probability of identifying and 
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removing a fault, namely q= i-s. Assumption (f) embodies the maintenance practice 
cuiTently adopted. 
6.5 Parameter Estimation 
6.5.1 Likelihood Formulation 
To forra the likelihood function using the failure data including the accurate I 
failure time, consider Figure 6.4. 
At 
Ti-I t(i-1)(j-1) t(i-l)i t(i-I)k, 
-, 
Ti 
Figure 6.4. The failure process of a fault arising in (T,, -1, 
T,, ) 
In Figure 6.4, T,, is the epoch of the nth TPM from new, n=1.2, ..., t(i-, )j is the 
epoch of the jth failure occurring in (T, -,, 
T 
,), 
j=1,2, ..., ki-I I 
t(i-I)k, 
-, 
is the time 
of the last failure in (Ti-Iji), and At is a small time interval in which only one event 
at most can arise. 
If we can consider all observations in (T, -, ý 
T, ), these may be the TPM results at T, 
and failure epochs in (Ti-1, Ti). The likelihood function is the product of the 
probabilities of these observations arising. For the TPM results, we can consider the 
probability of detecting and removing x, faults from the system if they are present 
there, P(x, faults detected and removed at For failure epochs in (T, -,, 
T, we 
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can consider the probabilities of a failure arising at times t(, -, ), 1j=1.2, ..., 
ki-I 9 and 
of having no failure between failures. 'flierefore, the likelihood function L is given by 
L IP(xi faults detected and removed at Ti) 
k, 
-, fl P(a failure at time t(, -, ), 
) - P(no failure between failures)) (6.4) 
J=1 
and the log likelihood function 1 is given by 
{IogP(xi faults detected and removed at T, ) 
logP(a failure at time t(i -I)j) +log 
P(no failure between failures)), (6.5) 
J=1 
where in is the number of inspections. In equation (6.5), the terni, log-P(no failure 
between failures), is necessary because of the complex component nature of the plant, 
and would not apply if it is single component item. This formulation assumes the I 
necessary objective data is available from both inspection and failure interactive. 
In the above log likelihood ftinction, if the objective inspection data are not available, I 
we have to use the failure data only. In this case, the log likelihood function measure is I 
6ven by 
Mk -1 E fElogP(a failure at time t(i-, )j) +log P(no failure between failures)). (6.6) 
1=1 ., =I 
To compute the above log likelihood ftinction, firstly, we consider the probability of 
a failure over (t, t+At) resulting from a fault arising at time v, narnely P(t, I + Atly) , 
(see Figure 6.5). 
163 
T'-I y T. TI-I t t+At T, 
Fi-ure 6.5. The failure process of a fault arising in (T,, -,, 
Considering the probability q that a fault is identified and removed during the TPM 
period, as before q= rs, the probability that a fault arising in (T, -,, 
T with 
sufficientIv long delay time will not be identified before the interval (T, -,, 
T, ), i>n, is 
given by (see the equation (5.35)) Z 
c,, = (I -q 
)i-n for n=1,2, ..., i- 1. (6.7) 
Then, the probability of a failure in (t, t+At) from a fault arising at time j, in (T, -,, 
T, 
is given by (see the equation (5.36)) 1 
c,, (F(t+At-y)-F(t-y)) for T,, -, <y<T, n=1,2, ---, 
i-I 
P(t, t + Atly) 
F(t + At - y) - F(t - y) for Ti-I <y<t 
F(t + At - y) for t<y<t+At 
0 otherwise. (6.8) 
From equations (6.8), we can obtain the expected number of faults found and 
removed at the ith TPM, namely ENP (Ti), given by (see the equation (5.37)) 
i-I TT 
EN;, (Ti) =Ac,, q (I - F(Tj - y))dj, + Aq (I - F(Tj - (6.9) 
Since faults are assumed to arise according to a HPP, the number of faults detected and 
removed at TPM follows a Poisson distribution from Lemma 5.3. Because the number 
164 
of faults detected and removed at TPM follows a Poisson distribution with means 
defined by equation (6.9), the probability of x, faults detected and removed at T, is 
P(xi faults dectected and removed at Ti) = 
(ENP (Ti )) -, e- 
EN,, (T 
(6.10) 
Xi! 
To find the probabilities for failure epochs in (Ti-1, T, ), it is of value to us to note 
lemma 5.4. Using the lemma 5.4, we can obtain the probability of a failure arising at 
time t(, -, )j . 
For very small At, 
P(a failure at time t(i-, )j) = v(t(, -, )j)At, 
(6.11) 
where, as before, the failure arrival rate function, v(t), is given by (see the equation 
(5.38)) 
: -I 
v(t)= 2 c,, (F(t- T,, -, 
)- F(t- T,, )) + F(t - T, -, 
)). (6.12) 
Since the probability of having no failure in (t(i-, )(j t -1), (i-, )j) 
is given by 
(, -I)j 
V(t)dt 
P(no failure in (t(i-lxj-, ), t(, -I)j)) =e 
(6.13) 
the total sumniation of the log probability of having no failure between failures becomes 1.7 ID 
k"(, 
-, )I 
K 
logP(no failure between failures) = I( -f v(t)dt) - 
f(" v(t)dt 
j=1 (, -IXI-0 -M, -j 
without loss of generality, the equation (6.14) becomes -1)0 =T 
If we define i: 1-1) In 
logP(no fai lure between failures) v(t)dt. (6.15) 
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. -,, 
T, ). from equation (6.13). the probability of If failures Nvere not occurred in (T I 
-,, 
T, ) isgivenby havin2 no failtire in (Ti zn 
P(no failure in (T, (6.16) 
Accordingly, by taking the log of equation (6.16), we can see that equation (6.15) is 
satisfied. 
Dividing the product of the equations (6.10), (6.11), and (6.15) by At and taking 
a log, the log likelihood function becomes 
mm 
lo! z P(ni faults at Tj + log P(p, faults rectified at T, 
I= loaL 21 
m k. -, P(a failure at time t(i-, )j) +IfIlog + 1: logP(no failure between failures)) 
i=1 j=1 At I 
m k, -t T 
JE logv(t(i 
, 
(xi log EY. (Ti) - ENP (Ti) - log x,! ) + 
1] v(t)dt). (6.17) 
i=I J=I 
Also, for the case where objective inspection data are not available, information is lost 
and the log likelihood function is given by - 
ni 
1=I, v(t)dt). j) 
i=l j=l 
(6.18) 
Using the above likelihood equations, we can estimate the parameters of the process. 
6.5.2 Simulation Test 
Since Nve know that q=0.135, the number of TPMs is 13, and the sample size 
for the Prefornier is about 300, we can check the validity of the likelihood formulation 
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given by the equations (6.17) and (6.18) using a simulation test. Firstly, we crenerate 
a set of data by simulating the process represented by the set of assumptions in section 
6.4 with the known parameters using Figure 5.6. If these parameters can be recovered C -- 
by the maximum likelihood method based upon the equations (6.17) and (6.18), we 
will have confirmed the lo- likelihood formulation and use it. 
FORTRAN is chosen as a suitable language for simulating, mainly because of the 
excellent NAG library of numerical routines available for the Pentium-PC. The NAG 
function minimizer E04JAF was used to minimise minus the log likelihood. 
To simplify the problem, we firstly consider a case that the delay time is 
exponentially distributed, 
F(h) =I- e-, 4", (6.19) 
where P is the arrival rate. Firstly, we assume that the probability of identifying and 
removing a fault, namely q=0.135, is given by the subjective method. Also, to t) 
crenerate a set of data using a simulation, we assume that X=0.05 and 0.02. g In 
Next. we can generate a set of data using Figure 5.9. From the simulated set of data, C 
the result of the parameter estimation process based upon the equations (6.17) and 
(6.1 S) is given by Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Estimation result for an exponential distribution 
when the probability q is fixed as 0.135. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x P ?, P 
13 259 0.052 0.014 0.051 0.023 
ýO 
_62' 
3 0.054 0.015 0.0 53 0.020 
60 1215 0.052 0.018 _ 0.051 0.024 
too 2039 0.052 0.020 0.052 0.021 
150 3006 0.051 0.022 0.050 0.023 
X is the rate of occurrence of faults and P is the scale parameter of the exponential 
distribution. 
Trite values are X=O. Oi and 0.02. 
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Table 6.2 shows that the maximum likelihood estimates recover quite well the 
underlying process of failure and fault origination based upon equations (6.17) and =1 
(6.18). 
If the probability of identifying and removing a fault q is not given by the subjective 
method, we have to estimate the probability of identifying and removing a fault q by 
the objective method. After simulating a set of data, the estimation results based upon 
the equations (6.17) and (6.18) for the probability of identifying and removing a fault 
q, for X and P, as function of the number of inspections are given by Table 6.3 to 
6.7. 
Table 6.3. Estimation result for an exponential distribution when q=0.135. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x P q P q 
13 259 0.052 0.031 0.400 0.053 0.025 0.500 
30 6 233 0.053) 0.028 0.305 0.055 0.020 0.398 
60 1215 0.052 0.044 0.363 0.052 0.040 0.374 
100 2039 0.052 0.026 0.178 0.052 0.036 0.16' 3 r 150 1 3006 rO. 051 1 0.021 1 0.129 1 0.050 0.069 0.151-1 
*True values are X=0.05 and 0=0.02. 
Table 6.3 shows that if a set of inspection data is available, the maximum likelihood 
estimates recover the underlying process of failure and fault origination parameters 
based upon equation (6.17) in the case of the large number of inspections. Also, Table t) I 
6.3 shows that if inspection data is not available, the maximum likelihood estimates do 
not recover the underlying process of failure and fault origination based upon equation 
(6.18) in spite of the large number of inspections. This is to be expected since 
information on q is contained within inspection data, and if q is small, very little 
information on q will be available from failure data. This will change as q increases. I 
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Table 6.4. Estimation result for an exponential distribution when q=0.3. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x q x q 
255 0.052 0.024 0.488 0.052 0.022 0.527 
30 61 33 0.052 0.025 0.425 0.055 0.019 0.479 
60 1197 0.052 0.035 0.484 0.052 0.037 0.482 
100 2006 0.052 0.021 0.273 0.051 0.029 0.266 
150 2949 1 0.051 0.016 0.224 0.050 0.017 0.270 
*True values are X=0.05 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.4, in case of q=0.3 ), shows that if the number of inspections is large, the 
maximum likelihood estimates recover the underlying process of failure and fault 
ori6nation based upon equations (6.17) and (6.18) regardless of a set of inspection 
data. 
Table 6.5. Estimation result for an exponential distribution when q=0.5. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x P q x P q 
13 250 0.052 0.020 0.514 0.052 0.020 0.539 
30 598 0.053 0.020 0.545 0.055 0.016 0.573 
60 1157 0.051 0.021 0.559 0.051 0.024 0.557 
100 F 1946 0.052 0.016 0.431 0.051 0.019 0.496 150 2855 0.051 0.015 0.488 0.050 0.023 0.495 
* True values are X=0.05 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.6. Estimation result for an exponential distribution when q=0.7. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x P q x Eý- q 
13 247 0*052 0.020 0.607 0.052 0.020 0.603 
30 589 0.053 0.020 0.681 0.055 0.017 0.690 
60 11333 0.052 0.020 0.691 0.051 0.022 0.691 
100 1897 0.052 0.017 0.675 0.051 0.019 
- 
0.677 + 
150 278-33 rO. 051 0.016 0.662 0.050 0.02 0 0.672 
* True values are ?, =0.05 and P=0.02. 
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Table 6.7. Estimation result for an exponential distribution when q=0.9. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x PIq 2, PI q 
13 2 
-3) 
8 0.052 O. Ols O. S55 0.052 MIS 0.857 
30 576 0.053 0.020 O. S34 0.055 0.016 0.836 
60 1165 0.052 0.021 0.898 0.052 0.021 0.899 
100 1844 0.052 O. Ols 0.824 0.052 0.020 0.828 
150 2 70 5 0: 051 0.018 0.830 0.0507 0.021 1 0.825 
*True values are X=0.05 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.5,6.6, and 6.7, in case of q>0.5, show that the maximum likelihood 
estimates recover the underlying process of failure and fault origination based upon 
equations (6.17) and (6.18) regardless of a set of inspection data and the number of 
inspections. 
" to 6.7, we can see that as the probability of identifying and From Table 6. ) 
removingafault q increases, the estimation of parameters based upon equations (6.17) 
and (6.18) is more accurate. If q is over 0.5, the estimation of parameters based 
upon equations (6.17) and (6.18) is accurate in spite of a low number of inspections. 
If the probability of identifying and removing a fault q is small, we need more 
information about inspections in order to estimate the parameters accurately. Referring 
to Table 6.3 and 6.4, in case of q=0.135 and q=0.3, show, if the number of 
inspections is less than 100, we carmot estimate the parameters with any confidence. 
In comparison with the case of Table 6.3 ), where the number of parameters to estimate 
is 2, if the number of parameters to estimate is 3, we need more information about 
inspections. 
In conclusion here, when the inspection parameter q is known, we can estimate the 
parameters accurately in spite of a small number of inspections. However, when the 
inspection parameter q also needs to be estimated, we need more information about 
inspections in order to obtain the accurate parameter estimations. 
Next, assuming that the delay time has a Weibull distribution. 
Fo 
F(h) =I-e", (6.20) 
where cc is the shape parameter and 0 is the scale parameter. the process is again 
simulated. Firstly, we assume that the probability of identifying and removing a fault q 
is given by the subjective method. Also, to generate a set of data using a simulation, we Z7 It) 
assume that X=0.05, (x = 1.5, and 0.02 and the probability of identifying and 
removing a fault q is fixed. We then generate a set of data using Figure 5.6. From 4ý Zý zlý : _ý 
the simulated set of data, the results of the parameter estimation process based upon the 
equations (6.17) and (6.18), various values of the probability of identifying and 
removing a fault q and the number of inspections are given by Table 6.8 to 6.12. 
Table 6.8. Estimation result for a Weibull distribution 
" 5. when the probability q is fixed as 0.13 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x I (x IP xI (x IP 
13 261 Cannot find optimal values Cannot find optimal values 
30 609 Cannot nd optimal values Cannot nd optimal values 
60 1237 0.053 6.179 0.017 0.053 6.018 0.017 
100 2064 0.053 5.880 0.017 0.053 5.912 0.017 
150 3058 0.052 5.444 0.018 1 0.052 5.661 0.017 
X is the rate of occurrence of faults and (x is the shape parameter of the Weibull 
distribution and is the scale parameter of the Weibull distribution. 
True values are X 0.05, c4 = 1.5 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.9. Estimation result for a Weibull distribution 
when the probability q is fixed as 0.33. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections I cc IP xI (x IP 
13 257 Cannot ild optimal values Cannot find optimal values 
30 596 0.052 5.542 =0.017 Cannot find optimal values 
60 1214 0.053 5.715 0.017 Cannot nd optimal values 
100 2026 0.053 4.566 0.017 0.052 5.154 0.016 
150 3007 0.052 3.028 0.019 0.052 4.531 1 0.017 
*-True values are X=0.05, ct=l. -5 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.8 and 6.9, in case of q=0.1335 and q=0.3, show that apart from the 
parameter ).. the maximum likelihood estimates do not recover the underlying process 
of failure and fault oriaination based upon equation (6.17) and (6.18) in spite of the 
lar-e number of inspections. 
Table 6.10. Estimation result for a Weibull distribution 
when the probability q is fixed as 0.5. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
- 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections cc 
ý x cc P 
13 253 0.051 57.90 0.021 0.052 52.95 0.021 
30 5S5 0.052 5.083 0.018 0.053 4.804 0.016 
60 1193) 0.053 2.475 0.018 0.054 2.277 0.014 
100 198S 09053 2.672 0.019 0.053 2.472 0.016 
150 2945 0.052 1 2.191 1 0.020 0.052 2.231 0.018 
*True values are ý. =0.05, cc=1.5 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.11. Estimation result for a Weibull distribution 
when the probability q is fixed as 0.7. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x (X P x (X I P 
13 253 0.051 25.81 0.022 0.053 34.40 0.021 
30 576 0.052 3.185 0.020 0.053 2.819 0.016 
60 1167 0.053 2.073 0.019 0.054 1.841 0.015 
100 194' 3 0.053 2.376 0.019 0.053 2.190 0.018 
150 2868 0.052 2.147 0.020 0.052 2.116 0.019 
*True values are ý. =0.05, cc=1.5 and 0=0.02. 
Table 6.10 and 6.11, in case of q=0.7 and q=0.9, show that if the number of 
in§pections is large. the maximum likelihood estimates recover the underlying of failure 
and fault origination based upon equations (6.17) and (6.18) regardless of a set of 
inspection data. 
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Table 6.12. Estimation result for a Weibull distribution 
when the probability q is fixed as 0.9. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x (X 21 Ct 
13 249 0.051 1.647 0.024 0.054 8.088 0.018 
30 564 0.052 2.357 0.019 0.054 2.154 0.016 
60 1144 0.053 1.837 0.019 0.055 1.616 0.016 
100 1904 0.053 2.110 0.020 0.054 1.903 0.018 
150 2811 0.052 , 1.924 0.020 , 
0.052 1 1.857 0.019 
*True values are X=0.05, cc=1.5 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.12 shows that if a set of inspection data is available, the maximum likelihood 
estimates recover the underlying process of failure and fault origination based upon 
equation (6.17) regardless of the number of inspections. Also, Table 6.12 shows that 
if a set of inspection data is not available, the maximum likelihood estimates recover the 
underlying process of failure and fault origination based upon equation (6.18) only in 
the case of the large number of inspections. t: 
From Table 6.8 to 6.12, we can see that as before, as the probability of identifying 
and removing a fault q increases, the estimation of parameters based upon equations 
(6.17) and (6.18) is more accurate. However, the above tables show that althoudi 
is over 0.5. we can estimate the parameters accurately in the cases where the number of 
inspections is over 60. If the probability of identifying and removing a fault q is 
small, it may be difficult to estimate the parameters accurately. In case of q=0.1 33 5 
and q=0.3, if the number of inspections is less than 150, we cannot estimate the 
parameters accurately. When the probability q is small, we may need more 
information about inspections. However, to obtain more information about inspections, 
,, ve have to increase the number of inspections. Also, it requires more times to estimate 
the parameters using the NAG library. In comparison with the case of the exponential 
distribution. the Weibull distribution case requires more information on inspections. 
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Secondly. consider the case where the probability of identifying and removing a fault 
q is not known. If the probability of identifying and removing a fault q cannot be 
estimated b%- the subjective method, we have to estimate the probability of identifying 
and removing a fault q by the objective method. After simulating a set of data, the 
estimation results based upon the equations (6.17) and (6.18), for different values of 
the probability of identifying and removing a fault q and various number of inspections 
are given by Table 6.13 to 6.17. 
Table 6.1-33. Estimation result for a Weibull distribution when q=0.135. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections X I (X IP Iq X (X IP Iq 
1 161 _ Cannot find optimal values Cannot find optimal values 
30 609 Cannot find optimal values Cannot find optimal values 
60 12 33 7 Cannot find optimal values Cannot find ptimal values 
100 2064 
. 
Cannot find optimal values 0.053 . 019 0.017 0.245 150 
'3058 
1 0.052 1 5.426 1 0.018 1 0.1 61 0.052 5.340 0.017 0.188 
X is the rate of occurrence of faults and cc is the shape parameter of the Weibull 
distribution and is the scale parameter of the Weibull distribution. 
True values are 0.05, (x = 1.5 and 0=0.02. 
Table 6.14 Estimation result for a Weibull distribution when q=0.3. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x I C4 I q x I Ct IP 
13 257 Ca ot find optimal values Cannot find optimal values 
30 596 0.052 5.547 0.017 0.300 Cannot find ptimal values 
60 1214 0.053 6.026 0.016 0.283 0.054 -2.667 0.013 0.378 
100 2026 0.053 4.420 0.018 0.305 0.054 2.649 0.016 0.3-79 
150 3007 0.052 4.598 0.017 0.260 0.052 4.699 0.016 0.293 
* True values are ?. =0.05, cc = 1.5 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.133 and 6.14, in case of q=0.135 and q=0.3, show that the maximum 
likelillood estimates do not recover the underlying process of failure and fault 
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origination based Upon equation (6.17) and (6.18) in spite of the larcre number of 
inspections. 
Table 6.15. Estimation result for a Weibull ýistribution when q=0.5. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections xI (X IPIq x (x IP 
13 253 Ca ot find optimal values Cannot find optimal values 
30 585 0.052 5.180 0.017 0.455 Cann t find optimal values 
60 1193 0.053 5.770 - 0.016 0.406 0.054 2.293 0.01-4 0.498 
100 1988 0.05' 3 2.854 0.019 0.487 2.002 0.016 0.547 
150 2945 1 0.052 2.296 0.020 0.490 0.052 2.027 0.019 0.519 
* True values are X=0.05, cc = 1.5 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.16. Estimation result for a Weibull distribution when q=0.7. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case with 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x (X IPIq x o: IP 
13 253 Cannot find ptimalvalues Cann t find optimal alues 
30 576 0.052 3.949 0.019 0.636 0.053 2.800 0.016 0.702 
60 1167 0.053 2.336 0.018 0.664 0.054 1.712 0.015 0.726 
100 1943 0.053 2.023 0.021 0.773 0.054 1.689 0.019 0.801 
150 2868 0.052 1.721 0.022 0.798 0.052 1.590 0.021 0.811 
* True values are X=0.05, (x = 1.5 and P=0.02. 
Table 6.17. Estimation result for a Weibull distribution when q=0.9. 
Number 
of 
Sample 
size 
Estimation of case Nvith 
inspection data 
Estimation of case without 
inspection data 
inspections x I (X IPIq 2, 1 (X IP 
Tq 
13 249 _ Can ot find optimalvalues Cannot find ptimal alues 
30 564 0.052 3.926 ' 0.018 0.781 0.053 2.913 0.016 0.826 
60 1144 0.053 2.475 0.018 0.808 0.054 1.922 0.015 0.847 
100 1904 0.053 2.220 0.019 0.879 0.054 1.938 0.018 0.894 
150 2811 0.052 1.924 0.020 0.900 0.052 1.827 0.019 0.906 
* True values are X=0.05, cc = 1.5 and P=0.02. 
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Table 6.15,6.16, and 6.17, in case of q=0.5. q=0.7, and q=0.9, show that if the 
number of inspections is large. the maximum likelihood estimates recover the 
underlying failure and fault origination based upon equations (6.17) and (6.18) 
regardless of a set of inspection data. 
From Table 6.13 to 6.17. we can see that as before, as the probability of 
identifying and removing a fault q increases, the estimation of parameters is more 
accurate. However, Table 6.15 shows that in the case of q=0.5, we can estimate the 
parameters reasonably well if the number of ins ections is over 150. In case of q=0.7 p 
and q=0.9, we can estimate the parameters well if the number of inspections is over 60. 
If the probability of identifying and removing a fault q is small, we need more 
information about inspections in order to estimate the parameters accurately. In the 
case where the probability of identifying and removing a fault q is very small, for Z) 11. D 
example q=0.135 and q=0.3, we cannot estimate the parameters accurately. In 
comparison with the case where the number of parameters to be estimate is 3, this case 
need more infon-nation about inspections. When q is small, it seems appropriate to 
obtain a subjective estimation of q, and then estimate the other parameters conditional 
on this estimate. It is possible, of course, that the value of q can be increased through 
engineering and manpower management means including better supervision and control. 
In conclusion, when the number of parameters to estimate is 2, we can estimate the 
parameters accurately in spite of a small number of inspections. If the number of 
parameters to estimate increases, we need more information about inspections. I'llis 
requires more time to estimate parameters using the NAG library. For example, in the 
case that the number of parameters to estimate is 3, the computing process using the 
NAG library took approximately I hour using a Pentium-PC. Also, as expected, the 
required volume of information about inspections is dependent upon the distribution of 
the delay time. When the delay time has a NVeibull distribution, if the probability of 
identifying and removing a fault q is large, the maximum likelihood estimates recover 
the underlying process of fault origination and failure based upon equations (6.17) and 
(6.18), otherwise it does not. With the actual data set, since the probability of 
identifying and removing a fault during the TPN-L estimated as q=0.135, is very small 
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and the number of TPNIs is 1 33, we are unable to use the Weibull distribution as a 
candidate distribution. 
6.5.3 Selectino, the Distribution of the Model 0 
Before fitting a model to the real data.. the functional form of the delay time 
distribution must be specified. The best choice of the distribution from a family of 
plausible distributions for h is made, using the criterion of minimum Akaike C 
Information (AIC) which is a method of evaluating the goodness of fit of a model. AIC 
is derived under the assum tion that the true distribution can be described by the given P 
model when its parameters are suitably adjusted. 
In maximum log likelihood estimation, the goodness of parameters of a specific 
model can be measured by the expected log likelihood, namely, the larger the expected C7 -- 
log likelihood, the better the parameters values. The log likelihood can be regarded as 
an estimator of the expected log likelihood. We now introduce the mean expected log 
likelihood as a measure for the goodness of fit of a model. This quantity is defined as Z. 17 
the mean, Nvith respect to the data x, of the expected log likelihood of the maximum 
likelihood model. The larger the mean expected log likelihood, the better the fit of the 
model. At first sight. it would seem that the mean expected loo, likelihood can be 
estimated by the maximum log likelihood. - The maximum log likelihood, however, is 
shown to be a biased estimator of the mean expected log likelihood (see Sakamoto et al 
[1986]). The maximum log likelihood has a general tendency to overestimate the true 
value of the mean expected log likelihood. This tendency is more prominent for 
models with a larger number of free parameters. This means that if we choose the 
model with the largest maximum log likelihood, a model with an unnecessarily large 
number of free parameters is likely to be chosen. 
By a close examination of the relationship between the bias and the number of free 
parameters of a model, Nve will find that 
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(maximum log likelihood of a model) - (number of free parameters of the model) 
is an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the mean expected loo, likelihood (see 
Sakarnoto et al [1986]). Taking historical reasons into account, this is presented as 
minus twice of this value 
AIC = -2x(maximum log likelihood of the model) 
+2x(number of free parameters of the model) (6.21) 
is proposed as the criterion for model selection in Sakamoto et al [1986]. A model 
which minimises the AIC (minimum AIC estimate) is considered to be the most 
appropriate model. Equation (6.2 1) implies that when there are several models whose 
values of maximum likelihood are about the same level, we should choose the one with 
the smallest number of free parameters. 
6.5.4 Results of the Model Fit 
We now consider the Preformer data. Since the probability of identifying and 
removin- .. a 
fault during the TPM is very small, possible candidates for F(h) are (1) 
exponential and (2) mixed delta-exponential distribution. There may be some faults 
that have zero delay time, which can be modelled with a mixed delay time distribution 
with pdf given by (I - P)f (h) + A5(h) , where 
J(h) is the pdf of delay time h, 5(h) 
is the Dirac delta function, and P is the proportion of faults that have zero delay time. 
Assuming the above choice of delay time distribution, the fitted values of parameters 
are shown in Table 6.18. From Table 6.1 S, it can be seen that there is not much 
difference in AIC values between model choice of delay time distribution. This means 
that the delay time models are not very sensitive to the data. Mixed delta-exponential 
distribution is selected as having the lowest AIC value. 
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Table 6.1 S. Fitted values of parameters from the Preformer data. 
Models Exponential distribution Mixed delta-exponential distribution 
ROCOD (A) 0.117 0.167 
Scale parameter 0.00047 0.000226 
p 0.0533 
Maximum log likelihood -1220.92 -1213.09 
AIC 2445.84 2432.18 
*Notes : ROCOD is the rate of occurrence of faults. 
6.5.5 Test for Goodness of Fit 
The chi-squared test statistic is 
(ni 
(6.22) 
where the range of data is divided into K suitable classes, n, is the number of the 1ý 
events in the ith class, and hi is the expected number of events in the ith class 
calculated from the fitted model. 
If we group the failure times in our data into classes, then there Nvill, however, be two 
difficulties in the calculation of the expected failures in each class: (a) each failure 
epoch may have a different number of previous TPMs, and (b) the data set show that 
TPM intervals are not equally spaced. To overcome these two difficulties, let At 
denote the length of the class interval of the histogram of failure times and let 
ENf(T,,..., Ti-,, I, ') denote the expected number of failures over the interval 
(T-1 + (j - I)At, Ti-I + jAt), 
cyiveiltliattlieprex! iotisTPMliistoi-yis Tlien, wehave 
(6.23) 
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EiV (T,,..., Ti f 
-,, 
I') =Ac,, (F(x - T, -, 
) - F(x - T,, ))dv i, 
-,, (_ 
i)At 
n=1 
ZF (x - Ti-1)d-c, (6.24) 
where, as before, X, is the instantaneous rate of occurrence of defects (ROCOD) and C,, 
is the probability that a fault arising in (T,, Y delay time will -1, 
T 
,, 
) with sufficientIN Ion 
not be identified before the interval (Ti-I , Tj ). 
Given that the expected number of failures over 
I'. 
within (T, -,, 
T, ) isavailable, 
the next task is to group the expected number of failures over I,, (n = 1, ..., 0, where 
I is the number of TPMs, in different TPM intervals together. To do this, we introduce 1: 1 
a step function (0) to give effect to the mechanism of different TPM intervals. It 
follows that the expected number of failures over 
I uin 
(6.25) 
n=l 
is 2iven by In 
I 
EN. ý (Ij) 
Z ENf (T,,..., T,, 
-,, 
lj')O,, 
-,, J, 
(6.26) 
n=l 
where 
1 if T-, + jAt: 5 T', ' 
1 -I, j ' 
10 
otlienvise. 
(6.27) 
If N. 
I. (1j) 
denotes the observed number of failures in the jth class. using the equation 
(6.22). the chi-sqUared test statistic in our case is simply 
ISO 
(N, (I EN. (1; 
ENf (I. ) 
and the number of degrees of freedom is I+K-v, with v, namely the number of 
model parameters. 
Using the equation (6.2S) on the Preformer data with the model parameters of Table 
6.18, the model predictions and actual data for the number of failures of the Preformer 
are shown in Figure 6.6. zn 
so 
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Figure 6.6. Histogram of failures for Preformer. 
Figure 6.6 shows that the model fit seems to be adequate. To check the validity of this 
point, we can compare the chi-squared test statistics with the critical value of the chi- 
squared distribution table. Since the number of degrees of freedom is 
df= 1 -i- K -v = 20ý 
the critical value of the chi-squared distribution is given by 
3 1.4 
(6.29) 
(6.30) 
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with the significance level of cc = 0.05. Since the chi-squared test statistics is given by 
X2 =26.072) , we can conclude that the model fit is acceptable at the significance level 
of ct = 0.05. 
6.6 Downtime 
-Model 
6.6.1 Delay Time Model 
Given an acceptable model for the failure and TPM process of the Preformer, a 
TPM model of maintenance practice of the machine may now be established. We 
model downtime, since the major concern of the company is to reduce the downtime 
caused by failures and TPM activities. The conventional downtime measure is the 
expected downtime per unit time over a long future period. The key issue in the model 
is the expected number of failures over different TPM cycles. 
Since we have a5sumed that faults arise according to an HPP, the expected number of 
failures over (t, t+-V) can be given by 
EYf (t, t+ AT) P(t, t+ AtljVj, - 
7. 
=AIC, (F(t + At - y) - F(t - y))dy 
(F(t + At - y) - F(t - y))ctv +Af F(t + At - y)4v, (6-3 1) 
where, as before, P(t, t -; - Atlj, ) is the probability of a failure in (t, t+At) from a fault 
arising at time Y ill (T,, -, , 
T,, ) (see Figure 6.5 and equation (6.8)) and 
EN, -(t, t+At) denotes the expected number of failures over (t, t+At). Changing the 
integral variable and rearranaina the integral sequence. after some manipulation we have 1 -1 1-7 
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,v 1-1 E. Vjtj +At)= A C, (F(x - T,, -, 
) - F(x - T,, ))d. v +A I F(x - T, -I)dv. 
(6.332) 
n=l 
Also. since the delay time follows a mixed delta-exponential distribution, the expected 
number of failures over a TPM cycle when in a steady state under various TPM cycles 
T can be obtained by setting t= Ti-I )t+ At = Ti-I +T= Ti, and letting i->00 in the 
equation (6.32), and summing the resultant geometric series of equation (6.32) with 
respect to n. This gives 
ENf (7) = [);, (e-flT-2+eflT) 
I-q 
](I - P) + A(T +I (e-IT- 1)(I - P)), (6.33-33) 
, 6(elý'r -1+ q) 18 
where T is the TPM cycle length and ENf (7) denotes the expected number of 
failures over T. In equation (6.33), for q=1, EjVf (7) is corresponding to the 
inspection model with a perfect inspection policy and is given by I 
ENf (T) = A(T+ 
I 
(e-IT- 1)(I - P)). P 
(6.34) 
Equation (6.34) can be obtained by letting q=1, t= Ti-I , and t+ At = T, -, +T= 
Tj 
in the equation (6.32) as expected. 
Since d, denotes the mean downtime per failure when the TPM cycle leng-th is T 
and di denotes the mean duration of the TPM activity, it follows that the long term t; 
measure of the expected downtime per unit time, ED(T), is 
ED(7ý = 
d6 ENf (7ý + d, 
T 
(6.35) 
Since d, = 0.914, using the fitted model parameters of Table 6.18, we can obtain the 
resultin2 model output shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7. Expected downtime per unit operating time and TPM cycle length. : -7 
From Figure 6.7. it can be seen that, under the current TPM policy, d, = 1.73, the 
model suggests that the optimal TPM cycle length is 100 hours and the expected I- 
downtime per hour is 0.045 hours. Since the production times per week are about 
120 hours, the optimal TPM interval is about 0.83 weeks, but the practical solution 
with virtually no extra downtime is once a week, and the expected downtime per week 
is 5.4 hours. Since the company has performed the TPM every 3 weeks, Figure 6.7 
shows that the expected downtime per week is 7.8 hours. Accordingly, if the company 
takes the TPM once per week instead of every 3 weeks, the company can reduce the 
expected downtime of 2.4 hours per week. Also, if the downtime due to TPM is 
changed to I or 3) hours, the mathematical optimal TPM interval becomes 0.62 or 
1.2 weeks respectively. 
Questions (a) and (b) of the subjective data survey indicated that the number of 
defects identified at a TPIVI is about 45 and the number of defects rectified durinc, a 
TPM is about 30 given that 100 defects are present, which as commented, seemed 
very low. If the number of defects identified at a TPM increased to 60 and the number 
of defects rectified during TPM increase to 60 and 80 tinder the current TPM policy, 
d, = 1.73 ), the probability of identifying and removing a fault during a TPNI is q=0.36 
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and q=0.48 respectively. A graph indicating the consequences to the downtime 
model of this change is presented by Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8. Expected downtime per unit time according to TPM cycle length 
from the delay time model when the probability q changes. 
FiGure 6.8 produces Table 6.19. 
Table 6.19. The optimal TPM interval and the expected downtime per week 
from the delay time model when the probability q changes. 
Probability Optimal TPIVI interval Expected downtime (hours) 
q in hour in week per hour per week 
0.135 100 0.83 0.045 5.40 
0.3 6 165 1.38 0.0-30 3.48 
r- 0.48 1 195 1.63 1 0.026 3.12 
* The current policy is q=0.135. 
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From Table 6.19. we can see that as the probability q increases, the optimal TPM 
interval increases and the expected downtime per hour reduces. This is as expected 
since with q increasing, more defects and therefore potential failure, and being 
removed from the svstem. It is noted that the modelling here gives the management 
quantitative insight into the value of improved training and tooling to increase the q 
measure. 
6.6.2 Serni-Markov Inspection Model 
In the chapter 5, the semi-Markov inspection model has been discussed. As a 
consequence of the discussion, we found that the semi-Markov inspection model 
utilising the delay time concept for parameter estimation can be applied for a multi- 
component system. However, in applying the semi-markov inspection model to a 
multi-component system of the real-world situation, the key point is that the fault 
arriving process must follow a HPP which satisfy the Lemma 5.1 to 5.6. Also, in the 
case of imperfect inspection, as discussed in the subsection 5.3.2, we can approach the 
modelling by assuming that the system failure process is in a steady state between 
inspections and that the defect detecting process at inspection has operated for a long Zý ID 
period. Since Nve assume that the fault arriving process follows a HPP by the 
assumption (a) of the section 6.4. and our interest is in the reduction of the downtime 
due to failures and the TPMs over the long term future, we may adopt the semi-Markov 
inspection model of the subsection 5.3.2 in this case study. 
Since the delay time has a mixed delta-exponential distribution, using the equation 
(5.56), the number of defects identified at time x if there is an inspection at time x, 
namely ENd WI is given by 
-ß(x-T) 
EA', ' (x) 
zq (- (1 + 
qe 
eý" 
(6.36) 
and, using the equation (5.57), the rate ftinction of the failure arrival process, namely 
p(x), is given by Z7 
IS6 
(I - P)qe 
-i3(x-T) 
P(X) = 4(l - I-q-e 'OT 
(6.37) 
Based upon the equations (6.36) and (6.37), we can apply the serni-Markov inspection 
model of the section 5.3 to the Preformer system. 
In section -5.33. the state space was given by 
I= {iji = 0.1,2, .. "N} u {(0, mAt), (, nAt, J)Iin = 1,2, """, M}, 
where state i corresponds to the situation in which an inspection identifies i defects 
within the system. the states (0, inAt) corresponds to the situation in which wAt time 
units have passed since the last inspection, and the states (nzAt, j) correspond to the 
situation in which a breakdown has occurred between (nz-I)At and nlAt. Also, At is 
an arbitrary small time, N is the number of components of the system. and "VI is a 
sufficiently large integer. For numerical solution, we set the upper bound of the 
number of defects is N= 30, the arbitrary small time is At = 4, and the sufficiently 
large integer is . 11 = 125 in this subsection. The possible actions a were denoted by 
0, leave the system as it is, 
a=1, inspect the system, 
I repair the component. 
Based upon the above state space and possible action, the downtime model was given by 
cr - (R)At + PO(0, &) +P _v. f) 
(O)iv 1110 2-- -- (6.38) 
for k=1,2,. --, N, (6.39) 0 
-_cj(R)At + 
for 0< nzAt < s, (6.40) 
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"": di -9d(R)dj + P(O.. A, )O(I)lvo +P(O.. &)I(I)Ivl+.. -+P(O. "-.,. ý. 
(I)iv, v 
for s:! ý mAt :! ý VlAt, (6.41) 
and 
db 
-gd(R)db+ P. d, (2)iv A 
for in = 1,2, ---, M, (6.42) 
where MR) is the average downtime per unit time given policy R with parameter tn 
value s, w., xc: I, are the relative downtimes resulting from the various starting states 
when policy R with parameter value s is used, and Pij (a) is the probability that at 
the next decision epoch the system will be in state j if actions a is chosen in the 
present state i. 
Using equations (6.36) and (6.37), we can obtain the one-step transition 
probabilities Pij (a). Firstly, if the action a=0 is taken at state 0, the system will 
either survive until the next decision epoch At or fail within the next decision epoch 
At. In equation (6.38), for very small At, the one-step transition probabilities 
Poj(O), for j= (0, At), (At, f), are given by (see equation (5.3)) 
rV 
p(x)d-c for j= (At, f) 
Poj (0) =I- 
rp(x)d-c for j= (0, At) (6.43) 
0 othenvise . 
In equation (63 )9), since the action a=2 is taken at state k, k=1.21. ..., N, we have 
that (see equation (5.7)) 
Pco(2) =I for k=1,2, ..., N. (6.44) 
Iss 
In equation (6.40), since the action a=0 is taken at state (0, inAt) with in = 1,2, ..., 
AM, the system will either survive until the next decision epoch (111+1)At or fail within 
the next decision epoch (in+I)At having survived to the present decision epoch nzAt. 
Accordingly, for very small At, the one-step transition probabilities fo r C, 
PýO. 
mAf)j 
j= (Ojin + l)At), ((nz + I)At, f) , are given by (see equation (5.11)) 
P(X)dv for j= «111 + 1)At, f) 
P(0, 
MAI)j 
(0) =1-: 
Igt 
p (x) d-c . 
for j= (0, (in + 1)At) (6.45) 
0 othenvise 
In equation (6.4 1), if action a=1 is taken at state (0, mAt) with nz= 1,2, ..., M, the 
inspection will result in a situation of finding j, j=0,1,2, ..., N, faults at an 
inspection. Since the number of defects identified at an inspection has a Poisson 
distribution by the Lemma 5.3, we have that (see equation (5.15)) 
- F-%',, (ni-%t) 
(EN,, (nzAt)) i 
for j=0,1,2, ---, N Pto. 
M-V)j(1) =, j! 
(6.46) 
0 othenvise 
Lastly, in equation (6.42), since the action a=2 is taken at state (mAt, j), m=1,2, 
..., M, we have that (see equation (5.19)) 
p d, (2) =I for in = 1,2, (1?: At, f XO, (M--)At) At 
(6.47) 
Usinc, the embedded technique, we can obtain the expected average downtime per 
unit time 9d(R) from equations (6.338) to (6.42). By putting one of the relative 
downtimes equal to zero, say it-,, = 0, the linear equation can deterrnine uniquely the 
average downtime per unit time 
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UsinQ the fitted model parameters of the Table 6.18 and the above mentioned 
downtime model, the resulting model output of downtime as a ftinction of TPM period tý 
is shown in Figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.9. Expected downtime per unit time according to TPNI cycle length 
from the serni-Markov inspection model with step size At = 4. 
From Figure 6.9, it can be seen that. under the current TPM policy, d, = 1.73, the 
model suggests that the optimal TPM cycle length is 100 hours and the expected 
downtime per hour is 0.04-3) hours. Since the production times per week are about 
120 hours. the optimal TPM interval is about 0.83 weeks and the expected downtime 
per week is 5.16 hours. Since the company has performed the TPM every 3 weeks, 
Figure 6.8 shows that the expected downtime per week is 7.32 hours. Accordingly, if 
the company takes the TPM once per week instead of every 3 weeks. the company can 
reduce the expected downtime of 2.16 hours per week. Also, if the downtime due to 
TPNI is about I and 3 hours, the optimal TPM interval should be 0.63 and 1.2 
weeks respectively. These results of the semi-Markov inspection model are as 
expected, very similar to the results of the delay time model. 
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Also, as with the delay time model. if the number of defects identified at TPM 
increase to 60 and the number of defects rectified during TPM increase to 60 and 80 
under the current TPM policy, d, = 1.73, the probability of identifying and removing a 
fault during a TPM is q=0.36 and q=0.48 respectively. A graph for this change is 
presented by Figure 6.10. 
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Figure 6.10. Expected downtime per unit time according to TPM cycle length 
from the semi-Markov model when the probability q changes. 
FiCrure 6.10 produces Table 6.20. 
Table 6.20. The optimal TPM interval and the expected downtime per week 
from the semi-Markov model when the probability q changes. 
Probability Optimal TPM inten-al Expected downtime (hours) 
q in hour in week per hour per week 
0.135 100 0.83 0.043 5.16 
0.36 164 1.3 7 0.029 3.48 
0.48 196 1.63 0.026 3.12 
* The current policy is q=0.135. 
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From Table 6.20. we can see that as the probability q increases. the optimal TPM 
interval increases and the expected downtime per hour reduces. This is as expected 
since with q increasing, more defects and therefore potential failure, and being 
removed from the system. These results of the semi-Markov inspection model are very 
similar to the results of the delay time model. 
6.7 Comparison and Conclusions 
To compare the semi-Markov inspection model with the delay time model in 
detail, we can take the curve of the current TPM policyý di = 1.73, from Figure 6.7 of 
the delay time model and the curve of the current TPM policy, di = 1.733, from Figure 
6.9 of the semi-. Nlarkov inspection model respectively. From both models, Figure 
6.11 is presented. 
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Figure 6.11. Expected downtime per unit time according to TPNI cycle length 
for the comparison. 
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Figure 6.11 shows that the semi-Markov inspection model curve is consistent with the 
delay time model curve. From both these models, an optimal TPM period point which 
minimises the expected downtime per unit time can be obtained. 
From the perspective of the output from both models, we can now address the two 
questions outlined in the introduction, namely (1) whether TPM can identify most faults 
present and thereby reduce the number of failures caused by those faults, and (2) 
whether the current TPM period is the right choice, particularly the current three-week 
TPM cycle. Clearly. as shown in Fi ure 6.3), TPM is effective for the Preformer 9 
because it can reduce the total downtime due to failures. However, since the downtime 
caused by TPM of the Preformer is currently about 1.73 hours, for the current TPM 
policy, the optimal TPM cycle length is about weekly. Should the downtime due to 
TPM of the Preformer increases to 3 hours, the optimal TPM cycle length is still less 
than 2 weeks. This indicates that the current TPM policy for the Preformer, which is 
about three weeks, is not appropriate. Accordingly, we suggest that if it is possible, the 
company need to reduce the TPM cycle length of the Preformer to weekly. If the 
company undertakes TPM of the Preformer about weekly, the company can reduce the 
expected downtime by 2.4 hours per week, from 7.8 hours per week to 5.4 hours per 
week according to the delay time model and 2.16 hours per week from 7.32 hours per 
week to 5.16 hours per week based upon the semi-Markov inspection model. 
Also, if the probability of identifying and removing a fault during TPM q increases 
by improving the engineering ability in identifý, ing and rectifying faults durin TPM, 1ý 9 
perhaps through training, the expected downtime can furthermore be reduced. As 
shown in Table 6.19 and 6.20, if the probability of identifying and removing a fault 
during TPM q increases from 0.135 to 0.336. the company can reduce the expected 
downtime of 4.3 32 hours per week from 7.8 hours per week to 3.48 hours per week in 
the delay time model and 3.84 hours per week from 7.32 hours per week to 3.48 
hours in the semi-Markov inspection model respectively for current TPM policy of 
every 3 weeks. Also, if the probability of identifying and removing a fault during 
TPM q increases from 0.135 to 0.48, the company can reduce the expected 
downtime by 4.6S hours per week, from 7.8 to 3.12 hours per week based upon the 
delay time model and by an expected 4.2 hours per week, from 7.32 to 3.12 hours 
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per week according to the semi-Markov inspection model, all assuming the current TPM 
policy of having every 3 weeks. 
In this case study, we propose an OR and statistical approach to model TPM practice 
for a Preformer in Brakelining Ltd. Modelling is based upon the delay time concept. 
A statistical model based upon failure and TPM data has been established to give the 
estimated values for model parameters, and a TPM model has been derived to find the 
optimal TPM cycle length in terms of minimising the total expected downtime caused 
by failures and TPMs from the delay time model and the semi-Markov inspection 
model. It has proved to be successful in that it recovered the underlying delay time 
distribution using conventional maximum likelihood method, and the consequential 
downtime model reflected the current and previous operating downtime level 
adequately. 
The problems encountered in practical modelling, in establishing the estimation 
procedure for parameters and in validating the modelling, have been highlighted. The 
recommendations to the company were based upon the modelling reported here. There 
is an attempt being made to move to weekly TPM's and to monitor results. Other 
recommendations arise from the discovery of data that were not available, namely TPM 
data on condition found and faults rectified. The need to collect such information if the 
maintenance process is to be managed cost effectively has been outlined, and how the 
data will or may be used indicated. As in other applied studies, this modelling exercise 
will, we hope, initiate a cultural change in the maintenance management process within 
the company and see a move to greater qualification and, therefore, control. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we have considered the inspection policy of facilities which gradually Z: ' 
deteriorate in time and eventually fail. The inspection policy is some activity carried 
out at intervals, with the intention of reducina or eliminatino, the number of failures 0 11: 1 
occurring, or of reducing the consequences of failure in terms of downtime or operating 
cost. It has been seen in the literature review of the chapter 2 that there are a great 
many models addressing the problem of finding the optimal inspection policy. Some 
authors developed the two-state models in which the working condition of the system 
was expressed as one of two states, operating or failed, based upon the time to failure. 
Since the two-state models may not allow for an inspection, which leads to repair before 
a possible failure of the system. most of the ublished theoretical models for finding the p ID 
optima I inspection policy adopt a multi-state Markov approach where the states are 
operating, operating but fault present, and failed. Generally speaking, most such 
models have assumed that the working condition of the system can be expressed as a 
discrete-time Markov chain with a new state, degraded states, and a failed state, and the 
transition probabilities are assumed to be given. In practice, it is, however, difficult to 
define the decyraded states for the deteriorated system, and more difficult to determine 
the state transition probabilities. So, most authors do not mention the fit of their model 
to data, and present no examples of actual applications or case studies utilising their 
model. 
In contrast to the Markov models, the delay time concept has, however, provided a 
useful means of modelling the effect of periodic inspections on the failure rate of 
repairable machinery. The delay time concept regards the failure process as basically a 
two-stage process, but three if one includes failure. First, a defect can be first identified Zý 
at time u if an inspection is carried out at that time. If the defect is not identified, the 
faulty component subsequently fails after ftirther interval h which is called the delay 
I t) i 
time of the defect. As seen in chapter 3 3, the delay time concept has been increasingly 
used in inspection modelling. Also, it has been noted that the introduction of the delay 
time concept in inspection modelling has provided a powerful tool in modelling and 
validating the relationship between inspection actions and the consequences of these 
actions. Obviously, the successful use of the delay time concept in maintenance 
modelling depends upon how well the underlying delay time distribution can be 
estimated from available information sources. Two methods for estimating the 
parameters of the delay time modelling. namely the subjective method and the objective 
method, have been presented. With such a method, numerous applied studies of the 
delay time concept have been developed since the first was published in 1984. Since 
delay time models can be used for decision-making, for example choosing the interval 
between inspections to minimise cost or downtime, it may be natural to rely on the delay 
time modellinEz in adapting the maintenance models to real-world situation. 
To overcome the restrictions of the Markov models, we have used the delay time 
concept in the chapter 4 and 5. By defining the degraded states of the Markov chain 
as the number of defects within the context of the delay time concept, we can readily 
define the working condition of the system as a Markov chain. Also, by using the 
parameters of the delay time model which can be estimated by the subjective method or 
the objective method, the state transition probabilities of the Markov model can be 
calculated. Under these conditions, a typical semi-Markov inspection model based 
upon the delay time concept for a component and for a complex repairable system that 
may fail during the course of its service lifetime has been established. 
Firstly, for a single component system, we have shown that the semi-Markov 
inspection model is consistent with the delay time model in the system with a Markov 
property of the initial point u. In real-world situation, however, it is expected that there 
are relatively few cases satisfying the Markov property and inadequate data fit the 
model. Although data may be available in application studies, it may be difficult to 
confirm the Nlarkov property and to determine the state transition probabilities from 
them. Either way. if the system has a Markov property, by utilising the deterioration 
probability r, ' which, as we have sho,, vii, can be estimated based upon the delay time 
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concept, the state transition probabilities can be calculated. Relying on the delay time 
concept. the semi-Markov inspection model can now be used for the first time in 
practice for the single component system. If the initial point u does not satisfý, the 
Markov property. the semi-Markov inspection model can become a very poor 
approximation to the actual inspection process. In contrast to the semi-Markov 
inspection model.. the delay time model can not only give the optimal inspection period 
point, but also the delay tirrie model is consistent with the simulation procedure. We 
can, therefore, see that the delay time model can be fitted to any system regardless of a 
Markov property. 
As well as the semi-Markov inspection model for a single component system, the 
semi-Markov inspection model for a multi-component system can be applied to the 
system regardless of the Markov property of the delay time h. We need to note that 
these models rely on the delay time concept in order to determine parameters. The 
delay time concept provides a means of not only denoting the working condition of the CI 
system as the degraded states of the semi-i'vlarkov inspection model, but also of 
obtaininc, the state transition probability from data of the real-world situation throu ZI 
estimating the fault arrival rate and the parameters of the delay time distribution. The 
semi-Markov inspection model based upon the delay time concept is, perhaps for the 
first time, available to useftilly apply to real-world situations. Here we can see the 
importance of the delay time concept. In practice, having delay time parameters, a 
delay time would, of course, usually be preferred to a semi-Markov model. 
When we establish the semi-Markov inspection model for a multi-component 
system, we have to note Lemmas 5.1 to 5.6 which are based upon the delay time 
concept. Then, after some complicated manipulation, we can formulate the semi- 
Markov inspection model of the section 5.3 which is fitted to the inulti-component 
system with a perfect inspection policy or an imperfect inspection policy. Since the 
equations of the senii-Markov inspection model are complicated, it takes a relatively 
long time to compute the equations of the senii-Markov inspection model. Also, in 
applying the semi-i%, Iarkov inspection model to the real-world situation. the key point is 
that the fault arrival process follows a HPP which satisfy the Lemmas 5.1 to 5.6. If 
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the fault arrival process follows a NHPP, we carmot apply the serni-Markov inspection 
model to the real-world situation because Lemma 5.1 to 5.6 are not satisfied. 
In applying to a real-world situation. the delay time model is consistent with the 
semi-Markov inspection model as discussed in the chapter 5. However, in contrast to 
the semi-Markov inspection model, the delay time model consists of the simpler 
equations. Thereby, it does not require a long computing time compared to the semi- tD 
Markov inspection model for computing the equations of the delay time model. Also, 
the delay time model provides a means of modelling the behaviour of the system and 
predicting such useful quantities as reliability, cost or downtime under various 
inspection policies. If the fault arrival rate regardless of a HPP or a NHPP and the 
parameters of the pdf of the delay time h, J(h), regardless of any distributions, are 
estimated from the data of the real-world situation using the subjective or objective 
estimation method, we can easily establish the delay time model which can find the 
optimal inspection policies minimising the expected total cost per unit time or the 
expected total downtime per unit time. As confirmed in the numerical example of the 
chapter 5, it was shown that the simulation model and semi-Markov model are nearly 
consistent with the delay time model. This means that the delay time model and semi- 
Markov model can both apply practically to the multi-component system. 
Also, it was seen in the case study of the chapter 6 that the serni-Markov inspection 
model is consistent with the delay time model. From both the models, an optimal TPM 
period which minimises the expected downtime per unit time were obtained which were 
consistent. This is the first known case of a Markov inspection model being built for an Zý 
actual application. In this case study, we proposed an OR and statistical approach to 
model TPM practice on the Preformer machine operated within Brakelining Ltd, and I 
based upon the delay time concept. A statistical model based upon failure and TPM 
data can be established to give the estimated values for model Parameters, and a TPM 
model can be derived to find the optimal TPM cycle length in terms of minimising the 
total expected downtime caused by failures and TPMs from the delay time model and 
the semi-Markov inspection model. It has proved to be successful in that it recovered 
the underlying delay time distribution using conventional maximum likelihood method, 
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and the consequential downtime model reflected the current and previous operating 
downtime level adequately. 
In conclusion. since not only is the delay time model free from the requirement of a 
HPP fault arrival process, but it also requires much less time than the semi-Markov 
inspection model for computing the equations, the delay time model is considered to be 
more general and practicable than the semi-Mark-ov inspection model in applying to 
real-world situations. Furthermore, the delay time concept has an evident contribution 
in rending semi-Markov inspection models more applicable. When establishing a 
Markov model for a component inspection problem or a complex system, it is clearly 
very important to establish the validity of the Markov assumption and appropriate 
measures of the parameters. 
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